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ABSTRACT 
EVERYDAY CRITICALITY:   
QUESTIONING, EXPERTISE, AND THE EMBODIMENT OF CRITICAL 
JUDGMENT 
by Daniel Fisherman 
The development of critical disposition, and particularly the disposition to 
question assertions, has long been viewed as an essential goal of education.  Its 
importance is expressed not only in numerous normative educational visions, but by 
contemporary policy documents, studies of teacher attitudes, and even popular 
educational literature.  Indeed, the movement to educate for higher-order, critical thinking 
that has developed over the past four decades views questioning as perhaps the central 
activity of skilled cognition.  As such, the disposition to question assertions – or what I 
have come to call “criticality” - transcends both the classroom and any specific academic 
or vocational discipline.  It is essential to all good thinking, whether such thinking 
concerns scientific research, workplace decision making, or the navigation of everyday 
life. 
While there has been little conceptual analysis of criticality per se, there exists a 
substantial and relevant literature concerning the nature of critical disposition.  In this 
dissertation, I analyze the two dominant conceptions in the literature as they relate to 
criticality, evaluating them with regard to both our held critical ideal of appropriate 
questioning, as well as a paradox that arises from the nature of the critical act itself – 
what I call the paradox of criticality.  I argue that both conceptions fail to justify our 
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critical ideal and offer little insight into how we can end the iterative questioning of 
critical behavior without paradoxically engaging in an “acritical” act.  I propose that any 
understanding of criticality capable of supporting a commitment to appropriate 
questioning must view critical behavior as a form of judgment. 
With this in mind, I incorporate Hubert Dreyfus’ theory of expertise into a 
phenomenological analysis of critical recognition to develop a conception of criticality 
that views such recognition as an act of judgment that itself relies on the embodiment of 
previous judgment.  I then turn to the literature on neurocognition and consciousness for 
empirical backing of this conception, arguing that both dual cognition and global 
workspace theory provide substantial justification for a commitment to it.  I conclude 
with a discussion of the educational ramifications of the expertise conception and the role 
that didactic philosophy might play in an education for criticality. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The development of critical disposition, and particularly the disposition to 
question assertions, has long been viewed as an essential goal of education.  It’s 
importance is expressed not only in numerous normative educational visions (for 
example Adorno, 1998; Dewey, 1910; Freire, 1996; Scheffler, 1995; Lipman, 2003) , but 
by contemporary policy documents (Common Core State Standards Initiative, 2010; 
National Research Council, 1996), studies of teacher attitudes (Eshach, Dor-Ziderman, & 
Yefroimsky, 2014), and even popular educational literature (for example, Berger, 2014; 
Wagner, 2012).  Indeed, the movement to educate for higher-order, critical thinking that 
has developed over the past four decades views questioning as perhaps the central 
activity of skilled cognition (see Costa & Garmston, 2001; Facione, 1990).  As such, the 
disposition to question assertions – or what I have come to call “criticality” - transcends 
both the classroom and any specific academic or vocational discipline.  It is essential to 
all good thinking, whether such thinking concerns scientific research, workplace decision 
making, or the navigation of everyday life. 
Given the pedagogical primacy of criticality, one would expect teachers to create 
an educational environment that nurtures questioning, particularly questioning that 
expresses a curiosity about the world and a healthy skepticism toward assumed belief.  
Yet studies have consistently indicated a disproportionate classroom emphasis on 
procedural questions and questions of lower-order recall (Eshach, Dor-Ziderman, & 
Yefroimsky, 2014; Gall, M., 1970; Gall, 1984; Wertsch & Smolka, 1993; Chin, 2004).  
Such questioning would seem to be at odds with the development of criticality, 
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encouraging students to view questions merely as a means of publicly expressing already 
known answers rather than to define an unknown worthy of inquiry.  Wertsch and 
Smolka (1993) describe the established social interaction surrounding classroom 
questioning in almost behavioristic terms, where an inquiry request initiated by the 
teacher is met with a student response that is followed by teacher evaluation - a 
pedagogical approach they aptly term “I-R-E.”  As the dominant means of engaging the 
activity of questioning, such a technique would seem to present a serious challenge to 
fulfilling normative pedagogical ends. 
In this work, I seek to address this disconnect between the goal of criticality and 
the actuality of critical questioning in the classroom.  And I do so from both philosophic 
and scientific perspectives, emphasizing their potential commonality and mutual 
epistemic support.  How such a disconnect could exist is certainly a matter for extended 
debate, but as I suggest below, the way we understand the causes and purpose of critical 
questioning encourages just such a situation.  For in believing that we generally search 
for questions to ask, we mistakenly put the onus for criticality on willful motivation.  
That is, we end up believing that we can be curious, inquisitive, and appropriately 
skeptical if we are only willfully motivated to behave that way.  Such belief strikes me as 
speciously simplistic and suggests an uncoupling between the questions we encourage in 
the classroom and how individuals behave outside of it.  As I hope to make clear, to the 
degree that willful motivation is at all justifiable, it is not so much that we need to be 
willfully motivated in the present so that we may find questions to ask, but rather that we 
need to have been willfully motivated in the past to both create the cognitive space and 
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develop the critical judgment that encourages the “right” questions to find us in the 
moment.  Such a temporal accounting defines a more reasonable role for education when 
it comes to nurturing criticality, for rather than simply abdicating critical disposition to 
personal will, it acknowledges the formative power of classroom questioning. 
1.1. The issue of criticality 
While criticality has long been part of the normative educational landscape 
(Nussbaum, 2010), its conceptual articulation has been subsumed under broader didactic 
aims, particularly those defined by the critical thinking and critical pedagogy movements      
(Facione, 1990; Burbules & Berk, 1999; Giroux, 1994).  As such, there has been little 
sustained discourse devoted to a detailed conceptualization of criticality as I have defined 
it.  The Delphi commission report on critical thinking (Facione, 1990), for example, 
speaks of recognizing and challenging assumptions as only one element of an idealized 
critical process.  And while critical pedagogy literature emphasizes the need to question 
assertions, it specifically emphasizes the questioning of socio-political assertions, 
questioning that seeks to bring awareness to the social power relations that constrain 
individual action and opportunities (McLaren & Hammer, 1989; Freire, 1996).  As a 
broadly applicable disposition with its own integrity, criticality is thus both in and not in 
the literature – very much part of the normative conception of education, but lacking its 
own detailed conceptual articulation. 
I would suggest that this lack of articulation is, at least in part, a result of the 
diverse usage and meaning of the word “critical” in educational and academic contexts.  
Ostensibly, the term serves to qualify educationally relevant concepts – critical thinking, 
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critical pedagogy, and even critical being (Dunne, 2015) – suggesting that each has a 
relation to some common and unified understanding of the term, as is the case with “blue 
table,” “blue hair,” and “blue sky.”  But as part of a well-established phrase labeling a 
pedagogical aim, a cognitive approach, or even an educational movement, the connection 
to a common meaning is compromised or even lost.  Indeed, the term no longer serves its 
role as an adjective, but gets incorporated as part of the noun phrase, allowing for a 
divergence of meaning over time.  That such divergence has occurred is evidenced by the 
odd and unfortunate view that the critical thinking and critical pedagogy movements are 
now often viewed as mutually antagonistic (Burbules & Berk, 1999). “Criticality,” as the 
disposition to question assertions, is an attempt to recover that essential and lost 
commonality among its disparate instantiations.  It refers to what makes critical thinking, 
critical pedagogy, critical being and any other critical X concept essentially critical. 
How might we then further elaborate this concept of criticality?  To the degree 
that the concept is educationally relevant, we ought to say more than the brief definition I 
have offered.  For however we analyze the concept, an education for criticality makes 
sense only if we can articulate a set of “critical levers” – a group of variables whose 
manipulation holds the promise of influencing behavior toward a critical ideal.  Here, we 
might take a cue from the critical thinking literature, which has exhibited a long-standing 
acceptance of the well-defined distinction between critical thinking skills and the 
disposition to use them (Facione, 1990; Abrami, et al., 2008; Facione, 2015).  Such a 
distinction between the act and a tendency to engage the act has proven fruitful, with the 
resulting conceptual analysis serving two purposes – a better understanding of both act 
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and tendency, and numerous concrete enumerations of their constituent components.  It 
is, arguably, the latter that has yielded the greater practical influence on the movement to 
educate for critical thinking, as it has facilitated the operationalization of both concepts, a 
milestone that in turn, has spawned an entire industry of critical thinking programs and 
assessments at all levels of education, from primary school through professional training 
(see InsightAssessment.com, CriticalThinking.org, CriticalThinking.com, 
ThinkWatson.com).  Regardless of one’s opinion of the commodification and, indeed, 
commercialization, of critical thinking, the fact remains that the push for critical thinking 
education has successfully harnessed the conceptual analysis of both the critical thinking 
act and tendency as the foundation for its didactic aims.  Such an example, I would 
suggest, offers reason enough to put the concept of criticality through a similar analysis. 
 In taking this approach, we are thus faced with the task of detailing not just the 
tendency to question assertions, but the act itself.  And while it seems reasonable to seek 
critical levers for modulating the tendency, it is not immediately clear how we might 
further elaborate the act.  Indeed, what more is there to say about the act of questioning 
assertions?  At least on the surface, it is not like critical thinking, which as a process 
carried out over time, lends itself to component description.  Questioning an assertion is 
an atomic act, one that, as a form of challenging assumptions, itself constitutes a building 
block of the critical thinking process. 
And yet, as I argue in Chapter 1, an analysis of the various uses of the term 
“critical” suggests that there is more to the critical act than the asking of a single 
question.  As both Paul (1984) and Burbules and Berk (1999) explain, critical 
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engagement entails a deep dive into the epistemic acceptability of a claim, one that 
requires that we issue interrogative challenges to any initial response.  Seen this way, the 
critical act does define a process.  It specifies a reflexive and ongoing reiteration of itself 
that progressively delves deeper into the justification for an assertion.  To the degree that 
criticality is valued for its utility in helping us decide what to believe and do (Ennis, 
1991), such justification is necessary.  Yet for the same reason, any proposed justification 
warrants asking the further question, “Why should we accept that?”  It is this question 
that begins the cycle of interrogation characteristic of critical engagement. 
From a theoretical perspective, this iterative aspect of the process presents a 
problem that threatens to undermine the very concept of criticality.  For if criticality 
demands that every justification be interrogated, there would seem to be no end to the 
critical process.  At least conceptually, any imposed end would entail that we leave some 
assertion unchallenged, some justification uncritiqued.  And yet if criticality is to perform 
its role in decision-making, some end needs to be imposed.  Does this mean that the 
concept of criticality is itself incoherent, that any decision rendered through the process 
of critical engagement must be labelled uncritical because it is ultimately founded on an 
uncritiqued, uninterrogated assertion?  This is what I call the paradox of criticality, a 
paradox whose challenge needs to be addressed in any elaboration of criticality. 
That said, critical thinking theorists have tended to avoid this paradox. Consider, 
for example, Ennis’s well-known definition of critical thinking as “reasonable reflective 
thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do” (Ennis, 2004).  Here, Ennis clearly 
indicates that the aim of critical thinking is to render epistemic and behavioral judgment.  
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Yet in requiring that such thinking be reasonable, he preempts any problem with the 
iterative nature of the critical process.  Critical thinking is reasonable thinking, and 
reasonable thinkers know when to end the iterative process.  Indeed, reasonableness 
provides the criteria for determining the need for ongoing interrogation.  Of course, we 
might suggest that any attempt to invoke reasonableness to end critical interrogation 
might be itself be met with the question “Why is it reasonable to end interrogation here?”  
Such a question simply jumpstarts the interrogative loop again, suggesting that Ennis’s 
articulation of critical thinking avoids the paradox primarily by ignoring it.1 
Assuming that the paradox proves tractable and the integrity of the critical act 
remains viable, what more might we say about critical disposition beyond its definition as 
the tendency to iteratively question assertions?  And what levers might we articulate that 
could prove sensitive to education?  Again, little has been said that specifically targets the 
concept of criticality as I have defined it.  However, the literature on critical thinking 
disposition is substantial and long-standing.  Historically, the various articulations of this 
tendency have been presented via proxy, as the intellectual character of the critical 
thinker.  Intellectual character has, in turn, been parsed into a variety of affective 
characterological attributes, which together are taken as the source of the “consistent 
internal motivation” for critical engagement (Facione, 2000).  While different theorists 
have offered distinct lists of attributes that slice the concept of intellectual character 
                                                 
1 I might further note that in the realm of critical thinking, reference to reasonableness concerns 
more than the iterative loop of interrogation.  Rather, it applies to all cognition constituting the critical 
thinking process, including, for example, interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and even metacognition. 
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across various taxonomic groupings, the essential character of the concept has remained a 
constant in the literature.  Attributes such as open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, a desire 
to be well-informed, inquisitiveness, trust in reason, and a desire for truth are all seen as 
core characteristics of the ideal critical thinker, and are thus treated as dispositional 
variables susceptible to pedagogic intervention  (see Facione, 1990; Facione, 2000; 
Ennis, 1991). 
Most important, the theory of action that implicitly underwrites the efficacy of 
these attributes requires that they be understood in affective terms.  For it is specifically 
their affective character that provides the impetus – the motivation - to expend the 
cognitive energy to critically engage.  Such affective motivation is evident in the 
language used to describe the critical thinker, who is said, for example, to have a “zealous 
dedication to reason, and a hunger or eagerness for reliable information” (Facione, 1990).  
Presumably, it is the felt character of these attributes that motivates critical behavior, 
generating a need or desire that bridges what we ought to do and what we tend to do.  
Scheffler (1991) speaks of these as the “rational passions,” the set of affective traits that 
are fundamentally linked to our cognitive values and epistemic beliefs – “a love of truth 
and a contempt for lying, a concern for accuracy in observation and inference, and a 
corresponding repugnance at error in logic and fact” (p. 4).  We are thus presented with a 
clear, almost graphic, basis for this “motivational” conception of critical disposition.  Our 
meta-epistemic and meta-cognitive beliefs inspire emotion, and such emotion propels us 
toward critical engagement. 
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But is motivation a sufficient explanation of critical thinking disposition?  And 
even if it is, are we justified in applying it to an elaboration of criticality?  The motivation 
conception has, indeed, been operationalized as the basis for a number of critical 
disposition assessments (see Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo, 2001; Giancarlo, Blohm, & 
Urdan, 2004; Yang, 2009; Fisherman, 2013).  And there is some limited evidence that 
such assessments are both valid and reliable (Facione, 2000).  Perkins et al., however, 
have made both the logical and empirical case that motivation, along with requisite 
critical thinking skills, is explanatorily insufficient, especially with regard to critical 
engagement outside the classroom (Perkins, Tishman, Richhart, Donis, & Andrade, 2000; 
Richhart, 2001; Tishman, 2001; Perkins & Ritchhart, 2004).  Instead, they point to an 
additional factor, critical sensitivity, as perhaps the most significant roadblock to such 
engagement.  As the personal attribute responsible for the recognition of critical 
opportunities, sensitivity constitutes a prerequisite of critical behavior.  Indeed, the 
various Perkins groups reference empirical studies that suggest that the lack of critical 
recognition is the greatest obstacle to critical engagement, preventing an appropriate 
critical response even by individuals who have demonstrated both critical motivation and 
skill (Perkins, Tishman, Richhart, Donis, & Andrade, 2000; Perkins & Ritchhart, 2004).  
This, they argue, is particularly true of critical engagement “in the wild,” where critical 
opportunities are rarely as salient as they are in the classroom, and one’s motivation to 
critically engage often plays second or third fiddle to other cognitive demands and 
behavioral goals. 
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At least on the surface of it, the introduction of sensitivity would thus seem to 
rectify a significant deficiency of the motivation-only conception.  Sensitivity justifiably 
suggests that, at least in everyday life, being motivated to utilize critical thinking does not 
ensure its appropriate application.  Rather, individuals must also perceive assertions and 
situations as ones that call for critical intervention.  I would argue that the same might be 
said about criticality.  Mere motivation to question is not sufficient to actually question - 
we further need to perceive assertions (and situations) as being question-able, as claims 
that can be rejected.  This, I would suggest, is more than a theoretical matter – it is one 
that underwrites the value we ascribe to critical engagement.  Criticality is held as an 
educational aim precisely because we believe that individuals tend to hold overly 
concretized worldviews, confusing historically and culturally contingent belief with 
universal truth (see Adorno, 1998; hooks, 2009).  Such a mistake forecloses the very 
possibility of critical engagement for even motivated individuals, limiting the perceived 
scope of what is legitimately questionable. 
The question thus becomes whether we ought to accept criticality as the union of 
motivation and sensitivity. And if we cannot, what conception might we offer that better 
serves that role?  This is where the core of my project begins, as the continuation of a 
dialogue that seeks to answer the central question “What is critical disposition?”  Of 
course, there is a sense in which I have merely appropriated this dialogue for my own 
purposes, changing its target from critical thinking to the substantially narrower, though 
no less important, issue of criticality.  But I believe that such appropriation is warranted 
on two counts.  First, in the absence of existing analyses of criticality, the robust literature 
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devoted to a closely related concept, one that is readily adaptable to the specific concern 
of critical questioning, offers as good a starting point as any.  This is especially true given 
the thrust of the sensitivity conception, which like criticality, focuses on the initiation of 
critical engagement.  Second, and perhaps more important, criticality is the element 
common to the various and diverse educational uses of the term “critical.”  As such, 
critical thinking presents access to the concept of criticality through the back door, 
allowing us to apply at least some of the analysis of a “child” concept to further elaborate 
its parent.  
1.2. The core of the argument  
Ultimately, it is my belief that neither the motivation or sensitivity conceptions 
offer acceptable articulations of critical disposition.  Indeed, both conceptions suffer from 
the same weakness – they fail to provide justification for the accepted critical ideal of 
appropriate questioning, an ideal based on an implicit standard of warranted questioning.  
Such an argument, of course, requires further elaboration and defense of appropriate 
questioning, paying particular attention to the problems that it raises.  But assuming that 
such a case can be made, it seems clear that however we conceive of criticality, it ought 
to provide reasons for committing to the accepted ideal.  And neither motivation or 
sensitivity offer such reasons.  In fact, the motivation conception best justifies an ideal 
that conflicts with that of appropriateness.  This is the ideal of more questioning, where 
one accepts that additional critical questioning is always a virtue.  Something similar 
might be said about sensitivity, where the Perkins elaboration speaks of recognizing 
critical opportunities only in terms of an increasing or decreasing tendency toward critical 
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questioning.  In neither case are we presented with a means to recognize, and thus target, 
only those opportunities endorsed as warranted or appropriate.2 
Indeed, I argue that the ideal of appropriate questioning implies a conception of 
critical disposition that must be tied to judgment, where the recognition of critical 
opportunities is, at least in part, a matter of judging critical warrant in the context of a 
variety of disparate and fluid considerations.  Much of the remainder of this dissertation 
is devoted to elaborating and defending the viability of such a conception, which I term 
the Expertise Conception of Criticality.3  I approach this task from two distinct and 
historically antagonistic perspectives, phenomenological analysis and neurocognitive 
theory, arguing that both provide mutually supportive justification for a view of criticality 
founded on judgment.  But the fact that these perspectives utilize radically different 
methodologies and assume potentially conflicting ontologies necessitates a second line of 
argument, one that concerns the legitimacy of the approach itself.  Here, I contest the 
longstanding antipathy between first-person and third-person methodology, arguing that 
the viability and relevance of educational neuroscience in particular depends on a degree 
of acceptance and integration of first-person techniques, data, and even ontology.  My 
hope is that this triangulation of perspective not only lends additional clout to a 
conception of criticality tied to judgment, but that it provides an example of how 
                                                 
2 This argument can be seen as a form of modus tollens, where the derivation of ideals from 
conceptions requires that we reject any conception that implies an unaccepted, or unacceptable, ideal. 
3 That I call this the expertise conception is a nod to the role played by Hubert Dreyfus’s theory of 
expertise in its development. See Dreyfus 1998, 2002, 2008, and 2014 for his elaboration of the theory. 
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neuroscience and phenomenology might work together to address issues of educational 
concern. 
1.3. The structure of the dissertation 
While the dissertation contains these multiple threads, it is structured as a single, 
winding argument, with each chapter building on the claims of the previous one.  The 
reader might look to the last section of Chapter Three as the nexus of the entire work, as 
it both ties together the preliminary arguments of the first three chapters to suggest the 
need for an expertise conception, and provides the launching point for its elaboration and 
defense.  Seen in this manner, the dissertation is comprised of three main arguments, 
where the first three chapters articulate what might be called the educational argument, 
and the subsequent two chapters offer the phenomenological and the neurocognitive 
arguments, respectively.  Yet even within each of these, there are a number of core claims 
that themselves require elaboration and defense.  A brief outline of each chapter thus 
seems useful here, serving to document these claims and account for their role in the flow 
of the larger argument. 
Chapter One introduces the concept of criticality as the disposition toward the 
iterative interrogation of assertions.  I argue that while the term “critical” has been 
appropriated by a variety of distinct educational concepts, including critical thinking and 
critical pedagogy, it imparts a common idea to each – that to be critical is to engage in the 
iterative questioning of assertions.  I then introduce the concept of everyday criticality, 
defining it as criticality in the context of situations where little or no demand for, or 
expectation of, critical engagement exists. 
14 
 
Chapter Two maintains several goals.  First, I discuss some of the theoretical 
issues concerning criticality that threaten to render the concept incoherent.  Most 
important among these is the paradox of criticality, which plays an important role 
throughout the dissertation.  Second, I seek to establish everyday criticality as an 
educational aim, arguing that the popular and academic literature advocates for criticality 
as a pedagogic goal.  Finally, I distinguish between a critical ideal of more questioning 
and one founded on the idea of appropriate questioning.  I argue that despite calls for 
more questioning, the ideal of appropriate questioning both is and ought to be the 
standard for criticality. 
In Chapter Three, I explore the viability of the two existing psychological 
conceptions of critical disposition in light of a commitment to appropriate questioning.  I 
argue that any acceptable conception of everyday criticality must offer reasons for 
accepting a critical ideal, and that neither the motivation nor the sensitivity conceptions 
provide justification for an ideal of appropriate questioning.  I then propose that the 
notion of appropriate questioning entails a conception of criticality founded on judgment, 
where the recognition of critical opportunities is, at least in part, a matter of judging 
critical warrant in the context of a variety of disparate and fluid considerations. 
Chapter Four is devoted to the elaboration of the expertise conception of 
criticality, a view of critical disposition founded on both the concept of perceived 
questionability and Hubert Dreyfus’s theory of expertise.  I define perceived 
questionability phenomenologically, as the subjective sense of epistemic acceptability 
that permeates conscious experience, and I discuss its role in the manifestation of critical 
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recognition.  I then utilize Dreyfus’s theory of expertise to explain its ties to critical 
judgment, arguing that the theory offers a means of understanding progress toward the 
critical ideal in terms of the ongoing development of embodied judgment.  I conclude the 
chapter with an elaboration of embodied judgment as an intellectual virtue, one that 
expresses the judgments of past critical behavior. 
Chapter Five seeks to provide neurocognitive support for the phenomenological 
articulation of the expertise conception.  To this end, I discuss both dual cognition theory 
and global workspace theory, the latter of which is an empirically supported dual 
cognition theory of consciousness.  I argue that global workspace theory offers much of 
the necessary neural backing for the expertise conception, providing empirically robust 
support for the centrality of judgment in both the development of critical expertise and 
the act of critical recognition.  I further explain how global workspace theory explains 
cognition in a manner that addresses the paradox of criticality, resolving the logical 
tension in the concept of criticality. 
Finally, in Chapter Six, I discuss the educational implications of the expertise 
conception.  I claim that the conception defines two basic levers for the modulation of 
criticality – care and the environment – that suggest concrete classroom changes if we 
wish to educate for criticality.  I conclude with a short discussion of the role that didactic 
philosophy might play in such an education, arguing that the unique value of the 
discipline rests not with its ability to allow the extended practice of thinking skills 
(Mulnix, 2012; Lipman, 2003; Winstanley, 2009), but as a space or forum where students 
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can test the boundaries of appropriate interrogation, iteratively questioning to the point 
where the legitimacy of the question is itself at issue. 
1.4. A note on theoretical perspective 
The eclectic approach that I have described may strike some as particularly odd.  
Indeed, the attempt to amalgamate phenomenological perspective with the publicly 
empirical constraints of neurocognitive theory requires some explanation, as the two 
approaches have long occupied diametrically opposed positions on the spectrum of 
theory of mind methods of inquiry (Wittgenstein, 2001; Dennett, 1991).  However, in 
presenting a framework for understanding questioning that offers practical possibilities 
for improving the thinking of developing minds, I wish to make as few contentious 
ontological commitments as possible.  As such, I make every effort to assume a common 
sense understanding of the world, one that I assume will be generally accepted by those 
responsible for developing and implementing educational programs, at least in the United 
States.  This understanding acknowledges the primacy of a materially-based external 
world, a world knowable in large part through third-person scientific method.  Yet it also 
acknowledges the legitimacy of first person perspective, treating phenomenal experience 
as data that needs to be explained rather than dismissed (Searle, 1997).  In a technical 
sense, then, it would seem that my treatment of phenomenology is somewhat strained, for 
I explicitly reject the ontological commitment to phenomenal monism that traditionally 
accompanies philosophical phenomenology.  That said, contemporary use of empirical 
phenomenology similarly engages the methodology while remaining ontologically 
neutral (Donalek, 2004; Dowling, 2007; Munhall, 2011; Dreyfus, 2002).  Even central 
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figures of contemporary philosophical phenomenology have sought a mutually 
supportive integration with scientific theory and practice, particularly in the domain of 
theory of mind (Gallagher, 2010; Zahavi, 2010).  If anything, it is not that the 
phenomenologists shun rapprochement with scientific theory, but rather that many 
cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind dismiss the value of first person perspective 
(Gallagher, 2010; Dennett, 1991; Dennett, 2001).  That said, there are numerous 
examples of naturalized theories of mind that assume the primacy of explaining first 
person reports of phenomenal data (Damasio, 2012; Edelman, 2003; Searle, 1997; 
Dehaene, 2014).  Put succinctly, there is no shortage of precedents for engaging an 
approach that blends the phenomenological with the scientifically empirical.4 
                                                 
4 I might add that absent my pragmatic intent to frame arguments on grounds acceptable to 
educationists, the assumption of scientific primacy could readily be reframed in the context of 
phenomenology - that is, as an abstraction of ontologically neutral phenomena. 
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Chapter 2: What is Everyday Criticality? 
2.1. Defining criticality 
Educational literature is rife with variants of the word “critical,” and the 
theoretical conceptions that underlie their use are diverse and sometimes antagonistic.  
From critical thinking to critical pedagogy, critical being, critical reading, and even 
criticality itself, the variety of educationally-relevant theoretical constructs referencing 
the word presents a challenge to crystalizing a shared understanding of what it means to 
be critical.  We are told, for example, that critical thinking involves the search for 
“reasons on which to base… assessments, judgments, and actions” (Siegel, 1988, p. 33), 
that critical pedagogy seeks to “[draw] attention to questions concerning who has control 
over the conditions for the production of knowledge, values, and skills” (Giroux, 2013, p. 
2), and that criticality requires that we transcend both critical thinking and critical 
pedagogy to think independently of any particular thinking framework (Burbules & Berk, 
1999).  In some cases, this diversity of meaning exists even within a single construct, 
with empirical studies on the subject of critical thinking displaying a surprising 
assortment of distinct conceptual articulations (Fisherman, 2013).  Perhaps most 
confusing are cases where concepts in the critical “family” are presented without any 
further elaboration, as when the English and Language Arts Common Core Standards 
document references the term “critical” only to state that students who meet the 
Standards “habitually perform the critical reading necessary to pick through the 
staggering amount of information available today” (Craft & Ideas, 2010, p. 3) and 
“evaluate other points of view critically and constructively” (Craft & Ideas, 2010, p. 7).  
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Here, the reader is simply left to his or her own devices to understand how critical 
reading and critical evaluation differ from their “non-critical” counterparts.  
It then makes sense to inquire into the “critical-ness” of these concepts.  What is it 
that is particularly critical about critical pedagogy and critical thinking?  What 
commonality does criticality hold with critical being and the various other “critical X” 
concepts that endows it with critical character?  Unfortunately, reference to a dictionary 
definition of the word critical suffers from a number of issues that illustrate the ostensible 
difficulty of articulating such commonality.  Defined by Webster’s as "exercising or 
involving careful judgment or judicious evaluation <critical thinking>,” the entry, which 
is explicitly tied to its critical thinking articulation, fails to capture the breadth of the 
concept even as elaborated by critical thinking theorists, who consider evaluation to be 
only one of several key components of critical thinking (Facione, 1990).  And even had it 
accounted for these other components, the focus on evaluation would, I believe, fail to 
address the framework-independent thinking demanded by Burbules and Berk’s (1999) 
conception of criticality or the questioning of existing power relations at the core of 
critical pedagogy.  Perhaps most troubling, though, is the definition’s reliance on the 
vague terms “careful” and “judicious.”  For it is precisely these terms that need to be 
unpacked to gain the requisite measure of conceptual clarity.5 
                                                 
5 It is perhaps ironic that I should critique this definition of the term “critical,” for criticality as a 
form of judgment is precisely the main claim of this work.  There is, however, an important difference 
between the dictionary definition and my core claim.  Whereas the former articulates judgment as the aim 
or product of critique, the latter does not.  Rather, as I make clear in the following paragraphs, critical acts 
are interrogative – they render questions instead of judgments.  Judgment, on this account, serves a second-
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Yet, I wish to suggest – or given the obviousness of the claim, simply emphasize - 
that there does exist a commonality of meaning among the family of “critical” concepts, 
one founded on the idea of interrogation or questioning.  Indeed, what the various 
constructs share is an emphasis on the practice of questioning assertions and interrogating 
beliefs.  Moreover, this practice is not only comprehensively shared - it permeates the 
core of each concept.  Yes, each concept defines a critical process that entails more than 
questioning, from asserting the need to engage reflective evaluation to requiring an 
awakening to the nature of social power dynamics.  But among the diversity of critical 
elaborations, interrogation is the sine qua non of critical activity, though it manifests in a 
variety of concept-specific ways. 
Take, for example, the consensus definition of critical thinking offered by the 
1990 Delphi Panel,6 a definition that makes no mention of questioning:  “We understand 
critical thinking to be purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which results in interpretation, 
analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation of the evidential, conceptual, 
methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations upon which that judgment is 
based” (Facione, 1990).  This definition focuses on obtaining judgment through a variety 
of thinking activities - interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference - and 
substantiating the product of those activities with reasons.  Nowhere in this summary 
                                                 
order role – whether to interrogate or refrain from interrogation.  In clichéd terms, it thus serves as a 
necessary means rather than an end in itself. 
6 The Delphi Panel was a United States government-sponsored commission of critical thinking 
experts given the task of articulating a consensus understanding of critical thinking. 
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definition do the authors make explicit an act of interrogation7.  Yet it does not take much 
to recognize the core role that interrogation plays for each of these conceptual 
components.  For example, that an individual engages interpretation to understand the 
meaning of a statement or experience requires that she has, at least implicitly, asked the 
question “What does this statement (or text, experience, etc.) mean?”  Asking this 
question provides the necessary impetus to seek interpretation – we don’t know what the 
statement means, and are drawn to find out.  In a stronger formulation, we might say that 
the act presupposes the question - that without an asking, there is no interpretive act. 
The same can be said for the other thinking activities enumerated in the Delphi 
description.  Analysis, at least implicitly, requires that we ask a question such as “What is 
the author’s main claim and how does she argue for it?”  Evaluation presupposes 
something like “Is there good reason to believe this statement?”  And inference entails a 
question like “What other statements follow?”  In all these cases, though the particular 
act of thinking may not be triggered by an explicit act of questioning, engagement of the 
act entails a preliminary “asking.” 
In a similar manner, questioning underlies both terms of Delphi’s succinct 
definition of critical thinking as “self-regulatory judgment.”  First, that critical thinking is 
ultimately concerned with judgment suggests that a critical thinker engages critically to 
                                                 
7 However, the importance of questioning in the critical thinking process is highlighted rather 
explicitly in the extended discussion offered by the Delphi report, particularly as it concerns the critical 
dispositions of curiosity and inquisitiveness. 
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“decide what to believe or do” (Ennis, 2004).  Such engagement is again tantamount to 
asking the question “what should I believe (or do)?”8  For in engaging critical thinking 
the individual maintains at least some practical doubt on the matter and seeks to resolve 
that doubt.  It is here that interrogation serves perhaps its most central role in critical 
thinking, as it puts on the table the very possibility of engaging the critical thinking 
process.  That is, the need for judgment is rendered moot without the question “what 
should I believe (or do)?”  So again, engaging the acts that lead to judgment represents a 
question already asked. 
Finally, questioning can be found at the core of the concept of self-regulation, or 
what has also been called self-correction (Lipman, 2003; Splitter & Sharp, 1995; Sharp, 
1991) or meta-cognitive reflection (Lipman, 2003; Willingham, 2007).  This signature 
aspect of critical thinking concerns the act of monitoring the quality of one’s thinking, for 
recognizing errors committed, assumptions made, or weak reasons offered in the process 
of the thinking.  As such, this monitoring constitutes an ongoing act of self-interrogation, 
a reflective asking whether my inferences are valid and my claims justified.  In a sense, 
self-regulation defines critical thinking as an iterative process where each step of 
potential progress made over the course of critical engagement is itself questioned.  Seen 
this way, the Delphi definition of critical thinking is fundamentally characterized as an 
                                                 
8 Or in the case of existing beliefs or actions, critical thinking would imply the variant “Should I 
believe (or do) this?” 
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act of interrogation, as a potentially endless series of questions that serves to justify belief 
and action. 
Though critical pedagogy lacks this concern for defining an abstract and 
comprehensive process of rational justification, it is no less concerned with the 
interrogation of claims.  Rather than situate an emphasis on interrogation in the context of 
an abstract ideal of reasoned justification, critical pedagogy emphasizes the need to raise 
awareness of the social forces that influence, and even dictate, patterns of interrogative 
behavior (Freire, 1996; Freire, 2009; Giroux, 1983; McLaren & Hammer, 1989).  As 
such, it seeks to “raise questions about inequalities of power… and about the way belief 
systems become internalized to the point where individuals and groups abandon the very 
aspiration to question or change their lot in life” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 6).  Here, 
interrogation does not directly serve our general judgment of what to believe or do.   Rather, 
it forces reconsideration of particular beliefs – those that comprise our understanding of 
social power dynamics.  In doing so, critical pedagogy seeks to “both affirm and render 
problematic the multiplicity of voices students bring with them into the classroom and 
transform them in the interest of social and cultural justice” (McLaren & Hammer, 1989, p. 
40).  In this sense, the field exhibits a more explicit, though no more fundamental, focus on 
questioning than critical thinking. Where questioning in critical thinking implicitly 
underwrites the general process of judgment, critical pedagogy explicitly moves to front and 
center the need to question beliefs about social power relations and their effect on the genesis 
of subjectivity, particularly as it concerns the development of critical disposition (Freire, 
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1996; Greene, 1988).9  As such, critical pedagogy emphasizes interrogation in two respects - 
first, by challenging existing socio-political belief structures to “illuminate[s] how 
knowledge, identities, and authority are constructed within particular sets of social 
relations” (Giroux, 2013, p. 1), and second, by harnessing such understanding to enable the 
individual’s tendency toward interrogation.  Indeed, the logic of this dual focus is articulated 
by Maxine Greene, who argues that “if situations cannot be created that enable the young 
to deal with feelings of being manipulated by outside forces, there will be far too little 
sense of agency among them.  Without a sense of agency, young people are unlikely to 
pose significant questions, the existentially rooted questions in which learning begins” 
(Greene, 2009, p. 139).10  Here, Greene’s prioritization of socio-political interrogation 
serves as an implicit criticism of the critical thinking movement by suggesting that social 
dynamics foreclose upon the possibility of asking fundamental questions.  That is, in 
legitimizing the possibility of knowledge that transcends socio-cultural perspective, 
critical thinking fails to appreciate the cognitive - and specifically, interrogative - 
ramifications of one’s position in the world.  Absent the awareness resulting from 
                                                 
9 Despite its focus on interrogation in the name of freedom and social justice, there have been 
those who have advocated that critical pedagogy ought to assume a broader view toward critical 
questioning.  Biesta, for example, has argued that “the only consistent way for critical pedagogy to 
proceed…is by a perpetual challenge of all claims to authority including the claims to authority of critical 
pedagogy itself” (Biesta, Say you want a revolution... Suggestions for the impossible future of critical 
pedagogy, 1998, p. 505).  Such a view, while itself a challenge to the traditional ethical ends of critical 
pedagogy, further exemplifies its commitment to interrogation.  In essence, Biesta advocates that more than 
working in the name of social justice, critical pedagogy must be comprehensive in the interrogation of 
claims if it is to “live its ideal.”  In this case, this ideal entails a challenge to the value of the domain itself.  
10 See Giroux’s (Theory & resistance in education - A pedagogy for the opposition, 1983) 
elaboration of a “problematic” for another argument that articulates this logic. 
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interrogation of existing social power relations, critical thinking is thus itself insufficient 
for nurturing a critical spirit. 
A related criticism is offered by Gerry Dunne (2015), whose elaboration of critical 
being offers yet another example of the centrality of interrogation to criticality.  While 
critical pedagogy emphasizes the impact of social dynamics upon critical behavior, Dunne 
focuses on the influence of individual factors, critiquing critical thinking on the ground that it 
takes scant account of the particularity and embeddedness of the critical thinker.  He claims 
that in establishing a norm intended to rigidly apply to every individual, critical thinking 
“irreducibly cognitivizes our very being and imposes an ends-focused problem-solving 
rubric to accomplish a satisfactory conclusion. In so doing, it extricates both the 
experiences, and the situationedness of the living agent from the reality she is 
experiencing. Put another way, it tries to separate the dancer from the dance” (Dunne, 
2015, p. 94).  Here Dunne suggests that it is difficult to accept an ideal of thinking that 
seeks to marginalize, or even ignore, the unique epistemic contributions of the individual.  
As such, he requires that we interrogate the primacy of rationality in critical thinking and 
acknowledge that cognitive engagement necessarily occurs in the context of a unique life 
history, individual preferences, and a set of personal goals.  Referencing Barnett’s (1997) 
tripartite conception of criticality as critical/analytical thinking, critical self-reflection, 
and critical action, Dunne advocates that critical thinking be superseded by the more 
expansive concept of critical being that, at its core, accounts for the “unique set of 
epistemic criteria and standards” (Dunne, 2015, p. 94) that underwrite individual belief 
adoption, value judgment, and everyday action.  In offering this conception, Dunne seeks 
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a critical ideal that transcends critical thinking both in scope and depth.  Critical being is 
not just a type of objectively proscribed thinking, one committed to the dispassionate 
evaluation of claims and judgments.  Instead, it encompasses both thinking and action in 
the context of reflective inquiry into an individual’s personhood - their goals, affinities, 
dislikes, and behavior – in order to evaluate belief and action within the context of a lived 
experience.  Ultimately, Dunne implies a relativity among justificatory criteria, where the 
foundational role of the individual necessitates rejection of a common epistemic standard 
to evaluate the adequacy of reasons demanded by a critical thinking ideal. 
While Dunne’s incorporation of personal epistemic considerations appears to be 
in direct conflict with the requirement that critical thinking be “universal and objective” 
(Siegel, 1988, p. 34) , an argument can be made that critical thinking provides 
accommodation for these conflicting elements.  Dunne seems to target the 
characterization of critical thinking that is most often visible in the classroom, a 
formulaic process emphasizing the tenets of informal logic that is typically engaged only 
when reading school text, discussing current events, or engaging topics of common 
interest.  But critical thinking theorists offer formulations that, by and large, seek to 
transcend such a narrow view of critical thinking.  Indeed, one might argue that both 
Siegel’s (1988) succinct but expansive articulation of critical thinking as a process of 
judging assertions on the strength of reasons and the Delphi Report’s (Facione, 1990) 
notion of self-regulating judgment are broad enough to encompass Barnett’s three 
components of critical being.  And Richard Paul (1984) seems to explicitly address 
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Dunne’s concerns about the ultimate relativity of epistemic criteria with an articulation of 
critical thinking that allows for reasoning based on individual “world view.” 
However, even if one takes the view that critical being articulates aspects of 
criticality that extend beyond the bounds of critical thinking, it is not difficult to see the 
common prioritization of interrogation.  Specifically, inquiry into personhood again 
assumes the asking of questions – questions like “What are my goals, affinities, and 
dislikes?”, “How do my actions align with these goals?”, “Do I have good reason to 
believe X given my fundamental epistemic beliefs?”  And this questioning forms a core 
aspect of Dunne’s concept of critical being – there is no inquiry into personhood without 
asking such questions.  As I have already argued, even if these questions are not 
explicitly formulated, the act of evaluating how actions align with goals or how potential 
or extant beliefs align with one’s core worldview already presupposes an interrogative 
act. 
Perhaps the most fundamentally interrogative elaboration of a “critical” concept 
can be found in Burbules and Berk’s articulation of criticality.  Burbules and Berk (1999) 
argue that the theoretical conflicts engaged by critical thinking and critical pedagogy 
proponents suggests the need to reassess our understanding of what it means to be 
critical.  They claim that while critical thinking fails to acknowledge the influence of 
social factors on critical engagement, it is precisely this acknowledgement that renders 
critical pedagogy vulnerable to charges of ideology.  Indeed, Burbules and Berk argue 
that claims to the exclusive sovereignty over what it means to be critical – claims offered 
by proponents of both critical thinking and critical pedagogy – suggest a critical 
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blindness toward to the inherent conceptual weaknesses of each critical concept.  While 
they accept the necessary contributions each construct offers to an understanding of 
critical engagement, they add two interrelated conditions intended to overcome their 
opposing limitations.  Both of these highlight the fundamentally interrogative nature of 
critical engagement. 
First, Burbules and Berk argue that on a deep level, critical thinking requires “the 
ability to think outside a framework of conventional understandings; it means to think anew, 
to think differently” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 8).  More than other critical elaborations, this 
requirement highlights the iterative nature of critical questioning, explicitly linking criticality 
to the interrogation not only of one’s first-order beliefs, but of the epistemic criteria utilized 
in the process of rendering judgment.  Criticality thus entails the interrogation of one’s own 
epistemic presuppositions and limits, “the ones without which we literally do not know how 
to think and act” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 16).  Second, they advocate the importance of 
viewing criticality as a social practice.  According to this position, it is not sufficient to be 
capable of and predisposed to open-minded interrogation, as any existing thinking 
framework constrains the possibilities for thinking anew.  Rather, one must proactively 
challenge existing belief by seeking out social situations where others present, advocate, 
and justify new ways of understanding the world.  Here again, this requirement suggests 
the priority of interrogation over the ability to render specific judgment.  Indeed, in 
claiming that the critical disposition requires that we hold our views “as perpetually open 
to challenge” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 9), Burbules and Berk suggest that interrogation 
infuses the act of judgment itself.  In a sense, the judgments of the critical thinker are 
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never fully assertive – they continue to exhibit a fundamentally interrogative quality that 
tempers every declarative posture.  
While it is possible to extend this analysis to other conceptual constructs of the 
“critical” family, the four instances I have chosen would seem to make my point 
sufficiently clear – that despite the wide-ranging meaning and use of these concepts, there 
is a common emphasis on the need to interrogate.  And this questioning, this fundamental 
subjecting to inquiry, lies at the core of our intuitive understanding of critical activity.  To 
critique claim X is to subject X to evaluation, and such evaluation necessarily entails 
initial and ongoing acts of interrogation.  “Is this statement true?”  “Is this good music?” 
“Is this argument convincing?”  “Should I break up with my boyfriend?”  “These are the 
implicit interrogative analogs that initiate evaluations of their declarative counterparts.  
The various concepts of the “critical family” might specify different epistemic criteria for 
evaluation, but the act of evaluation itself entails a preliminary interrogative act.  Perhaps 
more important, the evaluative component of critical behavior is itself infused with 
ongoing acts of interrogation, as it is the iterative questioning of interim judgments 
offered in the course of evaluation that uniquely characterizes our intuitive understanding 
of critical behavior.  It is this iterative interrogation in the context of evaluation that best 
describes the commonality among the family of “critical” constructs, whether the target 
of such interrogation concerns our own beliefs, decisions, and judgments or those of 
others. 
This common basis in interrogation, however, is readily overshadowed by 
differences in the epistemic criteria for evaluation, differences that often lead us to view 
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the various critical constructs as conflicting or antithetical.  Thus, Dunne’s elaboration of 
critical being is offered as a response to the shortcomings of critical thinking, to both 
validate the use of personal epistemic criteria and articulate the critical ideal as something 
that transcends thinking (Dunne, 2015).  The same can be said for the bidirectional 
antagonism between advocates of critical thinking and critical pedagogy.  Critical 
pedagogists view an understanding of power relations as a necessary component of claim 
assessment, arguing that the criteria for strength of justification are influenced by the 
dynamics of social embeddedness (Burbules & Berk, 1999).  Critical thinking theorists 
counter that such a claim itself requires justification by reasons independent of social 
dynamics (Siegel, 1988).  As a result, each group views the other as ideologically 
motivated and insufficiently critical, with the critical thinking camp arguing that the 
social dynamics criterion belies an uncritiqued worldview (Burbules & Berk, 1999), and 
the critical pedagogy camp claiming that the lack of a such a criterion unjustifiably 
restricts legitimate avenues of critical interrogation (Giroux, 1994).  In focusing on the 
evaluative component, we are thus left with an understanding of the various critical 
concepts that masks their fundamental commonality. 
We might therefore view each of the critical concepts as having both an assertive 
and an interrogative component, where the former accounts for the need to issue 
judgment, and the latter acts as the requisite critical “brake.”  Seen this way, the diversity 
of critical concepts reflects the differing, and often conflicting, articulations of the 
assertive component.  The interrogative component, on the other hand, serves as 
taxonomic “glue,” ushering each construct into the critical “family.”  This is why we can 
31 
 
view critical behavior as fundamentally interrogative.  While each of the critical 
constructs might define different criteria for judgment, it is the iterative questioning of 
claims – both to initiate evaluation and as an integral part of the evaluation process - that 
characterizes the commonality of each of the various articulations critical behavior.  It is 
this questioning, I suggest, that both distinguishes critical judgment from its non-critical 
counterparts and allows us to see each of the constructs as characteristically critical in the 
face of conflicting epistemic assumptions. 
Such an emphasis on interrogation is perhaps best exemplified by John McPeck’s 
succinct definition of critical thinking as “reflective skepticism” (McPeck, 1981), a 
concept having its roots in Dewey’s articulation of critical thinking (Dewey, 1910).  Yet I 
would suggest that even this phrase lacks the necessary nua nce to properly describe the 
questioning at the core of critical behavior.  Critical questioning entails an open-
mindedness that extends beyond our everyday understanding of doubt and skepticism, 
which carry with them a connotation of a negation, a suggestion that the doubted claim is 
false.  The interrogative element of critical behavior, however, is characterized by a 
distinct agnosticism, one that acts merely to “bring into play” the possibility of rejecting 
an assertion.  In this case, there is a withholding of judgment that accompanies this 
prerequisite to evaluation.  Where judgment concerns assertions of truth, interrogative 
agnosticism extends to whether the claim is even knowable, distinguishing it further from 
epistemological skepticism, which purports an inability to know the truth of any 
assertion.  As such, we should not equate critical behavior with either doubt or skepticism 
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per se, but view it as open-minded questioning, a questioning that eschews any 
predilection toward specific judgment. 
There is something more that we can glean from comparing the four critical 
concepts.  While they each express the centrality of iterative interrogation, I have noted 
that three of them – critical pedagogy, critical being, and criticality – present critiques of 
critical thinking, with the latter two being offered as a response to its perceived 
shortcomings.  These critiques bear a common refrain – that critical thinking fails to 
articulate the critical ideal because it neglects to require the critical thinker to interrogate 
their fundamental beliefs about the world, beliefs whose question-ability we fail to notice 
because they are central to our thinking and our understanding of the world.  In 
elaborating a general and abstract process geared toward judgment, critical thinking 
focuses only broadly on the need to question assumptions.  It makes no effort to 
distinguish the background assumptions that define the epistemic criteria for belief 
acquisition, planning, and decision making from the claims that depend on such 
assumptions.  Without such a distinction and a corresponding demand to interrogate 
background assumptions, critical thinking all too readily allows the reasons that justify 
critical judgment to go uncritiqued.  It thus presents as a type of thinking devoted more 
toward rendering judgment on already-asked questions and solving already-defined 
problems than searching for and identifying questionable claims11.  Critical pedagogy, 
                                                 
11 Such a view is borne out in statements like those of Facione, who claims that “The disposition 
toward critical thinking is the consistent internal motivation to engage problems and make decisions by 
using thinking.”  In speaking of engaging problems and making decisions, we are given a picture of critical 
thinking that focuses on the thinking that occurs after problems are identified and questions are asked. 
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critical being, and criticality, on the other hand, emphasize the need to question the truth 
of our most basic assumptions.  Whether those assumptions concern the epistemic import 
of social relations (critical pedagogy), rationality and the self (Dunne’s critical being), or 
the need to adhere to a thinking framework (Burbules and Berk’s criticality), the three 
critical concepts require that the critical thinker question the beliefs that comprise her 
fundamental understanding of the world.  Absent such interrogation, it would be difficult 
to view an individual as being critical. 
Whether such a criticism is warranted is a further question.  For critical thinking, 
at least in its mainstream formulations, does explicitly require that the critical thinker be 
disposed to questioning assumptions (see Facione, 1990; Ennis, 2004; Paul, 1984; 
Lipman, 2003).  And without any additional restrictions, such a requirement would seem 
to apply to all assumptions regardless of their role in our belief structure.  Indeed, I doubt 
that proponents of critical thinking would hesitate to claim that the demand to interrogate 
background truth claims is not already entailed by the requirement to question 
assumptions.  Yet, in criticizing critical thinking along these lines, the other critical 
concepts highlight something specific and important about what it means to be critical – 
that in order to render critical judgment, we need to interrogate beliefs “all the way 
down.”  It is not sufficient to simply reference an epistemic commitment to critically 
justify a belief, decision, or action – even when such commitment is accepted for its 
justificatory strength.  Being critical demands that we interrogate beliefs to the point 
where we question the very background beliefs about the way the world works, those 
assumptions “without which we literally do not know how to think and act” (Burbules & 
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Berk, 1999, p. 16).  To the degree that critical thinking atomizes critical behavior and 
ascribes the virtue of criticality to those who merely recognize thinking shortfalls and offer 
what are taken to be appropriate reasons for their judgments, it misses a deep and 
fundamental characteristic of the critical spirit – the characteristic of putting on the table 
those beliefs that comprise our most basic understanding of the world. 
Precisely this point is emphasized in Richard Paul’s distinction between strong and 
weak sense critical thinking.  Like many other critical thinking theorists, Paul acknowledges 
a gap between critical thinking competence and the disposition to use those skills.  However, 
he takes this gap one step further, distinguishing the ideal, or strong sense, critical thinker 
from weak sense thinkers who regularly engage critical thinking “moves” to defend their 
existing, yet unexamined, beliefs.  For Paul, weak sense critical thinkers are not critical 
thinkers in the way that we expect or want them to be.  They are, in his words, “sophistic,” 
skilled at defending positions in which they are already invested, positions whose rejection 
would suggest the need to reevaluate fundamental beliefs about oneself and the world: 
Those students who have already developed a goodly set of biased 
assumptions, stereotypes, egocentric and sociocentric beliefs, training in 
recognizing "bad" reasoning in "neutral" cases (or in the case of the 
"opposition") become more sophistic rather than less so, more skilled in 
"rationalizing" and intellectualizing" the biases they already have. They 
are then less rather than more likely to abandon them if at a later time they 
meet some one who questions them. Like the religious believer who 
studies" apologetics" they now have a variety of critical "moves" of which 
they can make use in defense of their a priori egocentric belief system. 
(Paul, 1984, p. 3) 
Strong sense critical thinking – the type of critical thinking that constitutes the aim of 
Paul’s teaching efforts - entails the interrogation of precisely this “a priori egocentric 
belief system.”  It focuses not on recognizing the inferential weaknesses of individual 
35 
 
arguments, but on unpacking the deeply held, and often unstated, beliefs about the world 
and self upon which such arguments rely.  Paul states: 
When we as humans analyze and evaluate arguments which are significant 
to us (this includes all arguments which if accepted would strengthen or 
weaken the beliefs to which we have committed ourselves in word or 
deed), we do so… in relationship to prior belief-commitments. The best 
we can do in moving toward increased objectivity is to bring to the surface 
the set of beliefs, assumptions, and inferences from the perspective of 
which our analysis is proceeding, and to see explicitly the dialectical 
nature of our task, the critical "moves" we might make at various points 
and the various possible "counter-moves" those moves might call forth 
(Paul, 1984, p. 4 - emphasis is mine). 
Such a position reiterates the critique leveled against the standard formulation of critical 
thinking - that to the degree that we avoid “going all the way down,” we miss something 
essential to our understanding of what it means to be critical.  It also hints at Burbules 
and Berk’s suggestion that we might even see criticality as a concept that transcends the 
need to render judgment.  For in stating that “the best we can do in moving toward 
increased objectivity is to bring to the surface the set of beliefs, assumptions, and 
inferences from the perspective of which our analysis is proceeding,” Paul prioritizes the 
understanding that arises from deep interrogation over the ability to “find a winner” 
among alternative or conflicting positions.  What we have is a critique of critical thinking 
from within, one that aligns well with those that seek to portray critical thinking as an 
insufficient articulation of what it is to be critical. 
In what follows, I sometimes use the term “criticality” to reference this open-
minded iterative interrogation of beliefs.  The term turns the common and signature 
characteristic of critical behavior into an attribute that is neither limited to thinking nor 
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marked by conflicts over epistemic criteria.  Thus, marveling at the criticality of Xavier’s 
understanding of the Syrian refugee crisis is an acknowledgment of the critical quality of 
Xavier’s specific behavior – his effort to ensure that he was not simply accepting as true 
both his own beliefs and others’ claims about the situation.  Similarly, in remarking upon 
the lack of criticality of a newspaper editorial that advocates the use of American military 
power in the Middle East, we highlight its failure to acknowledge the contestability of 
claims made about the state of the world.  In both cases, criticality references the critical 
character of a particular act or event, where critical is understood to be inherently 
interrogative. 
More often, however, I employ “criticality” to reference the critical character of 
an individual – that is, an individual’s disposition to engage critical modes of being (i.e. 
thinking, understanding, and acting).  Utilized in this way, the term exhibits a meaning 
similar to the Delphi group’s “critical thinking disposition” (Facione, 1990; Facione & 
Facione, 1992; Facione, 2000) and Harvey Siegel’s (Siegel, 1988) “critical spirit,” 
concepts that reference not the act of critical thinking, but the critical thinker.  Thus, in 
the same way that “Adrian lacks a critical spirit” is taken as an assertion of a less-than-
desirable character trait (Ennis, 1996; Facione, 2000), we might speak of “Sophie’s 
natural criticality” as way to describe a valued tendency to question her beliefs, the 
beliefs of others, and the institutional truths that we encounter daily. 12  Criticality, 
                                                 
12 As an aside, there is ongoing debate in the critical thinking community whether critical thinking 
disposition should be understood as constitutive of the individual (i.e. as a personal attribute) or merely as a 
tendency toward a specific type of behavior.  When understood as constitutive, critical thinking disposition 
37 
 
however, differs from critical thinking disposition in both scope and depth.  Where 
critical thinking disposition conceives of critical behavior as a type of thinking, one that 
utilizes defined critical thinking skills (interpretation, analysis, evaluation, synthesis, etc.) 
to come to judgment on all sorts of claims – not just epistemic claims, but aesthetic, 
ethical, pragmatic, etc. - criticality extends the reference of critical disposition beyond 
acts of thinking while limiting its concern to interrogation of belief.  In acting as an 
umbrella term, criticality references the disposition to interrogate regardless of whether 
such interrogation occurs during conscious mentation, in dialogue with others, or, as 
Burbles and Berk would have it, as part of one’s efforts to engage belief-challenging 
social experiences. 
2.2. Everyday criticality and the concept of demand 
Ultimately, though, as the heading of this section indicates, I am interested not in 
criticality per se, but in the more restricted concept of everyday criticality.  Here, I might 
initially propose that the phrase concerns the disposition to interrogate assertions in 
everyday situations.  Such an elaboration clearly suggests a distinction between everyday 
and non-everyday situations, and leaves us with two questions - what distinguishes an 
everyday situation from its non-everyday counterpart, and what value such a distinction 
brings to an understanding of criticality, particularly as it applies to education.  Here we 
                                                 
is typically elaborated as a set of character traits (such as open-mindedness and systematicity) that causally 
predispose individuals to engage critical thinking.  Such traits, while clearly tied to behavioral 
manifestation, maintain an ontological character independent of behavior, allowing for a description of the 
individual as having latent attributes – that is, attributes that may not manifest behavior in every 
opportunity for critical thinking engagement.  I will revisit this issue in Chapter 2, but for further 
discussion, see Facione 2000 and Ennis 1996. 
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might look to the educationally relevant concepts of everyday mathematics and everyday 
literacy for some preliminary guidance.  The introduction to “Literacy in Everyday Life,” 
(Kutner, et al., 2007) which reports the results from the 2003 National Assessment of 
Adult Literacy, begins with a detailed list of examples of everyday situations that require 
literacy of some sort: 
Using written information is an important part of everyday life in the 
United States. Adults in most workplaces are surrounded by written 
information: health and safety postings, brochures describing their 
benefits, instruction manuals, memos, reports, and e-mail. Parents of 
school-aged children often receive written notices and forms from their 
children’s schools: field trip permission slips, flyers about parent meetings 
or parent-teacher conferences, descriptions of course offerings, and 
applications for determining eligibility for free lunches and subsidized 
medical care. Older adults receive mailings explaining their Social 
Security and Medicare benefits. The millions of adults who take 
medication encounter labels explaining dosages, timing for taking the 
medication, interactions with other medications or food, and possible side 
effects. Getting a driver’s license, registering to vote, and renting or 
purchasing a place to live all require reading and understanding written 
information. (p. 1) 
Similarly, the document’s executive summary offers a succinct definition of everyday 
quantitative literacy, describing it as 
the knowledge and skills needed to identify and perform computations 
using numbers that are embedded in printed materials. Examples include 
balancing a checkbook, figuring out a tip, completing an order form, and 
determining the amount of interest on a loan from an advertisement. (pp. 
iii-iv) 
While it might be argued that the concept of everyday mathematics is not itself limited to 
the quantitative skills needed to competently engage printed materials, the varied 
enumeration of everyday situations in these two paragraphs suggest several essential 
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characteristics of “everydayness.”  We might summarize these by stating that everyday 
situations are those regularly engaged by large segments of the population while 
navigating the world.  Understanding health-postings, filling out applications, and 
following medication directions are commonly encountered requirements of successfully 
navigating the world regardless of one’s specific social, economic, and physical 
circumstances.  The same can be said for everyday contexts that demand quantitative 
literacy – they tend to be common experiences encountered while coping with world.  
Inversely, situations that are rarely, or even just occasionally encountered, or are specific 
to an individual’s personal circumstances, would likely not be included in lists like the 
ones above.  Instead, they exemplify what is meant by non-everyday situations. 
By analogy, we might now understand everyday criticality as the disposition to 
interrogate beliefs in situations commonly and generally encountered in the course of 
navigating the world.13  Here, I intend – though obviously not exhaustively - situations 
where we are at the workplace water cooler, at a job interview, watching a presidential 
debate, shopping at the grocery, buying a car, or just walking down the street.  In such 
environments, we almost always find ourselves engaged in some linguistic activity - 
either talking to friends and acquaintances, reading posted text of some sort, or 
overhearing the conversations of others.  And what we regularly encounter is what we 
might term truth claims, statements that purport to describe the way the world is.  
                                                 
13 By “commonly and generally encountered” I mean “regularly encountered by the general 
population.” 
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“America is a bastion of freedom”; “We carry only the freshest meat”; “If you don’t do 
well in Algebra, you’ll end up working at Mc Donald’s”; “Those that can’t do, teach”; 
“Look at how successful Trump is”; even something as benign as “It’s a quarter mile to 
main street.”  Statements like these are ubiquitous in everyday situations – we are 
surrounded by them to the degree that we find ourselves interacting with others.  And I 
would suggest that such claims exert a pressure on us to see the world in a particular 
way.14  It is not simply that they express or entail assertions that, to varying degrees, are 
perceived to be widely accepted, endorsed by authority, or consistent with other core 
beliefs, though these factors are known to exert outsized influence on the process of 
belief acquisition (Lewandowsky, H., Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012). 15  Rather, such 
statements also work in conjunction with each other to reinforce a web of implied 
assumptions, background claims about the structure and function of the world that 
provide higher-order statements the context required to make them semantically 
substantive (Wittgenstein, 1969).  The frequency with which these claims are implied, the 
matter-of-factness of their implication, and ultimately their role in enabling meaningful 
discourse, all contribute to their power to influence what we believe.  Everyday situations 
are filled with these statements, and thus become a primary context - perhaps the primary 
                                                 
14 This is a point emphasized by Heidegger (Being and time, 1962) and central to his elaboration 
of Dasein. 
15 Indeed, in substantiating the influence of mere familiarity on belief acquisition Lewandowsky et 
al. present empirical data that suggests that public retractions often serve to reinforce the belief of patently 
false statements by “directly or indirectly repeat[ing] false information in order to correct it, thus further 
enhancing its familiarity” (Lewandowsky, H., Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012, p. 115). 
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context - for belief acquisition.  As such, there is reason to explore the ramifications of 
critical engagement in these situations.  Everyday criticality, as the disposition to 
critically confront such claims and their silent implications, serves to bring awareness to 
this context, and thus lend a measure of autonomy to the process of belief acquisition. 
There is, however, a difference between articulating the characteristics of 
everyday situations that require criticality and offering a conceptualization of everyday 
criticality.  Indeed, everyday literacy is viewed as a legitimate concept not because there 
exist commonly encountered situations that must be successfully managed, but because 
there exists a type of literacy – a definable set of literacy skills - that everyday situations 
demand.  That these skills comprise a definable subset of the domain does not exclude the 
subset from use in non-everyday situations.  But from an educational perspective, there is 
value to defining such subsets to the degree that a) they map reasonably well to the 
requirements of everyday activities, and b) successful management of such activities is a 
primary educational aim.  By labeling these subsets, we better articulate and limit the 
types of skills students must master to meet stated pedagogical goals. 
In the same way that everyday literacy defines a type of literacy, there is 
something educationally important about the specific disposition to interrogate in 
everyday situations.  Such a disposition, I propose, labels a tendency to interrogate truth 
claims where there exists no demand or expectation to engage such behavior.  In other 
words, I am suggesting that everyday situations are generally characterized by a lack of 
demand for, or expectation of, criticality.  Certainly, that is not always the case.  But the 
same can be said as it relates to everyday literacy, where the type of language used on a 
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billboard, for example, could require skills more appropriate to reading poetry or 
literature.  The fact is, when shopping for groceries, speaking to a doctor about medical 
options, reading a newspaper article, or watching television, there is rarely any social or 
personal expectation to engage critical questioning.  We are left to our own devices to 
interrogate claims as we see fit. 
The same may, of course, be said for many non-everyday situations, as there is no 
stipulation that these must demand critical engagement.  There is, however, a potentially 
demanding non-everyday situation that maintains outsized pedagogical relevance – the 
classroom.  This is, again, not to say that all classroom-based situations are demanding 
situations.  Yet, to the degree that classroom education seeks to nurture criticality by 
asking children to engage critically, the classroom is a paradigmatic non-everyday 
demanding situation.  That is, in being asked to engage critically, whether in dialogue, 
writing, or assessment, students cannot avoid the demand for criticality, regardless of 
how they respond to such demand.  Indeed, the challenge for an education committed to 
everyday criticality is to nurture non-demanded critical engagement in the demanding 
environment of the classroom.  
To be clear, I am offering an analysis where the concept of everyday criticality is 
only contingently tied to our understanding of everyday contexts.  There is no conceptual 
link between the two constructs, nothing inherent in situations commonly and generally 
encountered while managing daily life that necessarily qualifies them as non-demanding.  
Indeed, we can envision a cultural milieu where critical engagement is valued to the point 
that there is sufficient social and personal expectation to engage critically in everyday 
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situations.  In this case, we might very well characterize such situations as being 
demanding, and there would be little reason to speak of non-demanding criticality as 
everyday criticality.  As such, my conceptual articulation of “everyday criticality” is 
based on the empirical claim that everyday situations are generally non-demanding 
situations.16 
From an educational perspective, it is this non-demanding character that is 
essential to the type of critical disposition we wish to nurture.  While an intuitive 
understanding of everydayness as “general and common situations” might naturally 
suggest a disposition to raise pragmatic questions - questions such as whether to take the 
bus or the train, whether to take an umbrella, or whether to go to college – the object of 
critical interrogation needs to be broadened if we are to view criticality as requiring 
“deep” and iterative questioning.  A definition of everydayness in terms of demand 
satisfies this condition, as it makes no claim to the types of questions we should be 
raising.  And yet, demand does suggest an intuitively educational condition on critical 
disposition.  That is, to the degree that development of critical disposition is an aim of 
education, it seems that educators would seek to nurture the tendency to be critical in 
situations where there is little perceived pressure or demand to do so.  These situations, as 
I have argued, are paradigmatically (though contingently) everyday situations.  That they 
                                                 
16 Why this link exists is an interesting question that offers fertile ground for further analysis.  That 
said, it is not necessary for my argument, and thus falls outside the scope of the project. 
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are general and common certainly magnifies the value of non-demanded criticality, but 
the educational value of everydayness itself derives from the general lack of demand. 
This attempt to link distinct critical tendencies to particular thinking contexts has 
precedence in the critical thinking literature.  Perkins et al., in elaborating their 
dispositional theory of critical thinking, introduce the concept of thinking “in the wild,” 
which they define as thinking outside of the classroom (Perkins, Jay, & Tishman, 1993; 
Richhart, 2001; Perkins, Tishman, Richhart, Donis, & Andrade, 2000; Perkins & 
Salomon, 2012).  From an educational perspective, this distinction is justified by the 
radically different conditions that characterize such thinking.  As they state: 
…the challenges of exercising one’s intelligence ‘‘in the wild’’ are 
strikingly different from those in such tame laboratory and testing 
situations. (cf. Hutchins, 1996). Everyday contexts present a wilderness of 
vaguely marked and ill-defined occasions for thoughtful engagement. 
Opportunities for investing one’s intelligence must be detected. When they 
are, whether to bother is often more a personal decision than a compelling 
need. In everyday life, people’s sensitivity to subtle occasions for thinking 
and their inclination to follow through would appear to be substantial 
influences on intellectual performance alongside their capabilities. 
(Perkins, Tishman, Richhart, Donis, & Andrade, 2000, p. 270, emphasis is 
my own) 
To further support the value of the distinction, Perkins’s group offers empirical data that 
document decreased engagement with critical thinking opportunities in “out-of-
classroom” simulations – that is, in contexts that approximate conditions “in the wild.”  
Interestingly, the difference between in-the-wild simulations and in-class situations 
concerns the lack or presence of prompts that encourage critical engagement.  Where in-
class situations ask students to critique text where thinking shortfalls have been 
underlined, out-of-classroom simulations request critique in the absence of such prompts.  
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This lack of prompting is intended to approximate the need for “sensitivity to [the] subtle 
occasions” for critical engagement that exist outside of the classroom.  Not surprisingly, 
the data shows that absent these prompts, students often lack the requisite sensitivity to 
recognize opportunities to critically engage. 
I will return in subsequent chapters to Perkins et al.’s dispositional theory of 
thinking and the importance of recognition to our understanding of criticality.  At this 
point, though, it is important to note that Perkins’s prompts function to approximate what 
I have called a demanding situation, as students in these cases are not left on their own to 
determine the appropriate level of critical engagement.  As Perkins notes, once 
individuals recognize an opportunity for critical engagement, classroom and assessment 
contexts provide a “compelling need” to follow through with critique – either the teacher 
has made the request, the student is being assessed, or the general expectations of the 
classroom environment encourage critical engagement.  Regardless of the specific 
condition, the demand placed on the student provides external motivation to critically 
respond.  Furthermore, demand affects the very sensitivity to critical opportunities 
discussed by Perkins.  Demanding situations not only exert a pressure to follow-through 
on recognized thinking shortfalls, they encourage a more deliberate search for them.  
Perkins may speak of the “loud voice” of critical opportunities in the classroom (Perkins 
& Ritchhart, 2004, p. 352), but we also need to acknowledge the “sharper eyes” 
encouraged by the context in which that voice appears. 
While Perkins’ elaboration of “in-the-wild” functions much in the same way as 
the concept of demand, there is a substantive reason for preferring demand - the two 
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concepts slice the world differently, and the latter cuts in a way that more appropriately 
categorizes the diversity of thinking contexts.  Perkins’s concept “hard-codes” the types 
of situations that appear on either side of the distinction – where the classroom appears 
on one side, all other contexts (i.e. outside the classroom) occupy the other.  In contrast, 
demand avoids such hard-coding.  In focusing on a tell-tale (though contingent) 
characteristic of everyday situations instead of the situations themselves, the concept 
appropriately acknowledges that some situations outside the classroom present 
opportunities in a loud voice and encourage sharper eyes.  For surely there exist instances 
where individuals gather workplace colleagues to critically evaluate company research 
that they believe to be vulnerable to criticism.  And it seems reasonable to believe that 
legal trials encourage a critical sensitivity and follow-through that rivals or exceeds those 
found in classrooms.  Inversely, the concept of demand allows that there are times when 
classrooms do not compel critical follow-through or nurture recognition of critical 
opportunities.  Put simply, there exists a gap between Perkins’ articulation of “in-the-
wild” and the “soft-voice” situations that are their educational priority – the two don’t 
necessarily map well.  Indeed, to the degree that our concern lies with the latter, it 
shouldn’t matter whether those characteristics are present inside the classroom or out.  It 
should only matter that they are present.  Thus, nurturing the disposition to critically 
engage in non-demanding situations becomes the more appropriate way to state the 
pedagogical priority. 
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Chapter 3: Everyday Criticality as an Educational Aim 
3.1. Potential limits of everyday criticality 
In saying that everyday criticality serves to bring awareness, and thus some 
measure of autonomy, to the process of belief acquisition, I intend to make a virtue of the 
concept, to say that everyday criticality is something worthy of being nurtured and 
developed.  Further, seen in the context of other educationally relevant critical concepts – 
specifically critical thinking and critical pedagogy – it is not difficult to view 
development of criticality as the purview of education.  Indeed, as we will see in this 
chapter, there is good reason to believe that everyday criticality already exists as an 
educational aim. 
And yet, the normative claim, the claim that designates everyday criticality an 
intellectual virtue, is not itself one that should be left uncritiqued.  Despite its intuitive 
appeal, there are a number of considerations that bring into question the degree to which 
we should encourage unfettered critique of the status quo.  To begin with, while part of 
the promise of such critique is to effect social change for the better, there is ample 
historical evidence to temper any such expectations.  Indeed, any understanding of 
“change for the better” would itself seem to suggest the need for a particular world view, 
highlighting the circular nature of any such justification.  As Mulnix (2012) notes, that 
we would require the product of critical interrogation to support a particular ethical 
standard would seem to invite an accusation of ideology antithetical to the espoused spirit 
of critical engagement.  The point is echoed by Scheffler when he states that “a system of 
schooling that does not place the world in jeopardy in the process of teaching its students 
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is, accordingly, not providing them with an education” (Scheffler, 1995, p. 85).  The 
point is that, unless we view criticality as an end in itself, there is little to guarantee that 
efforts to encourage it will yield social results aligned with our expectations. 
Additional issues arise when we consider the limits of critical engagement.  Here I 
think there is something to say both from the practical and theoretical perspectives, 
particularly as it concerns the question whether the critical ideal entails that we can 
question anything or whether we should question everything.  As a practical matter, that 
everyday criticality is valued for its service to belief adoption and decision making 
presents a tension with its iterative nature.  For the degree to which we engage iterative 
interrogation determines the extent to which we continue to withhold judgment.  Thus, in 
order to judge and act we must accept a practical limit to the depth of interrogation – at 
some point the iterative questioning has to stop, and we must simply accept some 
statements without critique.17  In a similar manner, it is no small task to engage in 
constant questioning, notwithstanding the vigor with which young children continually 
ask “Why?”  As educational neuroscientist Daniel Willingham notes: 
consider what life would be like if you always strove to think outside the 
box.  Suppose you approached every task afresh and tried to see all of its 
possibilities, even daily tasks like chopping an onion entering your office 
building, or buying a soft drink at lunch.  The novelty might be fun for a 
while, but life would soon be exhausting. (Willingham, 2009, p. 8) 
                                                 
17 As Ann Sharp notes, “The human conditions often might require that we make a provisional 
commitment to one belief or one course of action because of the need to act, but this in no way means that 
the particular belief can be justified as absolute truth” (Sharp, 1991). 
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As Willingham describes it, the issue does not simply concern the depth of critical 
interrogation.  Rather it extends to the range of events potentially subject to critical 
engagement – at some point, enlarging the scope further becomes onerous.  Thus, not 
only do the demands of action and judgment restrict the extent to which we can 
interrogate a particular claim or experience, but they also suggest that it is necessary to 
circumscribe the scope of claims subjected to inquiry. 
While these are practical considerations, theoretical limits to the depth of 
interrogation have also been proposed.  Wittgenstein (1969), in particular, has argued that 
any belief structure – that is, any coherent set of epistemic claims - is founded upon 
propositions that are both unjustifiable and immune from doubt.  He claims that 
statements such as “I am here,” or “I have two hands” express meanings whose negations 
are semantically sense-less, leaving us with assertions of which we are necessarily certain 
independent of any justification.  Indeed, it is precisely because semantic certainty is a 
logical construct, one that depends solely on the lack of meaning of a proposition’s 
negation, that justification is irrelevant to certainties.18  And yet according to 
                                                 
18 Wittgenstein’s argument hinges on the distinction between making an epistemic mistake and 
simply being wrong.  For Wittgenstein, one can be wrong about the truth of a proposition without having 
made a mistake about it.  For to have the possibility of making a mistake, epistemic conditions must exist 
that would render a person capable of doing so – for example, conditions where the lighting was bad or the 
electron microscope malfunctioned.  Absent such conditions, no mistake could be made – a person might 
be wrong to accept a certainty, but they would have not made a mistake.  And it is precisely statements like 
“I have two hands,” stated in the context of seeing one’s hands in optimal conditions, for which such 
conditions do not exist.  A person may be hallucinating, but hallucinations are not epistemic mistakes. 
Wittgenstein’s argument is thus a commentary on the nature of knowledge.  In requiring 
justification, knowledge claims are necessarily vulnerable to mistakes.  As a result, assertions about which 
there can be no mistakes are not knowledge claims.  That the truth value of a certainty derives solely from 
the sense-lessness of its negation obviates the need for justification, rendering the certainty immune to 
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Wittgenstein, these certainties comprise the “foundational” justification for knowledge 
claims, making our entire set of beliefs dependent on what might best be described as 
epistemic axioms.  Iterative interrogation thus reaches a logically necessary end when 
justification references one or more certainties, as questioning such justification is 
tantamount to asking a semantically sense-less question.  And it is clearly a requirement 
of critical engagement that we ask semantically substantive questions. 
Much of what follows, both in subsequent chapters and at the end of this chapter, 
is an attempt to reconcile the value we place on educating for everyday criticality with 
the theoretical and practical limits that I have just introduced.  As I have described it, 
there is an ostensible paradox at the core of criticality, one that juxtaposes the value of 
interrogation with both the need to act and nature of knowledge.  Put simply, if 
questioning has to stop at some point because of practical and theoretical constraints, our 
judgments and actions must ultimately be founded on statements accepted without 
interrogation.  Such is the proposed role of epistemic criteria, which offers a set of 
accepted standards to resolve inquiry in the face of justificatory limits (Lipman, 2003; 
Dunne, 2015).  As we have seen, though, different constructs in the “critical” family 
utilize disparate and often conflicting epistemic criteria, leading us to further inquire 
which criteria ought to be adopted.  Burbules and Berk have even argued that criticality 
itself demands that we engage such inquiry, going so far as to suggest that we explore the 
                                                 
mistakes.  As such, certainties are oxymoronically not knowledge claims.  Instead, they are the axioms 
upon which a knowledge structure is founded. 
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value of thinking outside any particular established framework.  Indeed, in claiming that 
“multiple, unreconciled interpretations, by contrast, might yield other sorts of benefits,” 
(Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 15) they propose that there is something inherently valuable – 
something inherently critical - about not coming to judgment, about simply arranging for 
intellectual “display” the possible answers to a question or problem.  The same might be 
said about Paul’s articulation of strong sense critical thinking, which suggests the limits 
of adjudicating between worldviews.19  All this highlights the essential paradox inherent 
in the concept of criticality– that to render judgment, the critical process ultimately 
requires an act of “non-criticality” as a restraint on further interrogation. 
As I hope to show, this paradox maintains deep ramifications for how we 
conceptualize and educate for everyday criticality, ramifications that I believe have been 
ignored by both the theoretical literature on critical disposition and education policy as it 
relates to developing the capacity for critical thinking.  That such ramifications matter at 
all, though, assumes that everyday criticality either is, or should be, an educational 
priority.  While my concern with everyday criticality may belie my personal normative 
stance, I prefer to argue for the empirical claim - that this value is generally held as a core 
aim of contemporary education in the United States.  Given that such a claim might 
appear to some as highly contentious in light of the current focus on academic 
fundamentals and standardized testing, I want to make it clear that I am not arguing that 
                                                 
19 Siegel, in fact, criticizes Paul’s strong sense critical thinking on grounds that “we are left with a 
vicious form of relativism in which all ‘rational’ disputes boil down to unanalyzable differences in world 
view” (Siegel, 1988, p. 14) 
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the contemporary classroom is a model of open-minded iterative inquiry.  However, I do 
want to suggest that education for everyday criticality is a widely-held priority in both 
popular and academic educational literature.  While what follows is far from being a 
comprehensive review of the literature, the exemplars that I have chosen should serve to 
justify the viability of this claim. 
3.2. Visions of everyday criticality as an aim of education 
3.2.1. Popular visions.  Though the call to educate for everyday criticality has 
traditionally found traction in academic literature, two recent books suggest that the issue 
has found its way into popular educational dialogue.  In “A More Beautiful Question,” 
Warren Berger (2014) argues that a practice of asking the right questions is the key to 
personal and social improvement.  As he states, “we can and should ask Why about 
career, family relationships, local community issues – anywhere we might encounter a 
situation that is ripe for change and improvement” (p. 30). Berger documents dozens of 
interviews with prominent individuals - people in academic, spiritual, business, and social 
domains – who attribute their success to critical disposition.  In analyzing the 
commonalities that these individuals exhibit in their penchant for questioning, Berger 
develops a three-step process of inquiry to define and answer ambitious but actionable 
questions, questions such as “Why does a prosthetic foot have to be shaped like a human 
foot?” (p. 29), “Why is my father-in-law so difficult?” (p. 30), and “Why do I believe in 
God?”  Berger calls these “Why?” questions “Beautiful Questions,” and suggests that 
their role in initiating personal, material, and social change endows them with exceptional 
character, a unique beauty in the domain of possible questions.  To be clear, though, in 
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advocating the importance of asking “Why?” Berger is not suggesting that we seek out 
reasons for an already accepted belief - to ask why a prosthetic foot must assume the 
form of a human foot is not to accept the necessity of the situation.  Rather, it is the job of 
the “Why?” question to engage the possibility of belief rejection – of not assuming that 
prosthetic feet must be fashioned in the shape of a human foot, or of reworking one’s 
beliefs about a father-in-law.  It is this power for initiating inquiry, for putting on the 
table the possibility of rejecting the status quo, that makes “Why?” questions uniquely 
beautiful.  Moreover, Berger is clear about the connection between beauty and success, as 
he attributes the success of the individuals he profiles to “their willingness to challenge 
assumptions and to believe that everything is subject to change – regardless of what 
conventional wisdom holds” (p. 94).  In this sense, we might say that not only are 
“Why?” questions beautiful, but that there is a certain beauty inherent in the critical 
disposition itself. 
While “Why?” questions define Berger’s first stage of inquiry, his second and 
third stages require that we ask “What if?” and “How?”.  These questions, however, 
maintain a different role in the inquiry process than “Why?” questions.  Whereas asking 
“Why?” invites the possibility of deconstructing one’s belief system, “What if?” and 
“How?” support a process of reconstruction.  In asking “What if?” we lay on the table 
alternatives to the status quo.  And when we ask “How?” we seek implementation, to find 
a way to replace the status quo with one of those alternatives.  In this way, we might see 
Berger’s process along the same lines articulated by the various “critical” constructs I 
discussed earlier.  Beautiful questions are questions of criticality, questions that affirm 
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the possibility of changing reality, whether that reality concerns the world, one’s own 
belief system, or one’s behavior.  As such, they serve the same role as critical questioning 
in critical thinking, critical pedagogy, critical being, etc.  “What if?” and “How?” 
questions, on the other hand, function to help answer a question, to resolve interrogation.  
Thus, such questions can be seen as being analogous to the epistemic criteria proposed by 
the various critical concepts. 
While “A More Beautiful Question” addresses critical disposition as an 
educational issue that transcends schooling, Berger does explore the role that schools 
might play in nurturing criticality.  As if to emphasize both the failures and possibilities 
of contemporary schooling in this regard, he rhetorically asks 
…if we also acknowledge that the ability to question effectively is among 
the most important of the critical skills needed… this question naturally 
arises:  What if our schools could train students to be better lifelong 
learners and better adapters to change, by enabling them to be better 
questioners? (p. 49) 
He then proceeds to elaborate a critique of the current classroom environment, 
referencing education research that documents the progressive lack of opportunities for 
inquiry as students move from primary to secondary education, and quoting 
administrators and teachers who uniformly express the belief that classroom questioning 
continues to be the privilege of the teacher, mostly to check up on students instead of 
encouraging inquiry.  Such questioning, Berger states is “apt to leave a student feeling 
‘exposed’ rather than inspired” (p. 56), and thus functions to kill the natural 
inquisitiveness that young children bring to school.  Among several academics, he quotes 
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Yale professor William Deresiewicz, who attributes students’ failure to “ask big 
questions about values and meaning and purpose” (p. 67) to education’s preoccupation 
with developing domain-specific technical expertise.  On the hopeful side, Berger 
profiles Deborah Meier’s Central Park East School, which he holds as a model of 
education for questioning that has also achieved success by traditional academic 
measures.  He also discusses other models of inquiry-based education, including 
Brightworks and High Tech High, noting that in such schools, “the entire curriculum is 
based around big questions” (p. 54). 
Tony Wagner takes a similar view of questioning in his 2012 book “Creating 
Innovators.” As the title of the book suggests, Wagner holds the same concern as Berger 
for nurturing the capacity to enact change.  And much like “A More Beautiful Question,” 
“Creating Innovators” is a work of informal qualitative research, presenting an analysis 
of eight case studies that elaborate the commonalities in the education of both STEM and 
social innovators.  Wagner’s focus, though, differs from Berger’s on two accounts.  First, 
while Berger makes clear the impact of critical questioning on all aspects of life, Wagner 
explicitly ties his educational ideal to the development of innovators in the workplace, 
emphasizing the need for innovation in addressing the world’s current and future 
problems.  Second, rather than explicitly prioritize the role of interrogation in developing 
innovators, Wagner points to three broad pedagogical heuristics as the crux of his 
analysis, naming play, passion, and purpose as core elements of an education for 
innovation.  He holds that these aims maintain a sequentially causal relation, where the 
openness of play fosters the growth of individual passion, which itself enables a sense of 
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life purpose as commitment to one’s passion grows.  Education for innovation requires a 
pedagogy that encourages the development of passion and purpose, and Wagner is clear 
that contemporary teaching and policy is often at odds with such goals. 
Though Wagner’s pedagogical imperatives are ostensibly defined by the “play, 
passion, and purpose” slogan, the value of critical questioning is a theme that permeates 
the entirety of “Creating Innovators.”  In describing the process of innovation, Wagner 
speaks of questioning in much the same way as Berger, stating that “questioning allows 
innovators to break out of the status quo and consider new possibilities” (p. 14).  Here we 
have a link to Berger’s “Why?” and “What if?” questions, where in both cases the former 
acts to interrogate reality as we currently understand it, while the latter serves to 
introduce alternatives.  This need for critically questioning the status quo is reiterated 
throughout the book, as we are told, for example, that “…the innovator’s skills described 
in this book…allow you to ask the right questions…” (p. 25), that “to innovate, you have 
to question the status quo – rebel in a sense” (pp. 178-179), and that “we have to suspend 
judgments about how things are supposed to be if we’re going to develop the capacities 
of children to be innovators as adults” (p. 205).  Indeed, there is little ambiguity about the 
educational demand to nurture critical engagement.  Innovation requires interrogation, so 
education for innovation entails education for criticality. 
I might note that there is a sense in which the slogan “play, passion, and purpose” 
suggests a distinction I have reiterated several times – the distinction between 
deconstructing and reconstructing belief structure.  In addition to seeing play as a means 
of developing passion, Wagner touts it as an activity conducive to critical engagement, 
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one that allows even the youngest children to immerse themselves in the ramifications of 
alternate realities.  As such, play can be viewed as a means of enabling deconstruction, as 
a way to nurture the disposition to reconsider our understanding of the world.  Similarly, 
Wagner’s “purpose” acts as a reconstructive impulse, one that works to realize alternate 
possibilities. These are, in fact, points that Wagner highlights in his case studies.  In 
telling the story of Jamien Sills, for example, he describes a young boy whose play with 
basketball sneakers led him to develop a fascination for sneaker design as a young adult.  
While learning everything about the sneaker industry, Jamien began to question the 
necessity of the toxic production methods utilized by sneaker companies.  According to 
Wagner, it was precisely this questioning that transformed Jamien’s passion for sneakers 
into a purpose, one that has him on the brink of creating a company devoted to the non-
toxic mass production of sneakers. 
3.2.2. Academic visions. In academia, there exists a long and varied tradition of 
normative educational ideals that seek to nurture everyday criticality.  The lineage can 
arguably be traced back to Socrates, whose pedagogy of iterative inquiry is both well 
documented by the Platonic dialogues and explicitly referenced by contemporary 
elaborations of education for criticality.  Despite these common roots, contemporary 
normative educational visions value everyday criticality for a variety of reasons, many of 
which align everyday criticality with the other educational aims.  In much the same way 
that Wagner emphasizes the need for criticality because of its role in fostering innovation, 
academic visions for education often ascribe an instrumental function to everyday 
criticality, seeing it as a requirement to achieving a broader aim.  This is particularly the 
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case when it comes to visions that prioritize aspects of social justice.  Thus, Martha 
Nussbaum’s (2010) democratic education and Paolo Freire’s (1996; 2009) liberatory 
education both advocate everyday criticality as a priority because of a theorized link 
between interrogation of the socioeconomic status quo and the development of more 
equitable social relations.  Something similar might be said for educational visions that 
avoid explicitly social aims – for example, the thinking skills movement and Dewey’s 
inquiry pedagogy - where everyday criticality is seen as an essential component of a 
program to improve personal judgment and action.  This is not to suggest that these ideals 
fail to ascribe non-instrumental value to an education for everyday criticality.  Indeed, 
authors like Freire and bell hooks (2009) speak of the phenomenologically transformative 
potential of criticality to impart a “pregnancy” to lived experience and a richer 
appreciation for everyday encounters.  However, with the exception of perhaps 
Scheffler’s (1995) concept of the educated person, the normative ideals I discuss below 
view the link between criticality and the character of lived experience as secondary to 
social and cognitive concerns. 
Indeed, the list of authors advocating an education for criticality is long enough to 
require an abbreviated treatment in this section.  Fortunately, Martha Nussbaum 
undertakes a task similar to mine, documenting the long tradition of the Socratic ideal in 
Western education.  Thus, I will reference her work in Not for Profit (2010) as the base of 
my case, adding to the discussion an overview of number of authors who have continued 
this tradition more recently - Freire, Adorno, Scheffler, and Siegel.  Others, like Gutman 
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(1987) and hooks (2009), could be included as well, though given the purpose of this 
section, the authors I have chosen should offer enough support for my core claim. 
Not for Profit presents an impassioned warning about the trajectory of Western 
education, declaring it in danger of abandoning its inherently democratic emphasis on the 
humanities in the face of a single-minded push to maximize economic development.  To 
this end, Nussbaum engages a detailed analysis of the essential components of the 
Western educational tradition, addressing why each is essential to the health of 
democratic society.  Education for critical thinking, and in particular the iterative 
interrogation of Socratic pedagogy, is arguably the centerpiece of her analysis, and she 
both documents its place in the history of Western educational theory and offers her own 
argument for its value.  In defending the claim that “[Socrates’s] ideal of critical 
questioning… is central to the theory and practice of liberal education in the Western 
tradition” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 47), Nussbaum traces the development of an education for 
everyday criticality from its 18th century theoretical roots in Rousseau’s Emile and 
Pestalozzi’s Leonard and Gertrude, through the 19th century practice of Froebel and 
Alcott, and finally to its 20th century culmination in the writings and projects of Dewey.  
In each case, the emphasis on critical questioning and self-examination is portrayed as an 
antidote “to an education that formed students into pliant tools of traditional authority” 
(Nussbaum, 2010, p. 62) , an education that she declares “is bad for life in general, [and] 
is fatal for democracy, since democracies will not survive without alert and active 
citizens” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 62). 
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In adding her voice to the critical tradition, Nussbaum offers three reasons for the 
importance of everyday criticality.  Though these are framed in terms of the need for self-
examination rather than criticality, her description of Socratic pedagogy as the critical 
questioning employed in the service of self-examination renders them applicable to 
criticality.  To begin, Nussbaum claims that self-examination is required for individuals 
to articulate with sufficient clarity a set of goals needed to avoid irrelevant or 
counterproductive action.  Indeed, she states that “Socratic examination does not 
guarantee a good set of goals, but it at least guarantees that goals pursued will be seen 
clearly in relation to one another, and crucial issues will not be missed by haste and 
inadvertence” (Nussbaum, 2010, pp. 49-50).  She further notes that self-examination 
offers a bulwark against manipulation and demagoguery, facilitating a “culture of 
individual dissent” that counteracts our natural vulnerability to authoritarian subservience 
and peer pressure (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 54).  Finally, she suggests that people who fail to 
engage critical self-examination often disrespect others.  This, she claims, is particularly 
true and detrimental in the realm of political debate, which, when taken as a form of 
competitive sport, often fails to promote constructive dialogue and good collective 
decision-making.  She suggests that such failings create the conditions for a failure of 
democratic life, presenting an opportunity for anti-democratic personalities and 
institutions to gain an influence of everyday life. 
Nussbaum does not mention Theodor Adorno in Not for Profit, but her argument 
for an education for criticality is almost identical to the one Adorno offers in “Education 
After Auschwitz” (1998).  Like Nussbaum, Adorno expresses the need for creating a 
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culture of dissent through self-examination, stating that “the single genuine power 
standing against the principle of Auschwitz is autonomy, if I might use the Kantian 
expression: the power of reflection of self-determination, of not cooperating” (Adorno, 
1998, p. 4).  And he believes that education offers perhaps the sole means of nurturing 
such a culture in light of the inherently barbaric tendencies of civilization.  Yet for 
education to live up to the task, it needs to make self-examination its primary pedagogical 
aim, developing in children the critical faculties needed to bring to consciousness the 
forces that motivate personal behavior, particularly behavior that is cruel or barbaric.  As 
he states, “One must labor against this lack of reflection, must dissuade people from 
striking outward without reflecting upon themselves.  The only education that has any 
sense at all is an education toward critical self-reflection” (Adorno, 1998, p. 2).  Critical 
self-reflection is thus the very activity advocated by Nussbaum – a self-examination 
through questioning that leads to better understanding of one’s self and relation to the 
world.  Furthermore, Adorno hypothesizes the same effects of engaging this activity – the 
ability to think for oneself and a propensity to treat others with dignity and respect.  
Indeed, both authors employ similar language to articulate the role autonomous cognition 
in avoiding the worst behavioral tendencies of humans.  Where Adorno speaks of the 
need to prevent another Auschwitz through “the power of reflection, self-determination, 
of non-cooperation,” Nussbaum states that “to prevent atrocities we need to counteract 
tendencies [toward authoritarian subservience and peer pressure], producing a culture of 
individual dissent” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 54) . 
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Freire’s liberatory education further expands the social and ethical dimensions of 
an education for criticality.  Unlike Nussbaum and Adorno, who speak explicitly of 
educating children, Freire targets the education of the disenfranchised poor, particularly 
poor adults.  And yet, his story is the same – education maintains a unique ability to 
address oppression and social injustice, but only if it embraces a pedagogy of criticality, 
where the disposition to critically interrogate one’s understanding of world becomes the 
didactic focus.  Consider what he states in Pedagogy of the Oppressed: 
The revolutionary leaders must realize that their own conviction of the 
necessity for struggle… was not given to them by anyone else – if it is 
authentic….  Only the leaders’ own involvement in reality, within an 
historical situation, led them to criticize this situation and to which to 
change it.  Likewise, the oppressed… must reach this conviction as 
Subjects, not as objects.  They also must intervene critically in the 
situation which surrounds them and whose mark they bear (Freire, 1996, 
p. 49). 
Here, the foundation of social revolution rests not with the ability of leaders to mobilize 
the oppressed, but with the critical engagement of the masses.  Perhaps more directly, but 
to the same effect, Freire states that “Those truly committed to liberation… must abandon 
the educational goal of deposit-making [of transmitting packaged knowledge] and replace 
it with the posing of the problems of human beings in their relations with the world” 
(Freire, 1996, p. 60).  Yet Freire is clear – problems themselves cannot be packaged.  It is 
not a matter of presenting them to the people, as a type of knowledge presented in the 
process of “deposit-making.”  Rather, individuals must recognize problems on their own, 
even if it is the job of a teacher to facilitate that recognition:  “the program content of the 
problem-posing method – dialogical par excellence -  is constituted and organized by the 
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students’ view of the world, where their own generative themes are found” (Freire, 1996, 
p. 90). 
This need to generate one’s own themes or “problems” is the foundation for an education 
for criticality.  The teacher of the oppressed is not the authority on which students rely to 
articulate the parameters of a liberation struggle.  Instead, the teacher acts in dialogue 
with students, engaging an interrogation of the world as perceived by the student.  It is in 
this way that students begin to recognize problems in situations that previously seemed 
unproblematic.  Freire explains: 
That which had existed objectively but had not been perceived in its 
deeper implications (if indeed it was perceived at all) begins to “stand 
out,” assuming the character of a problem and therefore of challenge.  
Thus, men and women begin to single out elements from the “background 
awareness” and to reflect upon them.  These elements are now objects of 
their consideration, and, as such, objects of their action and cognition. 
(Freire, 1996, p. 90) 
In this way, the dialogue inherent to a pedagogy for criticality maintains a transformative 
effect.  It is not simply that students are made aware of problems, and thus understand the 
need for action.  Rather, they engage an iterative, reflective process that develops their 
ability to recognize such problems in the context of their own lives. 
While Nussbaum, Adorno, and Freire value criticality for its social and ethical 
import, Scheffler justifies it conceptually, as part of the very meaning of education.  
Though Scheffler articulates a complex and multifaceted analysis of the educated person, 
he, like the others, gives center-stage to criticality.  Indeed, in detailing the three core 
attributes of educated individuals - cognitive perspective, care, and conversation - he 
repeatedly references the need for, and disposition towards, critical intervention.  
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Consider the section on cognitive perspective, in which his discussion of explanatory 
principles concludes with the requirement that moral education nurture “the disposition to 
probe into the principles underlying the code of conduct to which one is attached by 
training” (Scheffler, 1995, p. 85).  Here, moral education is defined not by the process of 
learning a code of conduct, but by the tendency to evaluate and rethink that code.  The 
same idea resurfaces in the section on care, where Scheffler declares that “caring involves 
active participation in the forms of thought into which the person has been inducted, and 
such participation is the basis of critical modification of these forms themselves” 
(Scheffler, 1995, p. 87) .  That Scheffler finds it necessary to single out “critical 
modification of a discipline” as an outcome of care when clearly there are numerous 
other relevant implications of caring participation suggests the value he ascribes to 
criticality.  Criticality is referenced one final time in the section on conversation, with 
Scheffler arguing that education through dialogue nurtures a “sense of [him]self as a 
member of a critical community, responsible to general canons of evaluation to which his 
own beliefs and actions are subject…” (Scheffler, 1995, p. 89).  Here again, Scheffler 
emphasizes the value of criticality.  But this time, the relation concerns neither the ability 
nor the tendency to engage critically, as was the case with cognitive perspective and care, 
respectively.  Instead, it concerns the thinker’s self-image as a critical being in 
community with others. 
While these statements suggest that the three components gain their educative 
import from their ties to criticality, Scheffler offers one broad statement that cements the 
priority of criticality.  He states: 
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My predecessor at Harvard, Robert Ulich, used to say that all education is 
a dangerous business.  You had better be prepared for risks if you enter 
into education.  John Dewey expressed the same point more generally 
when he remarked that every time you think, you place a piece of the 
world in jeopardy.  A system of schooling that does not place the world in 
jeopardy in the process of teaching its students is, accordingly, not 
providing them with an education. (Scheffler, 1995, p. 85) 
Here, we ought not mistake this statement as requiring that teachers merely present the 
world as questionable.  In the same way that Freire’s problem-posing pedagogy seeks to 
nurture a critical spirit, Scheffler’s demand to “put the world in jeopardy” is a call to 
develop in students the tendency to critique and, indeed, rethink the foundations of our 
understanding – to enable students themselves to problematize the world.  For, as noted 
by Dewey, it is when you think that you place the world in jeopardy.  Such thinking 
simply is critical thinking – not in its dual manifestation of interrogation and assertion, 
but as an act of criticality, of entertaining the possibility that the world is other than is 
currently assumed.  Of course, the full complement of assertive skills will have to come 
into play if such a possibility is evaluated.  But the act of putting knowledge in jeopardy 
is, at its core, an act of interrogation. 
3.3. Articulating an ideal of everyday criticality 
Regardless of the particular vision, the fact that everyday criticality is held as an 
educational aim entails that we can articulate an ideal of everyday critical behavior that 
constitutes that aim.  This would be the case with any educational aim, or even any aim in 
general, as the very idea of an aim requires that we articulate a target of our efforts.  Such 
is the motivation behind existing elaborations of the ideal critical thinker (see Ennis, 
1996; Facione, 1990; Facione, 2000; Siegel, 1988), where a description of one who is 
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open-minded, inquisitive, systematic, etc., defines at least some of the major objectives of 
an education for critical thinking.  Absent such description, the aim is itself semantically 
empty, devoid of the detail necessary to understand what it is we seek to achieve. 
 Yet the mere mention of a critical ideal or standard is fraught with potential 
pitfalls.  Perhaps most concerning is the question of who determines the standard, whose 
view of ideally appropriate questioning should constitute the norm.  Can we say that 
born-again Christians fail to approximate the critical ideal to the degree of Darwinian 
evolutionists because they tend not to question their creationist beliefs?  Or is it that their 
personal religious experiences have led them to develop epistemic criteria that render 
such questioning inappropriate, in the same way that others might consider inappropriate 
questions about the material existence of their dining room table.  Dunne’s emphasis on 
the need to consider personal epistemic criteria highlights precisely this criticism – that 
what we question depends, at least in part, on our fundamental epistemic commitments, 
on what we hold as appropriate justification for belief adoption.  Wittgenstein (1969) 
offers a similar claim in stating that “…the questions that we raise and our doubts depend 
on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt” (p. 44).  Such certainties, he 
claims, act as “methodological propositions” (p. 41) or “rules of testing” (p. 15) – that is, 
they form our epistemic criteria.  And while it may be appealing to adopt the epistemic 
criteria articulated by science, the problem of justifying such criteria has long been 
acknowledged (see, for example Wittgenstein, 1969; Goodman, 1983; Kuhn, 2012).  
Without such justification, any drive to define a critical ideal is vulnerable to a claim of 
arbitrariness. 
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Note, too, that the concept of everydayness further threatens to undermine 
attempts at defining an ideal of everyday criticality.  Here, the problem concerns the 
meaning of phrase “generally and commonly encountered” as well as the ontological 
assumptions it entails.  As Ben Highmore notes, “Any assumption that it [everyday life] 
is simply ‘out there,’ as a palpable reality to be gathered up and described, should face an 
immediate question: whose everyday life?” (Highmore, 2002, p. 1).  In defining everyday 
situations in terms of a generality that includes large swaths of a population, we run the 
risk of ignoring the life experiences of those omitted from that generality - the 
marginalized, the powerless, or the merely different.  As Highmore emphasizes, such 
exclusion is tantamount to concretizing the contingent dominance of specific cultures to 
the point of excluding, or even dismissing, the “other.”  Along similar lines, what counts 
as commonly encountered is also potentially up for debate.  Are swims at the watering 
hole commonly encountered?  Are evenings at a rock concert?  Such questions naturally 
return us to the question of whose everyday life are we talking about.  But even for those 
of us whose life includes such activities, are we justified in thinking of them as commonly 
encountered? 
While these issues highlight potential difficulties defending an articulation of 
everyday criticality, the same problems exist for other concepts that reference 
everydayness.  When we speak of everyday literacy or mathematics, we assume the 
existence of a family of situations requiring a definable set of skills.  That such skills are 
the purview of formal schooling derives, at least in part, from a belief in their common 
and general need, from the perception that a large enough percentage of the population 
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frequently enough encounters situations whose successful navigation requires such skills.  
As such, there is a utilitarian element to educational talk of everydayness that justifies 
Highmore’s basic criticism – in educating for the common and general, we necessarily 
exclude the uncommon and particular.  But does such a criticism delegitimize efforts at 
promoting everyday literacy?  If not, it would seem difficult to treat the concept of 
everyday criticality any differently, for the same utilitarian justification for teaching 
everyday literacy exists for invoking the concept of everyday criticality. 
Furthermore, while there is an inherent ambiguity to everydayness when 
conceived as general and common situations, there exists a particular allure to 
committing to its conceptual “core.”  Here, I might again reference Wittgenstein (2001), 
who describes the “concept of a concept” in terms of family resemblance.  Where an 
articulation of sufficient and necessary conditions tends to have difficulty accounting for 
instances that reside at the boundaries of a domain, we can conceptualize a universal by 
recognizing a distinct web of resemblances among particulars.  Like a rope whose tensile 
strength is generated without any one strand traversing the length of the rope, an 
understanding of everydayness derives from a web of similarity existing among the 
instances of everydayness that to a greater or lesser degree resemble each other without 
each resembling a definable universal.  Here the boundaries of “general and common 
situations” might themselves be fuzzy, but we have little trouble recognizing core 
situations of everydayness.  They have a resemblance to each other that rings out as being 
everyday. 
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Perhaps these conceptual difficulties are even less troubling when we conceive of 
everyday criticality in terms of demand.  For in speaking of criticality in non-demanding 
situations, we remove the conceptual dependency on general and common situations.  
Indeed, there is no requirement that non-demanding situations be general and common - 
they just must lack the personal or social expectation to interrogate assertions.  And I 
have suggested that this lack of demand is at the heart of the drive to educate for 
everyday criticality.  While we, of course, desire that individuals act appropriately critical 
in all situations, there is a particular challenge to engage critical behavior in situations 
where people do not expect us to do so.  Such was the upshot of the previous section, 
where I argued that popular, scholarly, and policy publications all emphasize that 
education ought to respond to this challenge.  There are likely a number of reasons for 
valuing such a challenge, perhaps none more so than the belief that claims made in non-
demanding situations bear an outsized influence on belief adoption.  But that such 
situations are common and general is not itself what we perceive to be at issue – rather 
ubiquity simply magnifies the severity of the issue, helping to dictate the urgency of a 
response.  What is at issue is that we value critical engagement when it is not demanded 
by the situation. And if we take this approach to articulating the educational imperative, 
the conceptual fuzziness of everyday criticality become less relevant and therefore less 
troubling. 
There is an additional way to address this issue that helps articulate a context for 
the argument that I will develop in subsequent chapters.  Regardless of any conceptual 
problems with “everydayness,” I have already offered the empirical claim that everyday 
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criticality is a core educational aim.  As such, there appears to be a mainstream 
recognition of the legitimacy of speaking about everyday situations, for it would be 
difficult to hold an aim of everyday criticality while dismissing talk of everydayness.  It 
is to this audience that my argument is directed.  That is, I wish to point out that even 
when we acknowledge the value of educating for everyday criticality, there exist 
substantive problems with the way we understand and seek to nurture everyday criticality 
in the classroom.  As such, one might say that I dismiss conceptual criticism of everyday 
criticality on technical grounds.  Some people may express concern about the viability of 
everyday criticality - but given that I am already speaking to the choir, such concerns fall 
outside the scope of the current discourse. 
Before moving on, let me summarize the argument I have offered up to this point.  
I have argued that, despite whatever disconnect exists between stated educational values 
and the reality of American schooling, everyday criticality is held as an aim of 
contemporary education in the United States.  Given that every aim is defined by an 
ideal, it would seem that there must be an ideal of everyday criticality, a normative 
articulation of the disposition to interrogate assertions in non-demanding situations.  
However, I have made it a point to note that what is taken as questionable is, in part, a 
function of one’s belief structure, which in acting to define an individual’s epistemic 
criteria, endows beliefs with varying degrees of practical immunity from questioning.  
Finally, I have agreed with Wittgenstein and others that adjudicating between belief 
structures is ultimately not itself a matter of reasoned justification, rendering it 
impossible to ascribe priority to any particular set of epistemic criteria on purely rational 
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grounds.  Justification begets a false demand for further justification, when in reality 
reasoning ends with unjustified assertions that, at best, maintain intuitive appeal.   
In taking stock of these claims, it becomes particularly difficult to say what, as 
critical beings, we ought to be questioning.  Again, are fundamentalists being any less 
critical than non-believers for not questioning the existence of a deity?  Or are their core 
beliefs necessary epistemic prerequisites for a critical standard?  Unless we accept the 
priority of a particular set of core beliefs, it would seem that we must entertain any 
number of specific ideals of critical disposition.  So let us leave it as a possibility that 
there is a “locality” to the critical ideal, one that takes into account the differences in 
belief structures that arise from differences in culture, geography, technology, etc.  In this 
case, we might resign ourselves to speaking of a localized, “small-s” standard of 
criticality.20 
That said, let me suggest that despite this possibility, the works and documents 
reviewed earlier suggest at least one basic normative commonality: that in educating for 
criticality, we seek to make individuals more critical.  Even if we lack agreement as to 
what is legitimately questionable, we want students to question more, to be less prone to 
accepting assertions without evaluation.  Implicit in this position is the belief that 
individuals do not meet the critical demands of the contemporary world, that they fail to 
                                                 
20 Of course, the very idea of multiple standards is itself oxymoronic, and potentially begs the 
question “What is a standard, if there can be multiple of them?”   
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critically interrogate claims when they should.  Perhaps Berger offers the most practical 
summary of this view when he states that 
the more we’re deluged with information, with ‘facts’ (which may or may 
not be), views, appeals, offers, and choices, then the more we must be able 
to sift and sort and decode and make sense of it all through rigorous 
inquiry. (Berger, 2014, pp. 25-26)  
 Often though, in what ostensibly sounds like standard language about the demands of 
critical thinking, we hear something a bit more extreme - an implicit suggestion to 
question everything.  Thus, Dunne claims that “critical reason…insists on tirelessly re-
evaluating and re-constructing institutionalized truth.” (Dunne, 2015, p. 95).  And Nieto 
and Valenzuela state that “once critical thinking has been deployed and has become the 
normal way of addressing problems and situations…” (Nieto & Valenzuela, 2012, p. 33).  
And Ikuonobe (2001) makes this suggestion explicit with an epistemological argument:  
the fact that our knowledge is only highly probable (given human 
fallibilism) implies that there is a window of opportunity for one to be in 
error. Insofar as such a window exists, no matter how small, we should be 
committed to questioning and critically exploring it. (Ikuonobe, 2001, p. 
329) 
Even Harvey Siegel (1988), who seeks to counter this view, ends up offering backhanded 
support.  In arguing that we should not be “moved solely and slavishly by devotion to 
reasons” (p. 133), and that “it makes perfect sense to… ignore the demands of reason in 
some circumstances” (p. 133), Siegel concludes that we should be “critical about being 
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critical” (p. 133).21  That is, he allows that we might be able to assume a non-critical 
attitude in situations, but only after we have critically accepted the “meta-reasons for 
ignoring object-level reasons” (p. 133).  Thus, we might abandon interrogation if, for 
example, we critically determine that we play piano better when we prioritize intuition, or 
have a better chance to survive battle by mindlessly reacting to events.  While such a 
position does allow individuals to assume a non-critical attitude, it has the odd effect of 
furthering the scope of criticality.  For in Siegel’s normative vision, restraint from critical 
interrogation becomes acceptable only when it is mandated by critical interrogation.  That 
is, even our moments of uncritical behavior require the blessings of criticality. 
I might also note that the “leeway” to be uncritical that Siegel grants is perhaps 
only marginally different than the mainstream critical thinking attitude toward belief 
adoption, which allows beliefs to be accepted after critical interrogation22.  In both cases, 
we are allowed a measure of non-criticality after critical interrogation where the degree to 
which we can accept an assertion after critique is the degree to which we engage in the 
same sort of restraint from critical thinking that Siegel finds acceptable.  And since Siegel 
clearly does not consider critical belief adoption to be indicative of a lack of critical 
thinking, the same should be the case for Siegel’s intentionally non-critical behavior. 
                                                 
21 Siegel speaks of critical disposition in terms of providing reasons rather than interrogation.  That 
said, there is no way to see the search for reasons without assuming interrogation.  Indeed, such a search 
inherently involves interrogation. 
22 Such an attitude is common to just about all formulations of critical thinking, and generally 
follows from Ennis’s stipulation that critical thinking concerns what to believe and do. 
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That both justify a measure of restraint from criticality by reference to criticality itself 
suggests that there is something wrong in characterizing one as an example of continued 
criticality and the other as illustrative of non-criticality.23 
What is to be said of this call for more critical engagement?  On first glance, there 
would seem to be little reason to disagree with it.  Indeed, I have little problem with the 
claim that individuals should be more critical.  But there is a difference in accepting this 
claim and saying that more critical engagement constitutes the ideal of criticality.  To say 
that people generally need to be more critical entails a comparison between the current 
“state” of critical expression and our ideal.  It implies that if the ideal were realized, 
individuals would be more critical than they currently are.  But it does not entail that the 
ideal of criticality is itself defined as more criticality.  Rather, it entails only that the 
byproduct of realizing the ideal, whatever that may be, ought to be more critical behavior 
than currently exists.  In fact, I am not sure that a critical ideal based on “more” is 
semantically specific enough to be considered much of an ideal at all, as its implied 
comparison – “more than what?” – merely specifies meeting some minimum quantitative 
baseline of criticality. 
                                                 
23 One might see this as a poor analogy, arguing that critical belief adoption requires that beliefs be 
held tentatively and always subject to further critical inquiry.  While I have no problem with this attitude 
toward belief adoption, I think the same can be said for being critical about being critical.  That is, the need 
to be critical does not end once we have critically allowed a measure of non-criticality.  For in the same 
way that we need to be alert to reasons for abandoning or modifying a belief, we must be alert to changes 
of context that require us to resume a critical attitude.  In both cases, we still need a measure of criticality in 
the context of a non-critical attitude so that we might know when to switch gears. 
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Perhaps the ideal is simply that more questioning is always preferred.  In this 
case, ideal criticality would not be characterized as a baseline, or a point on a vector of 
increasing criticality, but as an approximation to a limit case, to use a mathematical 
metaphor.  Such an ideal is tantamount to the suggestion that we question everything - 
that, as Ikuonobe advocates, we commit to interrogating our knowledge claims no matter 
how small the window for epistemic error.  Taken literally, and as a position to be applied 
to individual interrogation, this view is almost certainly untenable.  Indeed, what would 
life be like to approach the world in such a manner, to continually and iteratively question 
what one should believe and do?  Dunne (2015) offers a common description of a critical 
ideal that, in some sense, provides a rhetorical answer to this question.  He states: 
Education needs to empower students to interrogate the established 
epistemic norms (status quo) of the world around them. But they can only 
do this if they are epistemically literate. Epistemic literacy teaches 
students to scrutinize all knowledge claims and avoid the pitfalls of 
institutionalized or immutable truths. Epistemically literate students 
approach the world with the fervor of a reflective skeptic. With each 
knowledge claim, they ask themselves: does this convince me? Are the 
reasons this person believes X and Y to be the case sufficiently cogent 
reasons? Am I sufficiently moved by these reasons? Has this person 
appropriately justified their position? And finally, what are the limits of 
this person’s knowledge claims? (p. 32, emphasis is mine) 
While Dunne certainly articulates a critical ideal – and arguably a mainstream one at that 
- it is not one that we can possibly hope to approximate.  Rather, it is an ideal proposed in 
a vacuum – one that ignores our relation to, and our embeddedness in, the world.  Is this 
really how we want to educate students, to have them seek answers to these questions for 
all knowledge claims, to have them exhibit the “fervor of a reflective skeptic?”  If so, 
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how could we act in a timely manner? And even if we could, is this how we should value 
our time?  William James offers a more graphic elaboration of this point: 
There is no more miserable human being than one in whom nothing is 
habitual but indecision, and for whom the lighting of every cigar, the 
drinking of every cup, the time of rising and going to bed every day, and 
the beginning of every bit of work are subjects of express volitional 
deliberation. Full half the time of such a man goes to the deciding or 
regretting of matters which ought to be so ingrained in him as practically 
not to exist for his consciousness at all. If there be such daily duties not yet 
ingrained in any one of my hearers, let him begin this very hour to set the 
matter right. (James, 1925, p. 32) 
Here, James’s reiterates my earlier claim that there exists conceptual tension between the 
process of iterative interrogation and its value in service of action, where the degree to 
which one engages critically is the degree to which one postpones action.  Taken to an 
extreme, this tension promises to hinder action to a point where it is no longer reasonable 
to value criticality, since criticality is useful only to the degree that it facilitates acting in 
the world.  As a result, we might interpret the call for more criticality as a value claim 
contingent on the current state of affairs, one that would not be made if the typical degree 
of critical engagement were such that increased critical disposition proved to be overly 
inhibiting and onerous.   
All this suggests that while a critical norm in the here and now should justify a 
call for more criticality, it should not itself specify more criticality as part of the norm.  
Rather, given that we must limit both the scope and depth of iterative interrogation, an 
ideal of everyday criticality should speak of appropriate interrogation – and it should 
suggest heuristics for better questioning.  Stated differently, the fact that we seek to 
nurture further, but not limitless, critical engagement implies a critical ideal founded 
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upon the concept of appropriate engagement. We want individuals to question things that 
they currently accept uncritically, yet we do not want them to be so critically predisposed 
that the mere act of waking up in the morning effects debilitating cognitive dissonance.  
Given that every moment and every experience presents an opportunity for critical 
engagement, it becomes the imperative of an ideal to specify – at least in a broad manner 
- which opportunities ought to be engaged and which should be ignored if everyday 
criticality is to serve practical judgment and action.  
No doubt the specifics of such an ideal presents all sorts of practical difficulties.  
Who determines what is appropriate questioning, how we deal with conflicting visions of 
critical appropriateness, and how we evaluate critical engagement that proved appropriate 
or inappropriate only after the fact, all present a challenge to defining a specific ideal.  
Indeed, I have already allowed that we might abandon the hope for a universal Standard 
in favor of any number of shared local standards.  However, none of these issues detract 
from the argument that I have offered.  What is determined to be critically appropriate 
may be at issue, but that the ideal of everyday criticality is defined by reference to 
appropriateness is not.  For in this case the that is not dependent on the what.  Rather, it 
derives from the simple claim individuals ought to question additional, but not all, 
assertions. 
While I have claimed that normative articulations of critical disposition tend to 
emphasize more critical questioning, there are those that explicitly acknowledge the need 
for restraint.  In affirming that criticality ultimately serves action, Ritchhart, for example, 
states that “of course, one still must employ some judgment in the application of a 
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thinking disposition - one doesn't want students to be so open that they can never make a 
decision” (Richhart, 2001, p. 9).  Similarly, Roth critiques the glorification of unbridled 
questioning in the humanities, claiming that it creates “a cultural climate that has little 
tolerance for finding or making meaning, whose intellectuals and cultural commentators 
delight in being able to show that somebody else is not to be believed” (Roth, 2010).  
And Berger follows suit more colloquially, stating that “…if you don’t stop asking why 
at some reasonable point, you may end up, like Louis C.K. in his “Why?” comedy bit, 
lost in cosmic questions about why the universe is the way it is” (Berger, 2014, p. 94).  
Indeed, Berger comes close to advocating for appropriate questioning, as he not only 
emphasizes a limit to questioning, but speaks repeatedly of the need to ask the right 
questions.  The same might be said for Perkins et al., who declare that “The concept of 
intelligence is a normative concept of mind because it expresses a view of what counts as 
good, or effective, cognition” (Perkins, Tishman, Richhart, Donis, & Andrade, 2000, p. 
272).  While this statement lacks any direct reference to criticality, it is made in the 
context of emphasizing the role of critical disposition in a theory of intelligence.  As 
such, it is a short leap to seeing appropriate questioning as a subset of “good, or effective, 
cognition.” 
I should note that there is a distinct difference between asking appropriate 
questions and asking the right questions, at least given the way Berger defines the latter.  
When Berger speaks of right questions, he takes what I would call a “backward-looking” 
approach, where the determination of “rightness” requires hindsight.  Here, the 
“rightness” of a question depends on outcome, on how the results of asking the question 
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compare with one’s articulated goals.  So, for those working on a defined problem, a right 
question might be one that leads to a solution while a clearly “not-right” question might 
be one that promotes stagnation or further obfuscation.  In either case, we evaluate the 
“rightness” of a question only by looking back at its asking, after we can assess its 
impact. 
A determination of appropriateness, however, is independent of actual outcome.  
Instead, appropriate questions are those which we have good reason to ask. 24  Perhaps we 
recognize that a friend’s assertion contradicts a previously offered claim, or that we are 
not sure that the person whose argument we are entertaining has provided sufficient 
evidence for a strongly held belief.  In either case, the outcome of interrogating the 
assertion is irrelevant to the appropriateness of the interrogation.  Appropriateness 
demands only that we be reasonably justified in asking the question.25  Note, however, 
that in emphasizing the need for reasonable justification, we do not fully divorce 
appropriateness from outcome.  For there is a perceived coupling between reason and 
outcome, where we hold that justified questions tend to produce desired outcomes with 
                                                 
24 Again, I do not intend to minimize the issues created by invoking the idea of “good reason.”  
However, I want to reiterate that regardless of the difficulties involved, the existence of a critical standard 
derives from our intuitive understanding of the bounds of a standard, where the lower bound specifies that 
individuals seek to be more critical than they generally are, and the upper bound requires that they not 
question everything.  It is my claim that the existence of these bounds necessitates a view of criticality 
based on appropriate questioning.  Again, this is not to say that there is a unified belief in the criteria of 
appropriate questioning.  Indeed, it allows that different subsets of a population hold potentially radically 
different standards.  But it does entail that, in educating for criticality, we bring to the table some particular 
understanding of what it means to question appropriately. 
25 Of course, the whole idea of reasonable justification involves the imposition of a standard, and it 
is precisely this standard that underwrites the notion of appropriateness. 
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greater frequency than unjustified questions.  Indeed, I would suggest that this belief 
establishes the bedrock for understanding criticality as appropriate questioning – 
appropriate questioning is what we have reason to question, and we believe that justified 
questions are the ones we should ask in order to determine what to believe and do.26 
But in tying appropriate questioning to justification, we again face the paradox 
inherent in criticality.  If appropriate questioning entails that we have good reason for 
asking a question, criticality would further require that we ask if it is appropriate to 
question our reasons.  And inversely, if we refrain from interrogation in cases where 
someone suggested that there was good reason to do so, we might ask why such a reason 
was a good reason.  The point here is that, in speaking of appropriate questioning, we 
always rely on a standard that itself could be questioned “all the way down” to base 
commitments:   
“You should have questioned A.” 
“Why?  It seemed that A was clearly true.” 
“Because B.” 
“But it seems that B is a bad reason.” 
“No.  Here’s why B is a good reason…” 
                                                 
26 I might note here that, in speaking of appropriateness in terms of reasons, to some degree, I am 
committing to Siegel’s (1988) reasons conception of critical thinking.  As I see it, Siegel offers an attractive 
and defensible conception of the assertive aspect of critical thinking – that is, the appropriate use of reasons 
defines the essence of critically-founded assertions.  And, as we will see, he invokes reasons to ground its 
interrogative aspect as well.  However, I will argue, that his use of reasons in this respect does not justify a 
view of appropriate interrogation.  Reasons do offer a foundation for an ideal of appropriate questioning, 
but not because individuals should have to engage in explicit reason assessment, as Siegel suggests.  They 
do so because they manifest in perception.  
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This, of course, begins a vicious cycle of theoretically endless critical engagement, one 
whose resolution injects an “a-critical” element at the base of criticality.27  For clearly, 
we do not expect exemplars of criticality to engage an endless cycle of questioning to 
determine the appropriateness of their reasons.  Nor do we demand that they question 
everything.  Such questioning, as I have stated previously, hardly meets our intuitive 
requirements for an ideal of criticality in service of judgment and action, regardless of the 
tacit influence of our deeply held beliefs.  Rather, we admit that to the degree that such 
questioning happens at all, it ends because of pragmatic constraints. 
So where does this leave us?  I have argued that the educational aim of everyday 
criticality requires an ideal of justified questioning ultimately founded upon unjustified 
claims.  As paradoxical as this seems, I believe it brings with it the possibility of seeing 
everyday critical disposition in a new light.  In subsequent chapters, I would like to 
explore this possibility.  Specifically, are existing articulations of critical disposition 
consistent with an ideal of appropriate questioning?  Or do the claims made by theorists 
about the psychology and nature of critical disposition make it unlikely, if not impossible, 
to approximate the ideal?  If that is the case, can we reconceptualize everyday critical 
disposition to account for the constraints imposed by appropriate questioning?  To the 
                                                 
27 This point is echoed by Ennis when he states “there are some basic judgments (such as 
judgments about a basic principle) that cannot conform to principle on risk of infinite regress or circularity” 
(Ennis R. , Critical thinking dispositions: Their nature and assessability, 1996, p. 169). 
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degree that we hold the ideal dear, particularly as an educational aim, it would seem that 
we must – that the ideal demands a conceptual articulation of everyday criticality 
consistent with, and supportive of, the ideal. 28  Indeed, I would think that the failure to 
offer any such articulation provides grounds to abandon the ideal. 
Put simply, I am suggesting we utilize the normative sense of everyday critical 
disposition to further our descriptive understanding of the concept.  This may seem like a 
strange way to approach the issue, as one would think that understanding should be held 
as a prerequisite to developing an ideal. Yet as we will see in the next chapter, there is 
substantial disagreement about the nature of critical disposition, and the various 
articulations that have been offered present conceptual difficulties that make them 
difficult to accept.  It would thus seem that we cannot start from an understanding of 
criticality as we do not have one.  On the other hand, by taking this “ideal-first” 
approach, I am suggesting that our understanding of criticality is, to some extent, already 
wrapped up in the ideal – that the ideal, itself, opens a window onto the nature of 
everyday criticality by establishing certain constraints that any conceptualization must 
satisfy.  This, of course, does not imply that conceptualizations well-aligned with the 
ideal must be accepted.  Rather, the ideal acts as a sort of litmus test to screen out those 
                                                 
28 Consistency would seem to be a clear requirement, for how could we accept a conception of 
criticality that contradicts the tenets of the ideal to which we are committed?  Support for the ideal is 
perhaps a more nebulous, but I think, no less important condition.  By support, I mean justification – some 
reason to think - that individuals can attain or approximate the ideal.  I address these requirements in 
greater deal in the next chapter. 
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that fail to support an ideal of appropriate questioning.  Further evidence is then required 
to adjudicate among elaborations that satisfy the screen.
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Chapter 4: Two Conceptions of Critical Disposition 
4.1. Introduction 
As I have defined it, everyday criticality is the disposition to interrogate belief 
claims in situations where there is little demand to do so.  Yet, as specific as this 
definition may seem, it leaves undefined an understanding of both the general nature of 
dispositions, and the specific character of the disposition to interrogate.  If the ideal I 
have laid out in the previous chapter is at all justifiable, though, there ought to be much to 
say about both topics.  For while I think it reasonable to utilize our intuitions about an 
ideal to help us unpack a concept, an inability to articulate the dimensions and detail of a 
concept renders its corresponding ideal arbitrary and potentially unreasonable.  That was 
precisely my point in previously critiquing the call to question everything – the ideal 
conflicts with our understanding of an important aspect of criticality, specifically the 
purpose that it serves.  Ideals cannot be offered without regard to the conditions that 
enable or prevent their realization, and the concept or concepts that underlie the ideal are 
a primary source of such conditions.  As such, we might reasonably require an 
elaboration of what it means to have a disposition to interrogate. 
Much has been written on the nature of dispositions, as the issue has long been a 
staple philosophical discourse with regard to both subjects and objects (Ryle, 1949; 
Dewey, 2007).  Elaborations of critical disposition have been a primary focus of 
theoretical discourse as well, particularly within the critical thinking movement over the 
past 35 years (see e.g., Facione, 1990; Ennis, 1996; Siegel, 1988; Facione, 2000).  That 
said, it is important to distinguish criticality from the more broadly defined concept of 
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critical disposition.  Where critical disposition has been traditionally conceived as the 
disposition to engage critical thinking – both its assertive and interrogative sides - 
criticality concerns the more narrowly defined disposition to interrogate.  The concepts of 
curiosity and inquisitiveness are often referenced to elaborate the interrogative aspect of 
critical disposition, but numerous additional dispositional traits are included that 
ostensibly concern the assertive aspect - components such as systematicity, judiciousness, 
and confidence in reasoning.  And while there is a substantial literature that elaborates 
critical thinking disposition in terms of such components (e.g. Ennis, 2004; Facione, 
2000; Costa, 2001), there has been little focus specifically on the disposition to 
interrogate.  As such, we must look to existing conceptions of critical disposition to get a 
sense of how we might further understand the concept of criticality.  Such an approach, 
while not ideal, might be justified by the strong relation between the two concepts.  
Indeed, in the same manner that I previously argued that the critical act is fundamentally 
interrogative, I would suggest that we cannot understand the disposition to render critical 
judgment without acknowledging the role of the interrogative disposition.  That is, to the 
degree that critical disposition is a disposition to engage acts of critical interpretation, 
analysis, evaluation, etc., the fact that such acts are themselves fundamentally 
interrogative renders critical disposition a type of disposition to interrogate, even when 
prioritizing its assertive component. 
In this chapter, I analyze two widely disseminated conceptions of critical 
disposition – the motivation conception and the sensitivity conception - to determine 
whether either of them is consistent with, and indeed supports, an ideal of appropriate 
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questioning.  As I have previously argued, if we are committed to such an ideal, any 
viable understanding of criticality must provide a basis for it.  Stated in the 
contrapositive, the degree to which a conception of critical disposition fails to suggest 
and justify an ideal of appropriate interrogation implies that we must look elsewhere for 
an understanding of criticality.  And indeed, this is what we will find.  Rather than 
provide reason to support an ideal of appropriate interrogation, I shall claim that each of 
the two conceptions imply only the ideal of “more” questioning, and that their general 
acceptance can be explained as a product of the confusion between the contingent claim 
for more questioning - i.e. more questioning in the here and now - and an ideal of more 
questioning. Such claims set the stage for the subsequent two chapters, where I elaborate 
an “expertise” conception of everyday criticality, and explore its potential 
neurophysiological underpinnings. 
4.2. Constraints on the concept of disposition 
Perhaps we might consider it relatively unproblematic to describe a disposition as 
a tendency to behave in a particular manner, as when we say that glass has the disposition 
to shatter simply because that is how it often behaves.  But this criterion highlights a 
theoretical issue that has long plagued attempts to articulate the nature of dispositions, 
leaving us to wonder if we can say anything more specific about it (Ryle, 1949; Ennis, 
1996).  We might call this problem the ontology of counterfactuals.  As an object 
attribute that specifies only a tendency toward behavior, a disposition need not manifest 
as an actual state of affairs (Heil, 2005).  Indeed, that an object exists in the 
counterfactual state – that is, in a state where the dispositional behavior is unactualized – 
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would seem to be a necessary condition for the disposition to be understood as only a 
tendency toward behavior and not as a rigid and inevitable response to a particular 
context or situation.  And yet, this inherently episodic character of dispositions makes it 
difficult to conceptualize them as object attributes transcending the behavior itself, for we 
ostensibly cannot point to anything independent of the behavior that the object has that 
could itself be called the disposition (Heil, 2005).  We are presented only with an object 
that either exhibits particular behavior or does not exhibit it. As Robert Ennis states, 
“dispositions are not revealed by inspection” (Ennis, 1996, p. 166). 
That disposition might be best conceived as descriptive abstraction of object 
behavior is made all the more viable if we recognize that behavior – and hence, the 
tendency to behave - is a product not only of the object itself, but of the context in which 
the object is situated (McKitrick, 2003).  It would be difficult to say, for instance, that 
glass has a disposition to shatter in an environment with a temperature only slightly 
below its melting point.  Similarly, we might note that very small pieces of glass tend not 
to shatter unless subject to forces concentrated on a small enough portion of its surface.  
In both cases, the tendency to shatter is not the sole domain of the object, but rather the 
relation of the object’s structure and functioning to its environs.  And this is the case for 
all such dispositions toward specific behavior.  To attribute these tendencies solely to the 
object abstracts the object from the world and neglects to acknowledge the relation 
between the two. 
The issue, however, is rendered all the more complex when we consider the 
common attribution of dispositions to people.  In this case, our intuitive understanding of 
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the concept appears to extend beyond behavioral description to reference stable internal 
qualities of the individual (Facione, 2000).  We claim, for example, that Jesse is friendly, 
that Adrian is generous, or that Alex is an angry person.  While in each of these cases we 
assume some substantive link to behavior, such attribution directly references a 
characterological property, one that allows the occasional instance of contrary behavior to 
bear little effect on the presence of the attribute.  This is very much true of the 
traditionally enumerated critical thinking dispositions, where terms such as open-minded, 
truth-seeking, and analytical describe not just behavioral tendencies but character virtues 
– stable, internal forces responsible for the expression of critical behavior.  Such a 
conception, in fact, underlies a number of reputable assessments of critical disposition 
that utilize self-reports of attitudes toward these critical attributes (Giancarlo, Blohm, & 
Urdan, 2004; Facione & Facione, 1992).  Here, disposition is conceived explicitly as a 
stable referent, as a “consistent internal motivation, to act toward, or to respond to, 
persons, events, or circumstances in habitual, and yet potentially malleable, ways” 
(Facione, 2000).  Dispositions thus assume a causal relation to behavior instead of being 
defined by them.  The result is a conceptualization of disposition that transcends 
descriptive abstraction.  In divorcing dispositions from behavioral tendencies – that is, in 
conceiving of them as independent of, but causally related to, behavior - they become 
characterological constructs with explanatory power, allowing us to explain the tendency 
toward specific behavior in light of stable personal attributes.   
And yet, shifting the referent of disposition from behavior to attitude presents its 
own problems. For unless we are willing to completely forgo the link between disposition 
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and behavioral tendency, we must assume that attitudes will sufficiently manifest in 
behavior.  As Ennis notes, however, individuals can “feign the appearance of the 
disposition without really having it” (Ennis, 1996, p. 166), either through their actions in-
the-moment (as when they are being assessed) or by their verbal responses.  Facione 
offers a similar but broader claim, stating that “far too many [people] profess a 
disposition toward thinking, but, regretfully, are not capable of generating much mental 
horsepower” (Facione, 2000, p. 64).  And several critical thinking theorists acknowledge 
that one could profess the disposition to “clarify and seek understanding…without being 
sensitive to situations calling for clarification” (Ennis, 1996, p. 166; also see Perkins, et 
al., 2000; Richhart, 2001).  Such comments highlight the tension that exists between 
conceptualizing dispositions as personal attributes and satisfying their requirement to 
manifest as behavioral tendencies.  For even if we grant that first-person reports of 
attitudes toward critical virtues can be reliable and relatively stable over time, there is 
little to require the corresponding behavior in light of one’s attitudes.  Attitude toward 
behavior is not itself behavior, nor is it even a tendency to behave.  And while it may 
seem intuitively alluring to tie the two together through causal relation, such a link itself 
neglects the variety of other factors, both personal and contextual, that can frustrate the 
realization of motivated intent.  Stated in perhaps a more extreme way, an individual may 
have all the motivation in the world to behave in a particular manner and still fail to 
manifest the behavior.  Indeed, that Facione comments on the number of people who fail 
to exhibit appropriate critical behavior despite an expressed affinity for it suggests that 
such a situation is more than a theoretical possibility when it comes to critical 
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disposition.29  And if individuals can maintain a disposition toward a particular behavior 
without actually manifesting that behavior, we are left wondering what it means to have 
the disposition. 
Let me propose, though, that the fact that we hold criticality as an educational aim 
forecloses any purely descriptive account of critical disposition.  That is, to the degree 
that we believe that didactic interactions with students can foster the development of 
criticality in the direction of a held critical standard, we must conceptualize disposition as 
a causally explanatory construct.  As merely descriptive abstraction, we might continue to 
hold that there is something about the object as a whole, and in relation to its environs, 
which is responsible for the manifestation of behavior - some causal sequence of events 
involving the structure and functioning of the object that explains why particular behavior 
manifests.  Thus, we might point to the chemical structure of glass to explain why it 
breaks when it does, and why certain interactions between glass and the environment 
cause it to shatter.  But to the degree that we cannot point to some potentially malleable 
attribute of the object – some causally efficacious attribute that we can modulate while 
maintaining the object’s integrity - we give up the ability to nurture behavioral change.  
Along these lines, we might note that adding Boron to glass makes it less apt to break in 
the presence of extreme temperatures, and that adding Calcium Oxide makes glass non-
                                                 
29 While we might possibly look to empirical studies to establish some correlation between attitude 
and behavior, it is strange that, at least in the domain of critical thinking disposition, there is little mention 
of such correlation. Rather, again, such a link is generally assumed to be the case, despite claims 
acknowledging the widespread existence of individuals who profess to value the critical virtues but fail 
exhibit them.  
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water-soluble.  In each of these cases, we point to a potential target of interaction – here, 
the amount of Boron or Calcium Oxide contained in the glass - that we expect will 
causally modify the behavior of glass without compromising its integrity.  Absent such 
targets, though, there is little reason to expect change, especially change of a desired type.  
“Pure” glass, conceived as a substance without manipulable attributes, has defined 
behavioral tendencies immune to change (Richhart, 2001).  The same can be said with 
regard to criticality.  Without conceptualizing it as something that extends beyond a 
description of behavioral manifestation, we lose the opportunity to effect change in 
critical behavior through our interactions with individuals.  Thus, to the degree that we 
are committed to educating for criticality, the first condition on any conception of 
interrogative disposition is that it must explain critical behavior by reference to causally 
empowered constructs. 
It is important to note, however, that such a condition does not mandate a 
reference to personal attributes.  Indeed, there are numerous theories, many of them well-
aligned with the central tenets of critical pedagogy, that postulate the primacy of social 
constructs in explaining behavioral tendencies.  From Foucault’s articulation of power in 
Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977) to Marcuse’s interpretation of Heideggerean 
falling (Kellner & Pierce, 2011), these theories technically satisfy the first constraint on 
conceptions of critical disposition by articulating theoretical constructs external to the 
individual that are then taken to be the root determinants of behavior.  That said, it is 
difficult to see how such constructs are themselves articulations of dispositions.  Rather, 
they seem to be non-dispositional constructs that substitute for dispositions as the source 
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of behavioral tendencies.  In some substantial sense, explanations of behavior that locate 
the cause of behavior external to individual obviate the need to invoke disposition to 
explain behavior.  Or, perhaps more precisely, they reduce disposition to descriptive 
abstraction.  For dispositions are always dispositions of an object or individual, and in 
cases of behavioral explanation that source the cause external to the object, there is once 
again no thing that belongs to the object – nothing of the object – that we can label as a 
cause of the behavioral tendency.  The object assumes the character of a behavioral black 
box subject to the dictates of external forces, leaving us to view disposition as merely a 
description of how it has behaved in the past.30 
Thus, a second condition on a conception of criticality requires that the causally 
empowered construct be attributed to the individual.  Such a condition, though, does not 
entail that we reject the influence of external factors upon disposition.  Rather, it demands 
only that we acknowledge a measure of individual causal efficacy, the presence of an 
intermediate construct sourced in the individual capable of invoking some measure of 
behavioral modulation.  Again, from the perspective of education for criticality, such a 
requirement seems fundamental.  Without granting individuals at least a measure of 
                                                 
30 Such a position evident in the writings of various critical theorists.  For example, in “Education 
after Auschwitz,” Adorno questions his own call for education to take lead role in combatting social 
violence by stating that “If barbarism itself is inscribed within the principle of civilization, then there is 
something desperate in the attempt to rise up against it” (Adorno, 1998, p. 191). And Kellner, et al. express 
Marcuse’s more strident view of autonomy when summarizing his argument for revolution: “Since the 
individual is always a social individual and since one’s possibilities for thought and action are prescribed 
by the given social-historical situation, the individual project of liberation necessarily presupposes a project 
of social revolution” (Kellner & Pierce, 2011, p. 15).  In both cases, the authors question the viability of 
fostering behavioral change through some direct alteration of the individual.  Instead they view behavior 
solely as a consequence of environmental conditions.  
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autonomous decision making and belief adoption, the aim of nurturing criticality assumes 
the character of enculturation or perhaps even brainwashing.  Stated in a slightly different 
manner, that education for criticality seeks to increase autonomy requires that we 
acknowledge the possibility of autonomy.  And we foreclose on that possibility when we 
comprehensively reject the mediation of social forces by the individual.   
From an educational perspective, we might look to two contrasting interpretations 
of Vygotsky’s concept of internalization to further illustrate this point.  Internalization, as 
articulated by Vygotsky, defines a learning process where individuals gain conceptual 
and procedural understanding by appropriating publicly constructed meaning.  
Metaphorically, the process lives up to its name, in the sense that the individual absorbs – 
or internalizes – the meaning that exists external to the subject.  But, as Wertsch and 
Bivens (1992) explain, this metaphor can be cashed out in different ways.  The 
apprenticeship interpretation defines a learning process based on imitation, one where a 
learner gains understanding by mimicking the behavior of a competent individual.  To the 
degree that such learning is successful, learning is a matter of knowledge transmission, of 
replicating the understanding or know-how of a competent other without modification 
from the learner.  In bypassing individual mediation of social forces, the apprenticeship 
model explains changes to thinking and behavior without the need to grant autonomy in 
the learning process.   
 The text mediational interpretation, however, articulates internalization in a 
manner that acknowledges the necessary contributions of the learner (Lotman, 1994).  
According to text mediation, internalization operates on a spectrum of univocal and 
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dialogic interactions that require varying degrees of modulation by an individual.  While 
purely univocal interactions approximate a model of unadulterated transmission, learners 
in dialogic interactions partake in a process of meaning construction, one that “involves 
the reconstruction of psychological activity on the basis of sign operations" (Vygotsky, 
1978, p. 57).  Lotman (1994) elaborates this process from the perspective of semiotics, 
where such reconstruction results from the assimilation of public text into the existing 
“text” – that is, the conceptual understanding - of an individual.31   Such a process entails 
not the mere transmission of conceptual and procedural knowledge, but an inherently 
unpredictable and theoretically unique development of mental grammar dependent, in 
part, on the existing psychological constitution of an individual.  Lotman further theorizes 
that two factors contribute to whether public text is perceived as univocal or dialogic – 
the semantic complexity of the text itself and the attitude of the individual toward its 
reception. So, while ostensibly simple statements such as “It is raining outside” may lend 
itself to univocal interpretation, a philosophical attitude toward such a statement would 
encourage a dialogic interaction resulting in a web of personal semantic reinterpretations. 
These divergent elaborations of internalization illustrate both the need for, and the 
role of, internal constructs in the description of the autonomous individual.  The 
apprenticeship model forgoes such constructs and results in what is tantamount to a 
banking model of learning (Freire, 1996), one where the individual plays little role in 
                                                 
31 While Lotman elaborates internalization in terms of the confrontation of texts, he makes it 
explicit that he is talking about the learning of a conscious entity: “When a text interacts with a 
heterogeneous consciousness, new meanings are generated, and as a result the text’s immanent structure is 
reorganized” (1994, p. 379). 
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determining her own conceptual development and belief structure.  Text mediation, on 
the other hand, relies on individual constructs – both conceptual and attitudinal – to 
explain the possibility for unique understanding and divergent belief, two necessary 
characteristics of autonomous behavior.  Here the influence of external factors is 
acknowledged but not determinative.  That is, there exists something of the individual 
that contributes to conceptual understanding and belief adoption, something that enables 
the possibility of autonomous behavior.  And to the degree that education for criticality 
seeks to engage that possibility, it must conceive of disposition in the same manner - as a 
causally empowered construct ascribed to the individual. 
As such, it seems clear to me that we must elaborate everyday criticality as a 
mental construct, one that, while being subject to contextual influence, is understood to 
maintain some manner of autonomous character.  The question, however, is how to 
further elaborate such a construct, especially given the relevance of longstanding debates 
over how to understand the mental.  As I mentioned earlier, existing mental articulations 
of critical disposition acknowledge one or both of two possible components – motivation 
and sensitivity.  In both cases, the particular elaboration belies fundamental assumptions 
regarding the nature of mind, particularly as it concerns its conscious functioning.  As I 
analyze each conception in subsequent sections, I shall explore these assumptions, 
highlighting their implications for a critical ideal of appropriate questioning.  For again, if 
we are committed to this ideal, our understanding of criticality must both render such an 
ideal viable and suggest a basis for it. 
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4.3. Critical disposition as mental motivation 
There are numerous variants of the mental motivation conception of critical 
thinking disposition, and each articulates the multidimensional construct using diverse 
and sometimes conflicting terminology (Nieto & Valenzuela, 2012).  We hear it 
described as mental habit (Costa, 2001; Siegel, 1988; Facione, 1990), as attitude 
(Tishman, 2001; Facione, 1990; Dewey, 2007; Siegel, 1988), as one’s passions (Costa & 
Garmston, 2001; Perkins, Tishman, Richhart, Donis, & Andrade, 2000), or as a set of 
intellectual virtues (Richhart, 2001).  A number of articulations employ seemingly 
incompatible terms, with Costa speaking of both of human passions (Costa & Garmston, 
2001) and habits of mind (Costa, Habits of mind, 2001), and Siegel claiming that “the 
critical thinker… must have…certain attitudes, dispositions, habits of mind, and character 
traits, which together may be labelled the ‘critical attitude’ or ‘critical spirit’” (Siegel, 
1988, p. 39).  Dewey, himself, notes the difficulty of employing available terminology to 
describe the concept, stating that 
… we need a word to express that kind of human activity which is 
influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains 
within itself a certain ordering or systematization of minor elements of 
action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt 
manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form 
even when not obviously dominating activity.  Habit even in its ordinary 
usage comes nearer to denoting these facts than any other word.  If the 
facts are recognized we may also use the words attitude and disposition. 
(Dewey, 2007, pp. 40-41) 
Despite its complexity, Dewey’s elaboration suggests how the ostensible conceptual 
conflict between habit and attitude might be resolved.  Habit is not taken to mean an 
activity over which we have little or no control – as in a drug or alcohol habit – but rather 
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as an acquired default, but overridable behavior, as when we say that “Adrian has a habit 
of speeding.”  And “attitude” is characterized by a consistency of position that suggests 
habitual motivation, a stable “projective” and “dynamic” influence on behavior. 
This same alignment between habit’s connotations of repetition and stability and 
the more mindful and autonomous qualities of “attitude” find contemporary expression in 
Facione’s succinct elaboration of human disposition as “a person's consistent internal 
motivation to act toward, or to respond to, persons, events, or circumstances in habitual, 
and yet potentially malleable, ways” (Facione, 2000, p. 64).  Here, the phrase “consistent 
motivation” conjoins the disparate notions of attitude and habit to express the conceptual 
nuance sought by Dewey.  In framing dispositions in terms of motivation, Facione also 
expresses Dewey’s requirement of dynamism, of being able to autonomously override 
repetitive behavior.  Yet the qualification of consistency serves to imbue motivation with 
the temporal stability more often associated with habit.  As critical thinking disposition in 
particular, this mental motivation provides the specific impetus to engage critical thinking 
– that is, critical thinkers tend to engage in critical behavior because something about 
their own character propels them to act in this a manner.  Such a description explicitly 
addresses the two constraints I have laid out – in this case, critical disposition is not 
identified with critical behavior per se, but with a causally empowered attribute of the 
individual that, in enabling “habitual, and yet potentially malleable” behavior, satisfies 
the requisite demand for autonomy.  That said, Facione’s summary description addresses 
only the nature of disposition, not critical disposition, and thus requires further 
elaboration if the reference to consistent motivation is to offer value to an education for 
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criticality.  For absent such detail, it becomes difficult to impart semantic substance to an 
ideal of critical disposition, leaving educators to guess what sort of pedagogical program 
might make individuals more “consistently motivated” to engage critical behavior. 
Indeed, Facione offers seven components of critical disposition that, when viewed 
in the context of motivation, articulates a set of intellectual virtues capable of both 
causally explaining critical behavior and providing educators a workable model of the 
ideal critical disposition.  These include the characteristics of being open-minded, 
judicious, inquisitive, confident in reasoning, analytical, and systematic.  Such terms, of 
course, could by themselves be viewed as merely descriptive of an individual’s behavior, 
where a person’s open-mindedness, for example, is not a reference to a character trait – 
some enduring attribute the individual - but a general description of how he or she has 
behaved to date.  However, given Facione’s umbrella conception of disposition, the seven 
components clearly define motivational forces independent of the behavior describable 
by that same name. 
The same could be said for the nineteen personal traits that comprise the 1990 
Delphi panel’s conception of critical disposition.  In the case of the Delphi conception, 
though, the explicitly affective character of the dispositions presents additional 
understanding of disposition as a motivational, and hence causal, construct.  Consider for 
example, the Delphi Report’s initial description of critical thinking disposition: 
Although the language here is metaphorical, one would find the panelists 
to be in general accord with the view that there is a critical spirit, a 
probing inquisitiveness, a keenness of mind, a zealous dedication to 
reason, and a hunger or eagerness for reliable information which good 
critical thinkers possess but weak critical thinkers do not seem to have. 
(Facione, 1990, p. 11) 
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Here the use of “critical spirit” suggests an understanding of critical disposition as a 
construct independent of critical behavior, while the phrases “zealous dedication to 
reason” and “hunger or eagerness for reliable information” express the emotional basis 
for motivational force.  Indeed, the fact that the report calls the 19 attributes the 
“Affective Dispositions of Critical Thinking” (Facione, 1990, p. 13) suggests that the 
Delphi panelists view dispositions as behaviorally motivational precisely because of their 
affective character.  Such character provides the positively valenced force that propels 
critical thinkers to engage critically.  In short, the Delphi panelists commit to the idea that 
affect or emotion is the motivation that underlies critical thinking behavior. 
Beyer, too, calls attention to the centrality of affect when discussing the individual 
elaborations of critical disposition offered by Ennis and Paul, both of whom were Delphi 
panelists:  
Notice the words used to describe these operations: drive, devoted, 
persistent, disposed, seek, and be willing.  These attributes of dispositions, 
which reflect emotions and feelings, show that while critical thinking is 
objective, it is hardly value-free.  Critical thinkers attach great value to 
seeking understanding, determining worth, and searching out the truth.  
The continuing persistent disposition to know what is true motivates 
critical thinking and guides it by basing its execution on a clear underlying 
value. (Beyer, 2001, p. 90) 
Other proponents of critical thinking take a similar view.  Scheffler (1991) speaks of the 
value of the cognitive emotions.  Costa and Garmston (2001) list the five passions that 
belong to critical thinkers as a way to guide educators to nurture critical thinkers.  And as 
Perkins and Ritchhart (2004) discuss, there are numerous psychological constructs akin to 
critical disposition that are similarly founded on motivation.  Cacioppo and Petty, for 
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example, define the need for cognition as the “tendency to seek, engage in, and enjoy 
cognitively effortful activity” (Perkins & Ritchhart, 2004, p. 356).  And Webster and 
Kruglanski articulate the need for closure as the “desire for predictability… [and a] 
discomfort with ambiguity, decisiveness, and closed-mindedness” (Perkins & Ritchhart, 
2004, p. 356).  In both cases, “need” is explicitly articulated as “a motivated tendency or 
proclivity” where motivation is cashed out in terms of affective experience (Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1049). 
In some substantive sense, the motivational conception views critical disposition 
as a matter of desire – that is, critical thinkers are disposed toward critical engagement 
simply because they want to behave in that manner.  Such desire, though, is a far cry 
from primal biological urge.  Rather, it arises cognitively, from the perceived value of 
having the disposition, from believing it to be an intellectual virtue.  As such, the 
motivational conception does not itself begin with motivation.  It instead postulates a 
causal sequence from belief to affect to behavior, where affect provides the propulsive 
force to bridge the conceptual gap of purely cognitive beliefs and non-cognitive action.  
As a mediating construct, affective disposition enables us to explain critical behavior as a 
willed and rational endeavor, a product of the beliefs that we adopt for good reason.  
Such a model aligns particularly well with the metaphor of a “critical spirit,” which itself 
suggests a dualistic split between rational mind and physical behavior that requires a 
construct to link the two. 
We might best see this rationalist-dualist model at work in two highly regarded 
and widely utilized assessments of the critical disposition, Facione’s (1992) California 
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Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory and Giancarlo et al.’s (2004) California Measure 
of Mental Motivation.  Both assessments are based on responses to Likert statements that 
query individual beliefs about the use and value of critical thinking – statements such as 
"To get people to agree with me I would give any reason that worked," "Everyone always 
argues from their own self-interest, including me," and "if there are four reasons in favor 
and one against, I'll go with the four" (Facione, 2000, p. 72).  In assuming that responses 
to these belief statements correlate with the tendency to engage critically, the assessments 
operationalize motivational disposition, assuming both that beliefs themselves lack the 
propulsive force to engage particular behavior, and that whatever does initiate behavior 
must have an affective character.  Indeed, Paul acknowledges just such a position in 
claiming that “emotions, feelings, and passions of some kind or other underlie all of 
human behavior” (Paul, 1993, p. 348).  And yet, for all the emphasis on personal feeling, 
passion, and emotional experience, the assessments articulate a model of cognitive 
behavior where affect serves only as a mediating construct, one subject to the dictates of 
belief.  It is ultimately what one believes that determines value, and critical affect is only 
a byproduct of such value. 
4.4. A critique of mental motivation 
Before engaging a critique of the mental motivation conception, it is important to 
reiterate the difference between critical thinking disposition and criticality.  
Notwithstanding Paul’s more expansive articulation of strong sense critical thinking, 
critical thinking disposition has generally concerned the tendency to engage critical 
thinking, an activity devoted to rendering judgment with regard to problem solving, 
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decision making, and belief adoption.  While I have argued that critical thinking is itself 
an inherently interrogative activity, I have also claimed that the disposition to engage 
critical thinking is distinct from the more narrowly-defined disposition to interrogate.  
Indeed, in articulating both assertive and interrogative components to critical thinking, I 
have attempted to clarify the distinction between the two.  Where criticality concerns the 
tendency to question assertions, conceptualization of critical thinking disposition focuses 
on the tendency to formulate answers to already-defined questions by utilizing the 
cognitive skills that constitute critical thinking. 
As such, it is possible to acknowledge the value of the motivational conception of 
critical thinking disposition while questioning its viability for criticality.  The same can 
be said about the inverse – dismissing a conception of critical thinking disposition does 
not necessarily doom its prospects for criticality.  Thus, in offering a critique of any 
conception of criticality, the issue is not so much whether a conception is viable as an 
understanding of critical thinking disposition, but whether it can serve to conceptualize 
criticality.  That I have elaborated the motivational conception with regard to critical 
thinking disposition is a simply product of both similarity and necessity - since there is no 
literature devoted to interrogative disposition, the closest place to turn is the vast 
literature targeting its conceptual cousin.  With this in mind, let us address the prospects 
for a motivational conception of criticality. 
As I have emphasized repeatedly, a necessary condition on any viable conception 
of critical disposition is that it support an ideal of appropriate questioning.  By support, I 
mean two things – on the most basic level, any such conception must be consistent with 
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the ideal.  That is, nothing about an articulation of criticality should explicitly foreclose 
the possibility of substantively approximating the ideal.32  More importantly, though, to 
say that the conception supports the ideal requires that it provide reason for committing to 
the ideal, that it articulate something to which we can point as justification for adopting 
one ideal over others.  And this is precisely the weakness of the motivational conception.  
While there is nothing explicit in affective motivation that forecloses the possibility of 
appropriate questioning, the conception offers little warrant for committing to it as an 
ideal.  Indeed, I would suggest that the mental motivation conception is better, or perhaps 
only, suited for an ideal of more questioning.  Appropriate questioning requires not just a 
stable affective state that drives critical engagement.  It demands a brake on motivation as 
well, one that signals when we ought to refrain from interrogating.  The mental 
motivation conception makes no accommodation for such restraint.  It characterizes 
critical disposition solely as a propulsive force, one that drives the ideal critical thinker to 
engage critically.  As such, it fails to acknowledge a core claim of the appropriate 
questioning ideal - that we should not question everything.  While the motivation 
conception does not offer outright claims to the contrary, its silence on the need for an 
interrogative upper bound opens the door for the more extreme attitudes toward 
questioning that I discussed in Chapter 2. 
                                                 
32 Of course, one might point to the vagary of the phrase “substantively approximate.” While I 
agree that further elaboration is ultimately necessary, I am not sure that leaving the phrase as is should 
warrant any serious reservations at this point. 
104 
 
It is interesting, and perhaps telling, then, that proponents of the mental 
motivation conception also speak of the appropriate use of critical thinking.  Consider 
Facione, who, despite defining disposition without any requirement of appropriateness, 
later offers a single passing reference to the condition: 
We worry that our educational programs at all levels, from K-12 through 
college and into adult and professional development, will fail if they focus 
only on skills to the neglect of the consistent internal motivation to use 
those skills in the appropriate circumstances. (Facione, 2000, p. 80) 
Note here how the addition of the phrase “in the appropriate circumstances” substantially 
changes Facione’s conception of critical disposition.  Rather than being characterized 
solely as a motivating force for behavior founded on affect, critical disposition now 
expresses a cognitive element, one that requires individuals to evaluate circumstances 
before initiating critical engagement.  Such a conception is at odds with the purely 
affective conception, which allows that critical behavior is appropriate in all 
circumstances.  It also leaves us asking how motivation alone can account for the 
necessary critical judgment. 
In terms of understanding Facione’s position, we thus have two choices.  We 
might view this statement as a mistake, chalking it up to a lazy use of words at the end of 
a long article.33  Or we might treat it as an explicit and intentional aspect of his 
elaboration, in which case the logical gap between affective motivation and the judgment 
                                                 
33 Indeed, Facione offers this first reference to “appropriate circumstances” shortly before the 
concluding paragraph, in a section on pedagogical recommendations.  By this point, Facione has long 
finished any explication of his theoretical position. 
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required by appropriateness becomes particularly problematic.  While it is difficult to 
come to any reasonably definitive answer from reading the text, I suspect that that 
Facione has not fully considered the difficulty of reconciling affective motivation with 
the cognitive implications of appropriateness, as other references to the latter are 
similarly left unexplained. Regardless, his reference to appropriateness should make clear 
the substantive effect it bears on the motivational conception. 
This same tension between motivation and appropriateness is more explicitly 
apparent in the Delphi conception of critical disposition.  Unlike Facione’s elaboration, 
the Delphi Report (Facione, 1990) exhibits no shortage of references to the “appropriate 
use” of critical thinking skills.  We are told that critical thinkers “appropriately formulate 
categories” (p. 6), “apply appropriate modes of inference” (p. 9), and “meet objections to 
the… contextual appropriateness of inferential, analytical or evaluative judgments” (p. 
10).  More generally, the panelists state that “…being adept at CT skills but habitually 
not using them appropriately disqualifies one from being called a critical thinker at all” 
(p. 12).  Such conditions ostensibly suggest commitment to an ideal of appropriateness 
over “more is better.”  However, the panelists follow up these claims by stating that “if 
[individuals] are good critical thinkers, then they use their CT skills appropriately 
because good critical thinkers also have some or all of the affective dispositions listed in 
Table 5” (p. 12, emphasis is mine).  Thus, we are led to believe that appropriate use of 
critical thinking skills is a result of having the appropriate affective dispositions.  And 
yet, how is it possible that a construct framed in terms of motivation and willingness to 
engage critically can have anything but the most indirect link to the skill required to 
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determine appropriateness?  Again, we are left to speculate that proponents of the 
motivation conception fail to fully recognize the work required to bridge the gap between 
motivation to engage and the appropriateness of engagement.34 
Finally, we might explore Siegel’s use of the term “appropriate” in his “reasons 
conception” of critical thinking.  Siegel’s reliance on appropriateness is perhaps more 
explicit than either Facione or the Delphi panel, as he succinctly defines the ideal critical 
thinker as one who is “appropriately moved by reasons.”  He elaborates upon this 
conception by offering that  
A critical thinker must not only be able to assess reasons properly… she 
must be disposed to do so as well; that is, a critical thinker must have a 
well-developed disposition to engage in reason assessment.  A critical 
thinker must have a willingness to conform judgment and action to 
principle, not simply an ability to conform…  She applies the skills and 
abilities of reason assessment in all appropriate contexts, including those 
contexts in which her own beliefs and actions are challenged. (Siegel, 
1988, p. 39, emphasis is in the text) 
Stated in this manner, the use of “appropriately” again ostensibly suggests a critical ideal 
that extends beyond the call for more critical thinking, for the critical thinker assesses 
reasons “in all appropriate contexts.”  While we may naturally focus here on the phrase 
“in all appropriate contexts,” it is important to emphasize that the phrase applies to reason 
assessment.  Siegel’s intent, as I interpret it, is to emphasize Paul’s (1984) strong sense 
                                                 
34 Such speculation is further justified by comments like “being skilled also involves having some 
degree of proficiency in executing those procedures and being willing to do so when appropriate” (p. 14).  
Given the Delphi panelist’s commitment to the skills/disposition dichotomy, the fact that they append a 
condition of appropriateness to the willingness of the critical thinker without further discussion about what 
is involved in determining appropriateness, suggests a disregard for, or a lack of recognition of, the 
cognition involved in determining the “when” of critical engagement. 
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critical thinking – that good critical thinkers assess reasons not only when it serves their 
self-interest, but even in situations where one’s own beliefs are challenged.  
Unfortunately, the statement explicitly applies the condition of appropriateness only to 
reason assessment, to the assertive component of critical thinking.  It says nothing about 
appropriate contexts of interrogation, leaving us to look elsewhere for his position on that 
matter.  
Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that Siegel does not extend the condition of 
appropriateness to the interrogative side of critical disposition.  Like both Facione and the 
Delphi panelists, the text of Educating Reason (Siegel, 1988) clearly expresses Siegel’s 
commitment to the “more is better” conception.  To see this, consider how Siegel 
continues the passage above.  He states: “for the possessor of the critical attitude, nothing 
is immune from criticism, not even one’s most deeply-held convictions” (Siegel, 1988, p. 
39).  While this statement is intended to reinforce the need for strong sense critical 
thinking, it suggests that anything can and should be questioned, a point that I have 
repeatedly rejected as antithetical to the ideal of appropriate interrogation.  Indeed, I have 
presented the ideal of criticality as a paradox precisely because it demands that we 
interrogate our “most deeply-held convictions” in the face of not being able to question 
everything.  Siegel’s view, on the other hand, accepts the viability of unbounded 
questioning and commits to a critical ideal that encourages it. 
We might also look to Siegel’s argument against the “slavish devotion to reason,” 
which we examined in Chapter 2, as further evidence of his commitment to the “more” 
ideal.  This might sound surprising, as the argument itself seems like another instance of 
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justification for appropriate interrogation.  Here Siegel claims that there are times when it 
is “rational to be irrational,” that context and goal dictate when we are justified in 
forgoing critical engagement: 
If my mental health requires me to take a break from paying attention to 
reasons, or if my piano-playing will benefit from ignoring reasons for 
striking a certain key at a certain time and rather playing ‘by feel’ or 
automatically, or if my love-making will benefit in quality and intensity by 
“shutting my mind off” …these may all be good (meta-) reasons for 
ignoring reasons which are otherwise relevant to my beliefs and actions.  
In such cases reasons are ignored or set aside, but for good reason. (Siegel, 
1988, p. 133) 
This certainly sounds like a position in support of appropriate interrogation – indeed, that 
we refrain from critical engagement (“reason assessment,” in Siegel’s parlance) for good 
reason would seem to be a telltale characteristic of appropriate critical disposition.  And 
yet, it is not difficult to see how such claims actually support the “more is better” 
conception.35  For in concluding that “the critical thinker should… be critical about being 
critical” (Siegel, 1988, p. 133), Siegel seems to require that in order to refrain from 
critical thinking, the critical thinker must first engage critical interrogation.  That is, he or 
she must critically judge whether a situation warrants critical engagement before deciding 
to forgo a critical response.  Such a process is tantamount to committing to the “more” 
conception, as the only way to critically forgo first-order reason assessment is to engage 
critical evaluation of second-order reasons.  In other words, Siegel demands that we 
                                                 
35 That Siegel’s view justifies the “more” conception has important ramifications for how we 
should ultimately conceive of criticality.  We shall return to this point in Chapter 4. 
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critically engage in order to forgo critical engagement.  As such, we approximate the 
standard of critical disposition only to the degree that we approach decisions about belief 
and action critically.  That, almost by definition, constitutes the “more is better” ideal. 
I would propose that the unaddressed (and perhaps unrecognized) gap between 
motivation and appropriateness is inherently tied to the confusion I articulated in Chapter 
2 whereby the contingent goal of increasing critical engagement is mistaken for a critical 
ideal.  Consider recommendation 5 of the Delphi Report: 
Just as with the cognitive dimension of CT, when conceiving of the 
education or assessment of critical thinkers, it is important to consider 
ways of developing materials, pedagogies, and assessment tools that are 
effective and equitable in their focus on these affective dispositions. The 
cultivation of these dispositions is particularly important to insure the use 
of CT skills outside the narrow instructional setting. Persons who have 
developed these affective dispositions are much more likely to apply their 
CT skills appropriately in both their personal life and their civic life than 
are those who have mastered the skills but are not disposed to use them. 
(Facione, 1990, p. 13) 
As a goal of critical thinking in the here and now, recommendation five sounds perfectly 
reasonable.  I would think that the vast majority of educators, myself included, would 
agree that both children and adults, as well as society as a whole, could stand to benefit 
from an increase in critical engagement.36  And it further seems right to claim that 
“persons who have developed these affective dispositions are much more likely to apply 
their CT skills appropriately…”.  However, neither of these claims implies that 
                                                 
36 This I would think is true both when we think of critical engagement from the assertive aspect 
of critical thinking or the interrogative aspect of criticality. 
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development of affective disposition should be held as a critical ideal.  Rather, such 
development should be viewed instrumentally, as the current means to a universal end of 
appropriate engagement.37  Indeed, recommendation five sounds reasonable only because 
we also believe that most individuals do not currently manifest sufficient critical 
engagement.  Given that more mental motivation is likely to increase the sheer quantity 
of such behavior, the relation between motivation and appropriateness holds – more 
motivation is likely to yield more appropriate critical behavior.  But for those individuals 
who are already overly motivated toward critical engagement, more motivation means 
only a movement away from the ideal.  Thus, the legitimacy of any claim that ties more 
motivation to more appropriate critical behavior is contingent on current conditions.  And 
such contingency necessarily forecloses a claim of universal applicability.  This, I 
propose, is ultimately the mistake made by proponents of mental motivation.  Given the 
perceived urgency of increasing critical engagement among a population broadly taken to 
be critically deficient, the Delphi panelists and others fail to recognize the impact of the 
counterfactual on the ideal.  Of course, more critical engagement should be a ramification 
of the ideal in the here and now.  But such a claim is a far cry from saying that the 
contingent goal of more motivation should itself constitute the ideal. 
Having analyzed how Facione, Siegel, and the Delphi panelists utilize the notion 
of appropriateness, we can now articulate an important distinction between critical 
                                                 
37 Indeed, I would argue that in stating that “persons who have developed these affective 
dispositions are much more likely to apply their CT skills appropriately…,” recommendation five tacitly 
acknowledges the instrumental role of the affective dispositions. 
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thinking disposition and everyday criticality.  Indeed, critical thinking disposition 
requires the concept of motivation in a way that everyday criticality does not.  In 
prioritizing an end goal of judgment and evaluation, critical thinking requires that 
individuals critically follow-through on already-posed questions and already-identified 
problems.  Such follow-through does require motivation, as critical judgment demands a 
level of cognitive effort not required by its non-critical counterpart.  But to what degree is 
motivation required to ask questions or pose problems?38  Clearly, the act of publicly 
posing questions demands motivation, as one must care enough to exert the requisite 
effort to bring such questions to the attention of others.  In this case, again, motivation is 
needed specifically for follow-through.  But is follow-through required to ask questions 
and pose problems to oneself, to merely recognize that a particular question or problem 
exists?  Is there not a sense in which questions and problems simply “present” 
themselves?  And if that is the case, to what degree, and in what sense, is motivation 
required? 
Here, I think, the concept of demand plays a role.  In demanding situations – those 
that might exist in the classroom, workplace, or the therapist’s office - we are asked to 
search for questions and problems.  If we assume that such a search requires effort that 
would otherwise not be exerted, following through with the request would seem to 
demand motivation.  But by definition, no such request is made in non-demanding 
                                                 
38 I might note here that this question applies to both questions and problems that initiate critical 
engagement and those that form in the course of ongoing interrogation. 
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situations.  We are left to our own critical devices, often in the context of being focused 
on something other than critical interrogation.  Unless we, for some reason, consciously 
seek out questions and problems on our own, motivation does not seem to be much of a 
necessity in getting us to “self-ask” a question or “self-articulate” a problem.  Questions 
and problems just appear, even without the motivation to find them.39 
As such, we might acknowledge motivation as a requirement for critical thinking 
disposition while circumscribing its utility for criticality.  Motivation is required for the 
assertive aspect of critical engagement, for following through with the critical evaluation 
of already-posed questions and acknowledged problems.  This is the motivation about 
which critical thinking theorists speak – the motivation to engage critically when one is 
confronted with a question or, as Dewey noted, when an individual senses the personal 
“disequilibrium” that accompanies problem recognition (Dewey, 1910).  And motivation 
is further necessary for critical interrogation in demanding situations, for seeking out 
questions and problems when asked or expected to do so.  But when it comes to non-
demanded - i.e. everyday - interrogation, no such requirement exists.  Indeed, actively 
                                                 
39 Indeed, there is something odd about the idea of asking a question to oneself that suggests we 
might conceive of the act differently.  When we ask someone else a question, we have already 
acknowledged the question as a question – we understand the semantics of the speech act before we 
execute it.  However, in asking a question to ourselves, we do not know the question before it is asked – 
what it is that “we” are asking is understood, at best, during the asking.  Rather than asking ourselves 
questions, then, I would suggest that, even in our own head, we are asked questions, that the “self-asking” 
of a question is better conceived as not an act of the self, but of something pre-personal.  A similar idea is 
expressed by Hannah Arendt’s metaphor of “the wind of thinking” (Arendt, 1978) which, as Vansieleghem 
explains “refers to something that happens to us, something that we could not expect and that puts us into 
doubt” (Vansieleghem, 2005, p. 27).  Such a reconceptualization of questioning as something that happens 
to us is a central part of this work, and I will spend all of Chapters 4 and 5 developing this idea, both from 
the phenomenological and the neuroscientific perspectives. 
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seeking questions and problems in non-demanded situations may work at cross-purposes 
to our goals, marshalling cognitive resources to secondary or tertiary aims at the expense 
of the primary one.  While we may be motivated to search for questions and problems 
when left to ourselves, nothing precludes them from appearing in the most unexpected of 
moments, when we are far from manifesting in-the-moment an affective internal 
motivation to question, inquire, or be curious.  Such is the criticality that transcends the 
tendency to engage the assertive component of critical thinking.  Thus, rather than speak 
only of the need to nurture the critical (thinking) spirit of students, educators might also 
address the need for an interrogative spirit, one that shines not only when individuals are 
willfully motivated, but when motivation is directed elsewhere. 
4.5. Critical disposition and sensitivity 
While the need for critical follow-through on already-posed questions and 
problems justifies motivation as a necessary condition of critical thinking disposition, I 
have argued that a critical ideal of appropriate questioning exposes the insufficiency of 
viewing criticality solely as a matter of motivation.  A number of critical thinking 
theorists and researchers have suggested that the same holds true with regard to critical 
thinking as well - that motivation is not itself a sufficient condition for critical thinking 
disposition.  Perkins et al. (1993; 2000; Perkins & Ritchhart, 2004; Tishman, 2001) have 
proposed a dispositional theory of thinking consisting of three components – skill, 
inclination, and sensitivity – that they argue satisfy the requirements for “good” thinking.  
Rather than speak of mutually necessary skill and disposition, the several Perkins groups 
conceptualize thinking as a fundamentally dispositional activity outside the classroom - 
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or, as they state, “in the wild.”  In critiquing attempts to elaborate good thinking as 
something that happens upon demand, Perkins et al. highlight the problems associated 
with the traditional split between thinking skills and dispositions.  To the degree that 
education seeks to develop the thinking of individuals as they engage the world, the 
dispositional theory suggests that it makes little sense to speak of good (or skilled, or 
critical) thinking independent of the actual tendency to employ such thinking at the right, 
or appropriate, moments. Good thinking, put simply, entails the “when of thinking” 
(Perkins & Ritchhart, 2004).  That is, without employing thinking skills when 
appropriate, without “knowing” when to engage in evaluation or analysis, or when to 
make logical inference, engagement in skilled critical interpretation, analysis, evaluation, 
etc., fails to constitute an expression of good (or critical) thinking.  
 The when of good thinking, according to Perkins et al., is not simply a matter of 
motivation.  “When” certainly requires follow-through, and hence motivation, in order to 
express appropriate thinking.  But it first requires that we recognize, or become aware of, 
opportunities to utilize the skills of good thinking.  The Perkins groups term the tendency 
toward such awareness “sensitivity,” and view its development as central to the 
development of the critical spirit.  As Richhart states, 
perhaps the most difficult aspect of developing intellectual character 
centers around the cultivation of students' sensitivity to or awareness of 
occasions for employing their thinking skills. Research indicates that it is 
precisely in this area where people's performance breaks down. (Richhart, 
2001, p. 12) 
Indeed, the emphasis on the need for both recognition and follow through is directly 
linked to the goal of educating for good thinking outside of the classroom, where the 
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individual is often not primed to pick up on the situational need to employ critical 
thinking skills.  Perkins et al. elaborate: 
… the challenges of exercising one’s intelligence ‘‘in the wild’’ are 
strikingly different from those in such tame laboratory and testing 
situations. (cf. Hutchins, 1996). Everyday contexts present a wilderness of 
vaguely marked and ill-defined occasions for thoughtful engagement. 
Opportunities for investing one’s intelligence must be detected. When they 
are, whether to bother is often more a personal decision than a compelling 
need. In everyday life, people’s sensitivity to subtle occasions for thinking 
and their inclination to follow through would appear to be substantial 
influences on intellectual performance alongside their capabilities. 
(Perkins, Tishman, Richhart, Donis, & Andrade, 2000, p. 270 - emphasis 
is mine) 
This passage emphasizes again the centrality of the “when” of good thinking in everyday 
life and the core role served by sensitivity.  Good thinking is not a product solely of the 
ability and desire to employ thinking skills.  Rather, it entails the recognition of 
opportunities that are ripe for cognitive – and specifically, critical – engagement.40 
Seen from a slightly different perspective, the introduction of sensitivity as a 
critical construct influences a long-standing debate over the nature of critical thinking, 
one that further highlights the interrogative nature of criticality.  As detailed in the Delphi 
Report, panelists could not reach consensus whether the use of critical thinking skills was 
                                                 
40 It is important to note that in this passage, Perkins speaks of the sensitivity to critical 
opportunities as a matter of detection.  Such phrasing, I believe, does not capture the core intent of the 
sensitivity construct, which is better described by Richhart’s phrase “awareness of”.  Detection leaves open 
the possibility that awareness is a result of some potentially cognitive act, some “figuring out by the 
subject” that a situation presents a critical opportunity.  Sensitivity, on the other hand, is introduced 
specifically as a non-cognitive construct, one that connotes mere reaction to a situation.  At its core, 
sensitivity entails the tendency to become aware of critical opportunities, particularly through sensing or 
experiencing particular situations as critical opportunities.  Perhaps the term that best captures this 
“awareness of” is “recognition,” where recognition of a critical opportunity is the awareness of a situation 
as a critical opportunity. 
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itself an expression of critical thinking.  While roughly one-third of the panelists accepted 
this position, the remaining participants required that the dispositional characteristics of 
the critical thinker – the attributes of open-mindedness, love of truth, and fairmindedness, 
etc. - be present as well (Facione, 1990).  This majority viewed the self-interested, 
manipulative use of critical thinking skills in much the same light as Paul’s weak-sense 
critical thinking - as a form of sophistry rather than an expression of desired cognitive 
behavior.  Mulnix (2012), on the other hand, has recently advocated for the legitimacy of 
weak-sense critical thinking, arguing that the dispositional characteristics concern ethical 
considerations that bear little relevance to the expression of critical thinking.  On 
Mulnix’s account, whether critical thinking skills are employed in a context of 
fairmindedness and without consideration of self-interest is irrelevant to critical thinking 
itself.  Thinking that employs the critical thinking skills is, by definition, an expression of 
critical thinking, ethical considerations notwithstanding.  In summarizing her position, 
she notes that critical thinking “is a theory about how to think, not about how to live” 
(Mulnix, 2012, p. 467). 
While the “when” of thinking would seem tangential to the relevance of these 
ethical considerations, it seems clear to me that it does settle the issue whether the use of 
critical thinking skills on their own are sufficient to constitute an expression of critical 
thinking.  For critical thinking demands not only we utilize such skills, but that we use 
them in appropriate circumstances, in situations that warrant critical engagement.  In 
other words, an essential characteristic of critical thinking behavior is that the skills be 
utilized at the right time, in the right circumstances.  As such, the demanded or mere use 
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of such skills - which is often the case in the classroom or during assessment - fails on its 
own to constitute an instance of critical thinking.  Of course, this leaves open whether 
ethically-relevant dispositional components factor into a conception of critical thinking.  
But to the degree that the when of thinking is construed as a dispositional component – 
that is, as one that concerns the tendency to engage in critical behavior - it would seem 
that critical thinking itself requires some aspect of disposition. 
It is important to note that this conclusion is meaningful only in the context of a 
theory of critical thinking founded on the dichotomy between skills and disposition.  
Absent such a dichotomy, it becomes moot to question whether dispositional attributes 
must accompany the use of skill for the expression of critical behavior.  That the 
dispositional theory lacks such a dichotomy is one of its most salient features, perhaps 
more so than the introduction of sensitivity.  Indeed, each of the trio of components is 
articulated by Perkins et al. (1993) as a dispositional element, as a necessary contributor 
to the tendency toward critical engagement.  This is especially important with regard to 
the skill component, which in the context of a skills/disposition dichotomy, is defined in 
opposition to disposition. 
That recognition of critical opportunities should be included as part of the 
conceptualization critical thinking and not just considered an attribute of the critical 
thinker would seem to align well with my earlier articulation of “critical” as being 
fundamentally interrogative.  When we use critical skills inappropriately – either by 
forgoing them when warranted or employing them when unwarranted – it becomes 
difficult to say that we are expressing critical behavior, regardless of the competent 
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execution of inference, analysis, or evaluation.  Indeed, we may (or may not) be utilizing 
critical thinking skills, but in cases of inappropriate application, we have failed to 
determine that critical engagement is itself warranted.  And as I argued at the start of 
Chapter 1, any determination to utilize critical skills is the expression of the implicitly or 
explicitly asked question “Should I engage critically?”  As such, the failure to engage 
critically, even when competently employing critical thinking skills, can be seen as a 
failure with regard to the interrogative aspect of critical thinking.  Here again, we are 
reminded that the criticality of critical thinking emanates from its interrogative character.  
And if we are to label instances of thinking as critical thinking, the decision to engage or 
refrain from using critical skills, and the question that underlies any such decision, must 
itself be considered part of the act of critical thinking.  The utilization of critical thinking 
skills – the assertive aspect of critical thinking - might be viewed as the expression of 
competent thinking when abstracted from the general context in which it is employed. 
However, if we are to consider such thinking as critical thinking, the interrogative, and 
hence, the dispositional, components must be considered as well.  Put simply, the 
interrogative response to context is central to the critical character of critical thinking. 
While the dispositional theory initially offered a reasonable but speculative case 
for introducing the sensitivity construct, one of the Perkins groups sought empirical 
warrant for its inclusion alongside skill and disposition.  In a set of four studies with 
primary and secondary students, the group sought to justify the conceptual integrity and 
“psychological separability” of each of the three components, explore a correlation 
between ability and sensitivity, and test the extent to which sensitivity could be conceived 
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solely as a matter of recognition (Perkins, Tishman, Richhart, Donis, & Andrade, 2000).  
In the first study, researchers presented 64 eighth grade students with three tasks related 
to a number of fictional passages.  Each passage related a story where a character 
exhibited two critical thinking shortfalls in the process of rendering judgment or making 
a decision – the failure to seek alternative options, and the failure to seek reasons for the 
various sides of a case.  In a test of in-the-wild sensitivity, students were asked to read 
some of these passages, point out those parts where a character failed to demonstrate 
appropriate thinking, and elaborate the reasons for their choices.  Researchers 
subsequently assessed inclination (or follow-through) by presenting students additional 
passages with highlighted and explained shortfalls, a setup intended to remove any need 
for recognition.  In this study, students were asked if they viewed the presented shortfalls 
as problematic and were instructed to explain what they would do in such a situation.  
Finally, in a test of ability independent of both sensitivity and inclination, students were 
simply asked to propose possible remediation of labelled shortfalls. 
The Perkins researchers found that both recognition and inclination presented 
significant impediments to critical behavior.  Whereas students on the inclination 
assessment demonstrated an average of 45% of the ability exhibited on the ability-only 
assessment, they showed only 13.5% of their ability when asked to detect shortfalls.  The 
researchers expressed surprise at the extremely poor results, prompting them to note that 
typically, shortcomings in intellectual performances are attributed to either 
a failure of ability or a failure of motivation (an aspect of inclination). 
These results are surprising because they suggest that low sensitivity, 
rather than low inclination, may be the larger obstacle to good thinking 
(Perkins, Tishman, Richhart, Donis, & Andrade, 2000, p. 275). 
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The group achieved a similar result in a second study with 94 sixth graders, where in 
removing the inclination component of the assessment, the researchers found a 
statistically significant difference between average detection performance and ability 
performance.  Perhaps more dramatic was the finding that while over 91% of the 
sensitivity scores were deemed “low,” only 49% of ability scores were given such a 
designation.  The third study of 105 eighth graders offered findings well-aligned with the 
previous two, as researchers found that asking students to find shortfalls described on a 
crib sheet provided to them did not improve the detection rate.  Indeed, students who 
received no such “knowledge priming” generally performed better at detection 
assessment than those receiving the prompts.  In this case, the authors viewed the results 
as evidence that sensitivity to shortfalls exists as a dispositional factor over and above the 
mere knowledge of such shortfalls. 
While these results should be viewed for what they are - an initial exploration 
warranting further empirical confirmation – they suggest the viability of sensitivity as a 
legitimate component of critical disposition.  This is especially reasonable in light of the 
theoretical deficiencies of the motivational theory, particularly its inability to account for 
the critical ideal of appropriate interrogation.  As I have claimed, it is all too common for 
theorists to confuse the legitimate contemporary demand for more critical engagement 
with the universality of a critical ideal.  Such confusion legitimates the “more is better” 
ideal despite its lack of a mechanism to justifiably avoid critical interrogation.  The 
introduction of a dispositional construct that acts as a potential gatekeeper of critical 
behavior at least offers the possibility of articulating such a mechanism.  The 
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dispositional theory suggests that it is not enough to value, and hence desire, critical 
thinking engagement.  Other factors determine whether such behavior is manifested, 
including not only recognition, but the ability to utilize critical thinking skills.  Perkins 
and Ritchhart (2004) aptly summarize this view: 
[Our views] challenge a presupposition of most dispositional accounts: 
being disposed to engage situations thoughtfully is essentially a 
motivational matter of attitudes, commitments, incentives, and so on. We 
argue that thinking often falters through missing the moment altogether 
rather than declining to seize it. Obliviousness contributes at least as much 
as reluctance. (p. 353) 
While Perkins and Ritchhart apply this position to critical thinking, it relates perhaps 
more directly to the issue of criticality.  For criticality pertains only to the interrogative 
aspect of thoughtful engagement, to the moment of questioning that we confront in 
experience.  This is the moment this is often missed without realizing it, and it is a 
moment that is not necessarily subject to the dictates of motivation.  The recognition of 
an opportunity to critically engage is the recognition of a question, the feeling that there 
is something “not right” with merely accepting what is put before you.  And unless we 
are actively searching for questions, such recognition, like the recognition of a friend who 
we perchance meet on the street, happens whether or not we are motivated to see it.  
4.6. Recognition and the critique of sensitivity 
While the acknowledgement of recognition as a factor in critical disposition is a 
welcome advance in the conceptualization of critical thinking and especially criticality, 
the introduction of sensitivity as a construct is not without shortcomings.  For there is 
little in the Perkins elaboration that enables sensitivity to substantiate its gatekeeper role 
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in a manner that satisfies the requirement for appropriate questioning.  Understood in a 
general way, to say that an individual is appropriately sensitive to critical opportunities 
seems reasonably benign.  Such an individual recognizes the possibility of reacting 
critically to situations that a critical standard deems as justifying such a response.  This, I 
believe, summarizes the conceptual elaboration offered by Perkins.  And yet if this is the 
extent of the conceptual elaboration, we are left asking further questions, particularly if 
we approach the construct from the perspective of education, where the goal concerns the 
approximation of a critical ideal.  For one, how is it that individuals are critically 
sensitive to some situations and not others?  Such a question would seem to suggest that 
sensitivity, too, better aligns with a “more is better” critical ideal.  In its everyday usage, 
sensitivity suggests a threshold quantity for response, as when we claim that an individual 
is sensitive to cat dander.  In this case, once a person is exposed to a particular quantity or 
concentration of the substance, we expect a to see a reaction.  And we assume that 
increased levels of the substance will continue to yield a reaction. 
Such an understanding, however, aligns poorly with the notion of appropriateness.  
Unlike sensitivity, appropriateness does not pertain to quantity, nor does it specify an 
analog threshold for reaction.  Indeed, one’s recognition of a critical opportunity is likely 
dependent on a plethora of variables that makes it possible to recognize subtle instances 
of one type of thinking shortfall while remaining oblivious to more egregious instances.  
Put simply, increasing one’s sensitivity to critical opportunities on its own is not 
sufficient to account for the “targeted” sensitivity demanded by an ideal of 
appropriateness. 
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The difficulty with Perkins’ elaboration of sensitivity is that while it 
acknowledges the need to recognize opportunities for critical engagement, it fails to 
adequately articulate the concept of an opportunity.  Clearly, the Perkins assessments 
view the absence of “seeking both sides of a case” as a critical opportunity.  But is it a 
critical opportunity to be confronted with the assertion that the Earth is 93 million miles 
from the sun?  For even in this situation, there is another “side of the case” - it is possible 
that the statement might be false.41  Indeed, by this reasoning, almost any situation or 
assertion could be viewed as an opportunity for critical engagement, even famously 
simple assertions such as “I have two hands” (Moore, 1939).  Such “opportunities” are 
endless – they confront us continually in our everyday existence.  And if we seek to 
exclude such situations from the domain of “truly” (or legitimately, or reasonably) 
critical opportunities, it is insufficient to invoke the concept of critical sensitivity.  
Rather, to the degree that sensitivity supports the critical ideal of appropriate questioning, 
it is necessary to tie sensitivity to judgment.  Without such a relation, there is little in the 
concept of sensitivity that enables individuals to recognize appropriate critical 
opportunities.  Indeed, as I have argued repeatedly, we are appropriately critical only to 
                                                 
41 Here, I wish to again acknowledge the Wittgensteinian position that not all statements can be 
questioned.  However, if one argues that a particular statement is not truly questionable, that it forms part of 
the axiomatic “riverbed” (Wittgenstein, On certainty, 1969) underlying knowledge claims, there are a host 
of others that certainly could be referenced.  For while each particular claim (according to Wittgenstein’s 
position) either is or is not logically questionable, the domain of propositions rests on a spectrum of 
questionability where some questions that we should not question are indeed logically questionable.  The 
question I have offered seems to fall into such a category, but there are innumerable others that could be 
proffered should this particular one seem contestable. 
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the degree that we are not sensitive to all critical opportunities – that we are “critically 
encapsulated”.42  Such a requirement derives from the fact that critical engagement 
ultimately serves belief, action and decision-making.  And without the judgment to filter 
out reasonable opportunities from unreasonable ones, the introduction of sensitivity does 
not get us much closer to articulating an understanding of criticality that supports an ideal 
founded on appropriateness. 
4.7. Criticality as a form of judgment 
But what does it mean to tie sensitivity to judgment?  In what way is judgment 
related to critical behavior?  Here, I offer two specific claims that will be unpacked and 
defended in the following two chapters.  First, I propose that everyday critical disposition 
is a product of our conscious critical meta-judgments - that our prior assessments of 
instances of critical and uncritical response bear causal effect on our tendency to 
critically engage.  Such effect, I will argue, exhibits a distinct characteristic – it tends to 
align future critical tendency with past assessment, so that critical recognition is not 
simply the habitual reenactment of previous decisions, but their justified modulation. We 
might thus describe criticality as the embodiment of previous judgment.  Second, I offer 
the stronger and perhaps more contentious claim, that the recognition underlying Perkins’ 
concept of sensitivity is itself an act of judgment.  Together these claims present a 
                                                 
42 This phrase is a variant of what Fodor (Modules, frames, fridgeons, sleeping dogs, and the 
music of the spheres., 1987) calls an “informationally unencapsulated” situation, one that offers no criteria 
for determining which information is relevant to a situation. 
125 
 
complex view of criticality where critical recognition (and, indeed, non-recognition as 
well) involves an act of judgment that is itself the embodiment of previous judgment.43 
Conceived in this manner, the concept of critical recognition provides a basis for 
validating the ideal of appropriate everyday criticality - and the core of my argument 
requires a conceptualization that accounts for this ideal.  Where sensitivity, on its own, 
simply accounts for the need to become aware of critical opportunities in order to enable 
the possibility of a critical response, recognition as judgment explains how we might be 
able to respond to appropriately critical opportunities while ignoring those that a standard 
of criticality says ought to be ignored.  In providing the evaluation of a situation or 
assertion with regard to the need for critical response, such a conception offers a straight-
forward way to explain criticality without the need to invoke the concept of “more 
criticality.”  To state my proposal in an overly simplistic manner – one that clearly 
requires further conceptual unpacking - we respond critically to some assertions but not 
others because we recognize that a critical response is warranted, and such recognition 
itself entails judgment.  Whether we follow through on that recognition is, as Perkins et 
al. explains, a further matter, but judging critical warrant is that first step toward a critical 
response.  In this way, I suggest that judgment is at the root of critical disposition. 
That we should entertain a conceptualization of critical recognition as judgment 
follows, in part, from a commitment to the ideal of appropriate questioning.  Appropriate 
                                                 
43 At times, I will employ phrases like “recognition as judgment” and “recognition as a form of 
judgment.”  In all such case, the phrase should be taken as shorthand for the clumsier phrase “recognition 
as a form of judgment that embodies previous judgment.”  That is, in speaking of recognition as judgment, 
I intend the specific conception that I have elaborated above. 
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questioning, as I claimed in Chapter 2, is reasonable questioning, and reasonable 
questioning requires that we assess the warrant for engaging critically.  Such assessment 
simply is an act of judgment – judgment whose quality can be assessed by approximation 
to the ideal.  One may claim that this approaches the issue backwards, that rather than 
conceptualize criticality to align with the ideal of appropriate questioning, we ought to 
underwrite it with an accepted conception of criticality. However, given both the 
questionable consensus around the motivational conception and its attendant conceptual 
problems, starting with the ideal offers a fresh look at an issue on which we have made 
little recent progress.  Indeed, as I will argue later, the ideal enables an elaboration of 
criticality that both aligns well with current neuro-cognitive theory and empirical 
consciousness research, and at least theoretically, can be subject to future empirical 
study.  In taking this approach, it is my suspicion that the confused and semi-
acknowledged commitment to appropriate questioning expressed in the critical thinking 
literature offers a window onto criticality, suggesting an implicit acknowledgement of the 
centrality of judgment in interrogative disposition. If I am right about this, we have had 
all along some obfuscated insight into the nature of critical engagement that future 
empirical exploration might validate.44 
                                                 
44 Indeed, I would argue that this obfuscated insight is expressed in the careless use of 
“appropriateness” exhibited by proponents of the motivational conception.  As I discussed earlier, Facione, 
Siegel and the Delphi panelists all speak of appropriate use of critical thinking skills without recognizing 
the gap that such talk presents in the context of mental motivation.  It is the unanalyzed commitment to 
“appropriateness” in the face of this conflict that expresses this inkling of insight. 
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That said, my proposal clearly requires further explanation, for it presents at least 
two substantial, and related, theoretical issues.  First, if critical recognition is conceived 
as a judgment of sorts, we might ask how we know when to engage in the process that 
renders such judgment.  That is, recognition as judgment would seem to present a 
recursion problem similar to that of the homunculus construct in theory of mind - if 
criticality itself demands judgment to know when to engage critically, some other 
dispositional factors must be operative in constituting this tendency toward the critical 
“meta-reflection” that is required to render such judgment.  Thus, one might argue that 
recognition as judgment gets us nowhere - it simply pushes the conceptual issue one level 
down. 
Equally as damning, we might ask how it is at all possible to conceive of 
recognition in terms of judgment.  For at least prima facie, recognition appears 
conceptually antithetical to judgment – it specifically demands that the thinking required 
by judgment be left out of the picture.  Rather, recognition is more readily viewed as a 
perceptual process, one that presents a subjective “given” independent of conscious 
cognition.45  Indeed, the connotations of Perkins’s “sensitivity” serve to emphasize this 
point, as sensitivity toward X suggests merely a reaction to X.  In the case of critical 
disposition, then, one’s sensitivity reaction is the “given” experience of a statement or 
                                                 
45 Here, I in no way intend to take a stand on the epistemic character of perceptual “givens.”  
Instead, I offer the ostensibly benign claim that we generally do not have to consciously think to make 
sense of our experience, that conscious experience is always-already intentional, infused with semantic 
substance.  The epistemic status of such experience is, of course, a further question, one that has 
engendered a long history of philosophical and scientific debate. 
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situation as a critical opportunity.  It is this “experiencing as” that constitutes critical 
recognition.46  And yet, by eschewing a reliance on judgment, sensitivity leaves 
unanswered how it is that some situations or statements are given or experienced as 
critical opportunities and others are not.  Absent such explanation, sensitivity on its own 
fails to provide the requisite impetus for adopting a critical standard of appropriate 
questioning. 
Earlier, I spoke of the paradox inherent in criticality where in order to render 
judgment, the critical process ultimately requires an act of “non-criticality.”  I questioned 
whether critical behavior could ever satisfy the demand for justification if we must, for 
both practical and theoretical reasons, ultimately base critical judgment on uncritiqued (or 
even uncritique-able) assertion.  At this point I offer an answer to that question – we can 
legitimatize the critical-ness of critical behavior by understanding critical recognition as a 
form of judgment.  In the theoretically endless process of iterative interrogation, we 
reasonably justify the end of interrogation through a process of recognition of critical 
opportunities, one that itself entails some measure of judgment.  That is, some statements 
should not be questioned because we, in some way, recognize that they should not be 
questioned - we fail to see the need for questioning.47  Such recognition, while a form of 
                                                 
46 For more on perception and the concept of “experiencing as,” see John Searle’s (Seeing things 
as they are, 2015) Seeing Things as They Are. 
47 Note that this does not mean that just because an individual fails to recognize a statement or 
situation as a critical opportunity, they are justified in not engaging critically.  Clearly, individuals fail to 
recognize all sorts of legitimate critical opportunities.  In such cases, the recognition-as-judgment thesis 
would explain such failure as a failure of judgment.  Indeed, such less-than-ideal behavior justifies the 
contemporary call for more criticality.  Rather, the warranted end of iterative interrogation assumes a skill 
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judgment, does not itself entail any conscious thinking - it is instead a perceptual given.  
How this might be possible is the subject of the following two chapters. 
                                                 
of recognition that aligns with the ideal of criticality.  Critical behavior need not regress infinitely because 
individuals manifest the standard of criticality through critical recognition. 
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Chapter 5: The Phenomenology of Criticality 
5.1. Criticality as recognition 
To be clear, my proposed conception of everyday criticality amounts to two core 
claims: first, that everyday criticality requires the recognition, or awareness, of 
interrogative opportunities; and second, that such recognition is a form of judgment.  
Taken together, the two claims define what I call the expertise conception of criticality.  
The claims also establish the core goal of this and the next chapter – to articulate the 
theoretical relation between recognition and judgment so that the former can be 
understood as the manifestation of the latter.  My argument up to this point has laid the 
groundwork for this task.  In claiming that the accepted, though only partially 
acknowledged, standard of appropriate questioning requires that the “when of thinking” 
be addressed by judgment rather than motivation or sensitivity, I have suggested that 
criticality is itself significantly a matter of judgment.  And despite my specific critique of 
sensitivity, I have further argued that Perkins et al. make a substantive case for including 
recognition in any account of critical disposition.  Indeed, my critique of sensitivity is, in 
some sense, limited to the claim that the concept requires further elaboration to account 
for the critical standard of appropriate questioning.  That I seek to tie judgment to 
recognition is my attempt to provide this elaboration.1 
                                                 
1 It is worth noting that some of the data from Perkins’ empirical studies suggest a link between 
the ability to use critical skills and sensitivity to critical opportunities, though it seems that none of the 
groups involved chose to pursue this line of thinking. Linear regression analysis between ability assessment 
results and sensitivity results led Perkins et al. to associate a one-point improvement in ability scores with a 
.62 improvement in sensitivity.  While this finding on its own merely hints at the possibility of 
131 
 
While Perkins presents both an intuitive argument and empirical justification for 
introducing the sensitivity construct, there are additional reasons to commit to the 
centrality of recognition in an account of criticality.  These come from the domains of 
both phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience, where the first-person claims of the 
former can be substantiated by the third-person perspective of the latter.  In this chapter, I 
limit myself to the phenomenology, presenting the first-person reasons for both 
committing to interrogative recognition and linking such recognition to judgment.  
Specifically, I introduce the concept of perceived questionability, arguing that the 
questionability of experience is itself given as an integral part of an individual’s 
phenomenological landscape.  Such questionability forms the first-person basis for 
critical recognition, as it is the degree of questionability given in experience that accounts 
for the subjective awareness of critical opportunities.  Whether such awareness 
constitutes justification for interrogative engagement is, as I have argued, determined 
solely in relation to an accepted critical standard.  But the recognition itself is built into 
the structure of experience. 
                                                 
conceptualizing sensitivity in terms of some sort of judgment, it is surprising that nobody in the Perkins 
group picked up on its possible import.  Here, my hunch is that if recognition of critical opportunities is 
truly a form of judgment, the same skills needed for critical thinking would be operative in some form 
during the process of recognition.  Conversely, one might at least speculate that the correlation between 
skills and sensitivity suggests that such skills are utilized in the process of recognition. 
Perhaps the most we get on the issue from the various Perkins groups comes from Perkins and 
Ritchhart, who parenthetically acknowledge the possibility of such a conceptualization.  They state: 
“sensitivity could be called an ability of a sort—the ability to notice—but in our nomenclature ability refers 
to thinking capabilities once the person is engaged in an effort to think something through” (Perkins & 
Ritchhart, When is good thinking, 2004, p. 359). 
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There are, thus, two primary goals for this chapter – to elaborate the concept of 
perceived questionability as the characteristic of first-person experience underwriting 
critical recognition, and to articulate in phenomenological terms the theoretical link 
between the experience of critical recognition and interrogative judgment so that the 
former is understood as the experiential manifestation of the latter.  To accomplish this 
second task, I invoke the expertise theory of Hubert Dreyfus, which postulates the 
transformation of perception in the process of skill acquisition.  When paired with the 
concept of perceived questionability, expertise theory enables a conceptual elaboration of 
criticality that overcomes the shortcomings of the motivational and sensitivity accounts.  
In doing so, I suggest that the expertise theory of criticality provides substantive support 
for the critical ideal of appropriate questioning. 
5.2. Theoretical considerations regarding the use of phenomenology 
 The value of phenomenological analysis as a method of establishing matters of 
fact has long been questioned by the scientific community.  Something similar can be 
said of first-person claims about the nature of mind and consciousness, which until 
recently, had been held in equal, if not greater, disregard.  As Lutz and Thompson (2003) 
note, resistance toward first-person claims in empirical mind, brain, and consciousness 
research has come from three fronts – the potential inaccuracy of first-person description, 
the belief that the integrity of first-person experiences is compromised in the act of 
reporting, and the inability to translate or understand first-person reports in terms of a 
third-person conceptual (i.e. neural) framework - the so-called explanatory gap.  More 
definitive and comprehensive rejection of the use of the first-person exists as well, with 
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Dennett, for example, stating that the “first-person science of consciousness is a 
discipline with no methods, no data, no results, no future, no promise” (Dennett, 2001, 
Where's the Program? section, para. 6).  Even proponents of phenomenological analysis 
have acknowledged its methodological issues, with some bemoaning the lack of 
adherence to established methodology (Giorgi, 1997; Dowling, 2007), others critiquing 
the diverse methodological variants themselves (Kakkori, 2009), and yet others 
eschewing defined methodology entirely (Munhall, 2011).  Indeed, to the degree that 
phenomenological analysis has been accepted as an empirical research method, it has 
been limited to developing rich descriptions of personal experience based on the common 
elements of first-person reports - descriptions of, for example, what it means to have 
experienced loneliness, insomnia, being fired from a job, dropping out of high school, or 
having survived cancer (see Moustakas, 1994).  As such, empirical phenomenology has 
sought to develop the domain of shared meaning instead of offering claims about the 
nature of the reality. 
For better or worse, such skepticism toward phenomenology suggests the need to 
clarify and explain one’s use of first-person methodology to generate and justify 
theoretical constructs of mind and experience.  Particularly important would seem to be 
an explanation of the epistemic status and ontological underpinnings of such claims.  Are 
first-person statements about the nature of experience expected to stand on their own by 
virtue of our direct access to them?  What relation do such claims maintain to third-
person empirical investigation?  And what is the ontological context in which these 
claims reside – that is, what ontological commitments accompany such first-person 
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assertions?  This last question is particularly fundamental given phenomenology’s 
historical tension with, and rejection of, naturalist ontology. 
Regarding my own use of phenomenology in this work, let me begin by noting 
that the first-person claims I offer in this chapter concern not the shared meaning of 
specific experience, but matters of fact.  That is, in introducing perceived questionability 
as part of the first-person domain, I offer a general, though perhaps not universal, claim 
about the structure of human experience.  As such, it may seem that I am particularly 
vulnerable to the epistemic critiques that I have articulated.  Two points, however, 
mitigate such exposure.  First, there is a distinction to be made between philosophical 
phenomenology and what we might call methodological phenomenology.2  The project of 
philosophical phenomenology, from its Husserlian roots, aims to articulate the conditions 
for the possibility of scientific knowledge and theory (Husserl, 1970; Zahavi, 2003).  As 
such its first-person claims serve both epistemic and ontological functions, providing the 
foundational justification for scientific method and content.  From a purely 
methodological perspective, the act of engaging phenomenologically demands that we 
suspend what Husserl termed the natural attitude - the belief, or perhaps assumption, that 
                                                 
2 A somewhat related distinction was first made by Husserl (Husserl, The crisis of european 
sciences and transcendental phenomenology: An introduction to phenomenological philosophy, 1970; 
Husserl, Phenomenological psychology: lectures, summer semester,1925, 1977), who contrasted the 
ontological commitments of transcendental phenomenology with phenomenological psychology, which he 
took to be a “regional-ontological analysis which investigates consciousness for its own sake” (Zahavi, 
Naturalized phenomenology, 2010, p. 10).  In a similar manner, methodological phenomenology suggests 
that first-person claims are offered independent of ontological commitments.  Specifically, the claims of 
methodological phenomenology are consistent with, and do not require that we take a position on, the 
ontological priority of third-person claims. As I shall argue, using phenomenology in this way provides 
beneficial constraints on, and opportunities for, empirical science. 
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consciously apprehended phenomena are indicative of a reality external to consciousness.  
For any such claim directly contradicts the very assumption that underwrites the 
phenomenological project – that is, that the conditions for the possibility of scientific 
knowledge and theory are, in fact, at issue. Thus, rather than presuppose that such 
knowledge concerns an external, mind-independent reality, phenomenological analysis 
aims, at least in part, to provide a phenomenal ontology, one that views the detailed 
description of appearances as the ultimate foundation for scientific theorization.  As 
Heidegger states, the goal of phenomenological analysis is to 
to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which 
it shows itself from itself.  This is the formal meaning of that branch of 
research which calls itself ‘phenomenology.’ … But here we are 
expressing nothing else than the maxim …: ‘To the things themselves!’ 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 34) 
The point here is that the “things themselves” are not, as one might think, the things as 
they presumably exist in a mind-independent reality.  Rather, they are the things as they 
appear to us, absent, to the degree possible, any corrupting conceptual lens.  The task of 
philosophical phenomenology is to articulate those lenses, so that we may separate or 
“bracket” them out of experience, and justifiably attribute ontological status to whatever 
remains. 
Methodological phenomenology, on the other hand, makes no claim to the 
ontological priority of first-person claims.  Instead, the approach retains the core 
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assumption of mind-independent reality.3  Its goals are thus, in some sense more 
pedestrian than that of philosophical phenomenology.  Seeking a collaborative instead of 
competitive relation with scientific inquiry, methodological phenomenology aims to 
describe, and thus bring attention to, the background characteristics of conscious 
experience that require explanation (Gallagher, 2010; Zahavi, 2010; Lutz & Thomspon, 
2003; Dreyfus, 2014) – for example, the sense of ownership that pervades conscious 
awareness (Gallagher, 2010), the sense of agency that we feel when taking action 
(Gallagher, 2010; Damasio, 2012), or perhaps more fundamentally, the sense of a unified 
self (Damasio, 2012; Zahavi, 2005).  Such characteristics are the structural constituents 
of lived experience.  They are the pre-reflective4 meta-phenomena woven into the fabric 
of consciousness, the stable, though contingent5, conditions that accompany the specific 
content of an individual’s ongoing phenomenal stream.  While these background aspects 
may prove to be mere illusion, in the sense that claims of agency, for example, may 
                                                 
3 From a philosophical perspective, it is important to note that while the methodological variant 
works within the context of a natural ontological attitude, and thus operates “methodologically” under the 
assumption of the natural attitude, it technically refrains from making a particular ontological commitment.  
As such, methodological phenomenology is ultimately consistent with the larger philosophical project, 
which views the entirety of scientific inquiry, including the acceptance and utilization of first-person 
claims, as an abstraction ultimately to be explained in phenomenological terms.   
4 Here, I ought to note that by pre-reflective, I refer to a conscious mental state or aspect of such a 
state of which we are not fully aware in the moment.  Reflectivity is thus a property of conscious states that 
pertains to attention.  Where reflective aspects of consciousness are those to which give our attention as we 
experience them, pre-reflective aspects are those that we attend to, if at all, only after having experienced 
them. 
5 That this experiential structure is a contingent and not necessary condition of experience is clear 
from the variety of psychopathologies that appear to manifest radically different experiences of autonomy, 
ownership, self, etc.  Such contingency, in addition, ultimately renders problematic the attempt to 
generalize from one’s own first-person “sense of X."  That said, should the generalization of such first-
person claims be contested, empirical phenomenology would serve to validate them. 
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ultimately fail to survive the growing evidence in support of comprehensive automaticity 
(see, for example Bargh, 1997; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Banaji, Blair, & Glaser, 1997), 
their existence as a felt and pervasive aspect of experience - as a sense of agency, a sense 
of ownership, or a sense of self – is, to phenomenologists, not in question.  As Gallagher 
(2010) explains, it is the seeming of the experience - the private phenomenal appearance 
itself - that constitutes reality when it comes to consciousness.6 
As such, methodological phenomenology treats these first-person claims as raw 
first-person fact – as data in need of scientific explanation.  Or, in the more ambitious 
phrasing of Lutz and Thompson, the goal is to “to use these original first-person data to 
uncover new third-person data about the physiological processes crucial for 
consciousness” (Lutz & Thomspon, 2003, p. 32).  Regardless of the philosophico-
scientific issues surrounding, for example, the ostensible free will of human behavior and 
cognition, methodological phenomenology acknowledges that the very sense of such 
agency as an integral part of lived experience demands explication.  And the same can be 
said about other structural first-person components.7  To dismiss such data because their 
assumed empirical deficiencies would simply limit the explanatory value of any resulting 
theory of mind and/or consciousness.  As Zahavi states, “phenomenology addresses 
                                                 
6  cf. Dennett (Consciousness explained, 1991), who explicitly takes issue with this claim. 
7 That such claims require explanation assumes that they are accepted as shared and generally 
universal components of experience.  But this assumption is itself potentially contentious, particularly when 
considered from a positivist epistemic perspective.  That said, to deny the existence of such meta-
experience is to embrace a form of eliminativism (see below) that is difficult to justify in light of both the 
fundamental pull of intuition and the potential theoretical impact of excluding such data. 
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issues that are crucial for an understanding of the true complexity of consciousness and 
might even offer a conceptual framework for understanding the mind that is of 
considerably more value than some of the models currently in vogue in cognitive 
science” (Zahavi, 2010, p. 8).  Indeed, this attitude toward first-person claims in the 
domains of theory of mind and cognition has not been limited solely to 
phenomenologists, with both prominent cognitive neuroscientists (see Damasio, 2012; 
Dehaene, 2014; Panksepp, 2005) and analytic philosophers of mind (see Searle, 1997) 
advocating the need to treat first-person experience as scientific explananda. 
Those questioning the scientific viability of first-person claims, however, have 
taken a position similar to that of Dennett (2001), who in characterizing a first-person 
science of consciousness as “fantasy” rejects the epistemic value of any theory arising 
from such claims.  The issue can thus be framed as a question about the limits of 
scientific explanation, where unless one goes so far as to reject the existence of felt first-
person experience – the “what it is like” of conscious happenings - it is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that there exist some phenomena beyond the purview of scientific 
explanation.  Indeed, this is precisely the approach taken by Dennett and other 
eliminativists when it comes to acknowledging the existence of first-order phenomenal 
experience.  In doubling down on the epistemic comprehensiveness of scientific 
methodology, they are willing to dismiss the need to account for what appears to be most 
basic and incontrovertible - lived experience itself. 
Beyond the intuitive primacy of first-person experience and the potential 
theoretical deficiencies resulting from skepticism toward first-person claims, there exists 
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an empirical argument for embracing the epistemic stance of methodological 
phenomenology in theory of mind – the nascent success and clear promise of empirical 
consciousness research.  Indeed, I would argue that first-person detractors like Dennett 
need to reassess their comprehensive rejection of first-person methodology in light of 
such success.  While I shall delve into the details of empirical consciousness research in 
Chapter 5, it is important to note here the integral role of first-person claims in helping to 
legitimize a field of study long viewed as theoretically impervious to empirical research.  
As articulated by Dehaene (2014), the success of empirical consciousness studies is a 
byproduct of three recent methodological and technological developments – the advent of 
high-resolution fMRI brain images, an operational definition of consciousness articulated 
as “awareness of X”, and the use of first person reports of such awareness.  These reports, 
according to Dehaene, are “the key phenomena that a cognitive neuroscience of 
consciousness purports to study… [and] constitute primary data that need to be measured 
and recorded along with other psychophysiological observations” (Dehaene, 2014, p. 43).  
Such data are then correlated with fMRI scans to determine the large scale neural analogs 
of conscious awareness.  The results of these correlations have been used to support at 
least two promising explanatory constructs of consciousness theory, Edelman’s concept 
of re-entrance (Edelman, 2003) and Baer’s global workspace (Dehaene, 2014).  Whatever 
the theoretical limitations of first-person claims, their integration into the empirical 
inquiry of mind and consciousness has already yielded fruit enough to warrant excitement 
about future consciousness research.  Such promise, as we will see in more detail in 
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Chapter 5, offers further reason to adopt a more accommodating attitude toward the use 
of the first-person methodology. 
My own claims of first-person matters of fact thus sit within the ontological and 
epistemological context defined by methodological phenomenology.  As such, I offer 
them as first-person empirical data in need of theoretical explication by research domains 
devoted to the empirical study of mind - in particular, cognitive neuroscience.  While this 
stance, as stated, assumes a sort of primacy of first-person phenomena - in that it may 
suggest that we view them as epistemic “givens” to be accepted at face value - it is 
important to note that proponents of methodological phenomenology advocate a 
bidirectional interaction between first-person claims and third-person findings (Zahavi, 
2010; Gallagher, 2010).  Such interaction entails not only that scientific constructs 
account for the results of phenomenological analysis, but that the outcome of scientific 
inquiry itself may require that we “take another look at the phenomenology, in order to 
ascertain whether we got it right the first time” (Zahavi, 2010, p. 8; see also Varela, 1996; 
Damasio, 2012, particularly p.195).  Such a view illustrates a tension between the 
commitment to phenomenological analysis and its application to a mode of inquiry that 
prioritizes third-person claims – each method dictates a constraint on the other precisely 
because it seeks to affirm a degree of epistemic priority.  Ultimately, this tension is a 
byproduct of the explanatory gap that exists between the first and third person 
perspective, where the naturalist ontology of scientific inquiry presents a seemingly 
intractable confrontation with the intentionalist paradigm of phenomenology.  Despite 
this confrontation, the need to account for the full complexity of subjectivity as well as 
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the current promise of an eclectic approach warrant that we make every effort to flexibly 
navigate the problems created by such a gap. 
Indeed, Kiverstein (2012) has sought such flexibility by articulating a 
commitment to what he calls a “soft naturalism,” one that rejects science as the sole 
ontological arbiter in favor of a requirement that phenomenological ontology cohere with 
our best scientific explanations.  Such coherence, which Kiverstein terms the “Muggle 
Constraint”8, demands solely that “if a philosopher posits the existence of an entity or 
process that finds no echo in our best scientific theories, the philosopher must concede 
that the entity or process in question doesn’t exist” (Kiverstein, 2012, p. 28).9  In 
exchange for such constraint, the soft naturalist accepts phenomenological contributions 
to ontology “precisely because [she] recognizes the potential of a science to operate with 
a partial understanding of being that often hides and obscures from view other equally 
valid ways of understanding being” (Kiverstein, 2012, p. 34).  As such, soft naturalism 
seeks to provide metaphysical warrant for the possibility of a constructive dialog between 
cognitive science and phenomenological analysis, one where first- and third-person 
domains can both legitimately contribute to and constrain ontological development. 
                                                 
8 Muggles are the wizard population in the Harry Potter book series.  As such, the Muggle 
Constraint playfully rejects the “magic” implicit in non-coherence with scientific claims. 
9 While Kiverstein’s soft naturalism attempts to navigate the gap between first and third person 
epistemology, it is not without problems.  While my point here is not to critique the proposal, I might note 
that the phrase “no echo” is ambiguous enough to warrant an explanation that Kiverstein omits. 
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5.3. Perceived questionability and the phenomenology of criticality 
Despite my critique of sensitivity, I have made it clear that Perkins et al. have 
presented both a viable apriori argument and promising empirical data to justify the need 
to account for critical recognition in any elaboration of critical disposition.  In this 
section, I would like to offer an additional reason for doing so – our lived first-person 
experience10.  In much the same way that sense of agency, sense of ownership, and sense 
of self have been articulated conceptually as aspects of meta-phenomenal experience 
open to empirical neurocognitive inquiry (Damasio, 2012; Gallagher, 2010), I want to 
suggest that there exists a subjective sense of epistemic acceptability – what I have 
elsewhere called perceived questionability (Fisherman, 2014a).  Like these other 
phenomenologically articulated concepts, perceived questionability, or PQ, is a structural 
element of human consciousness, one that can account for our first-person experience of 
interrogative recognition.  As such, perceived questionability is an omnipresent, though 
often pre-reflective, awareness that accompanies first-order perception.  Such experience 
includes both linguistic and non-linguistic instances, as when we hear an assertion from a 
friend or when we see a bird on the horizon.  In these cases, we experience a pre-
                                                 
10 The phrase, “lived experience” has long been part of core phenomenological discourse.  In light 
of the tendency to utilize the phrase without elaboration, I refer to Lutz and Thompson’s articulation: “… 
‘lived experience’ comprises pre-verbal, pre-reflective and affectively valenced mental states (events, 
processes), which, while not immediately available or accessible to thought, introspection and verbal 
report, are intransitively ‘lived through’ subjectively, and thus have an experiential or phenomenal 
character. Such states, however, are (i) necessarily primitively self-aware, otherwise they do not qualify as 
conscious (in any sense); and (ii) because of their being thus self-aware, are access conscious in principle, 
in that they are the kind of states that can become available to thought, reflective awareness, introspection 
and verbal report, especially through first-person methods” (Lutz & Thomspon, 2003, p. 36) 
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reflective degree of felt attraction or resistance to accepting what has been said or 
otherwise experienced, an affective meta-experience whose character signals whether we 
ought to accept or reject a claim or perceived situation.11 
In its positively valenced manifestation, perceived questionability is expressed as 
a measure of felt confidence or trust in the acceptability of a claim or situation.  To 
varying degrees, such confidence forms our lived baseline attitude toward experience, 
allowing us to cope with the immediacies of our interaction with the world.  Thus, we 
navigate around the table without any thought that we might instead choose to ignore its 
presence, maintaining a background confidence that what appears before us is as much of 
an obstacle to walking straight as it seems to be.  Similarly, we trust the veracity of the 
vast majority claims we encounter in our everyday life, accepting statements such as 
“We’re on our way to the movies” or “Adrian just published her first novel” without 
pausing to consider the possibility that they may not express the speaker’s real intent or 
might otherwise be false.  For any such claim, there are of course, instances where we do 
engage this possibility.  But these almost always form a small minority of the possible 
opportunities to engage in this way – and for good reason.  To extrapolate from James’s 
statement that I offered earlier, there would be no more miserable a human condition than 
to lack this general trust in perception.  Indeed, such a default sense of epistemic 
                                                 
11 For the sake of simplicity, I shall use the term “claim” from this point on to refer to both 
linguistic and non-linguistic experiences.  While I do not wish to suggest that we can conflate the two, there 
is a sense in which an epistemic stance toward a perceived situation equates to a position that concerns a 
linguistically articulable claim about the situation. 
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confidence would seem to be a precondition for the development of habit so valued by 
James. 
That said, there is a contrary manifestation of perceived questionability, one that 
we experience as a degree of resistance to accepting a claim.  Such resistance is itself 
experientially multifaceted, as it may be expressed either as some measure of confidence 
that a claim or experience should not be accepted, or as a contrasting lack of confidence 
either way.  Thus, we might manifest a felt resistance to accepting the claim that black 
people are inferior to Caucasians as confidence in the statement’s negation.  On the other 
hand, we might hesitate to accept our friend’s assessment that the bird on the horizon is a 
turkey vulture not because we believe it to be a hawk, but because its appearance lacks 
sufficient clarity to confirm such a determination.  In this case, resistance is experienced 
not as a distinct confidence that the statement ought to be rejected, but as a lack of 
confidence - as a neutral doubt over its truth.  And yet, the specifics of the affective 
response do not detract from the fact that in both situations, there is a felt resistance to 
accepting the relevant claim. 
 While I have described perceived questionability in terms of the contrasting 
feelings of epistemic confidence and resistance, one might argue that it is more accurate 
to conflate the two.  In this case, we might describe the first-person experience simply in 
terms of degree of resistance, where epistemic confidence correlates to absence of 
resistance.  Indeed, the very phrase “perceived questionability” suggests this sort of 
description, as it is the lack of questionability that amounts to confidence.  One might 
also point to the pronounced asymmetry in the two extremes of felt acceptability, where 
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the generally distinct, well-bounded, and punctuated character of resistance is rarely 
present in the case of epistemic confidence.  Perhaps such asymmetry of experience is a 
matter of relative frequency, where given a continuous baseline level of confidence and 
trust engendered by an epistemic framework that enables the successful navigation of 
physical and social environments, moments of felt resistance naturally “pop out.”  Or 
perhaps one might note the evolutionary benefit of associating an affectively salient 
experience with potential epistemic challenges.  Regardless of the reason, the fact 
remains that such asymmetry exists to the point where it is not unreasonable to question 
the phenomenological accuracy of postulating a positive and distinct experience of 
epistemic confidence.  Such confidence, at best, exhibits a low-level intensity that 
borders on the non-existent, a lack of salience that makes it difficult to reference as a 
distinct aspect of meta-experience.  As such, we might find it more appropriate to 
describe the experience of acceptance as an absence of questionability. 
To some degree, though, the issue is rendered moot when we frame perceived 
questionability in the context of interrogative recognition.  Such recognition has little to 
do with experiences of confidence or trust and everything to do with the felt resistance to 
acceptance.  Whether epistemic confidence ought to be acknowledged from a 
phenomenological perspective bears little effect on the fact that interrogative recognition 
requires that individuals experience at least some felt resistance to accepting claims or 
experiential interpretations.  And such experience is not itself contentious given its 
punctuated salience.  We experience a distinct feeling of resistance to some subset of 
claims and experiences, and that feeling is the initiation critical recognition.  Perhaps 
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there is more to such recognition, some developing articulation of the dimensions and 
complexity of the experience that might involve classically conscious deliberation.  But 
the moment of recognizing that there may be something epistemically contentious is, at 
least from the phenomenological perspective, characterizable as a moment of affective 
resistance. 
However moot the issue, I would still maintain that there is a proactive, assertive 
character to the experience of seeing a turkey vulture on the horizon or hearing a claim 
that “just seems true,” a character that extends beyond a mere absence of resistance.  
There is a moment of experienced identification or confirmation, some degree of lived 
“this is the case” that actively encourages epistemic acceptance.  Sometimes we are sure, 
sometimes not so sure.  But the degree of certainty that we experience does not seem to 
be felt as simply a corresponding absence of resistance to acceptability.  It is instead felt 
as a moment of active confidence, whatever its degree of perceived salience. 
Given my description of interrogative recognition as an affective experience of 
epistemic resistance, it is important to emphasize the felt nature of perceived 
questionability.  While it may ultimately be I who am epistemically confident about, or 
resistant to, a claim or situation, there is a “givenness” to the experience of 
questionability.  This is not the givenness of empiricist epistemology, a givenness that is 
taken to underwrite the knowledge of some independent state of affairs.  Rather, it is a 
phenomenological givenness, where questionability is thrust upon consciousness without 
a sense that it is a product of intentional decision-making or action.  From the point of 
view of the subject, perceived questionability is like first-order experience in that it 
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“happens to us” – it is sensed instead of decided.12  As such, it carries with it a distinctly 
perceptual quality, one that ostensibly fails to exhibit the cognitive content.  It is an 
experience of epistemic judgment, but one that lacks the conscious cognition associated 
with such judgment.  Put simply, it is a decision made for us, a judgment rendered 
without the experience of judging.13  And this is precisely the reason that it makes sense 
to speak of recognizing interrogative opportunities.  In everyday situations we generally 
do not engage conscious interrogative judgment.  Rather, particular claims and situations 
appear as interrogative opportunities because the affective resistance to acceptance 
manifests as an integral component of the experience.  That is, the experience itself 
exhibits a greater-than-threshold level of questionability. 
While perceived questionability and sensitivity are two attempts to highlight the 
need to account for critical recognition, others have presented concepts that similarly 
emphasize the role of perceptual recognition in the process of epistemic judgment.  Haidt 
(2012; see also Burton, 2016), for example, invokes Howard Margolis’s (1987) 
                                                 
12 This is precisely how Vansieleghem (Philosophy for children as the wind of thinking, 2005) 
describes the deep doubt and perplexity that constitutes her “wind of thinking” – as a happening-to-us, as 
something from without that forces us to rework our primary epistemic assumptions and patterns of 
thought. 
Indeed, as a happening-to-us, questionability is very much like first-order experiences such as 
seeing red.  Here, the experience of red-ness projects the red-ness to the object itself, as something that 
exists external to us.  And yet, if physics and biology are right, the experienced red-ness is a construction of 
mind.  For the only red-ness that exists external to mind are colorless light waves of a particular frequency. 
13 Here it is important to note that such a claim exemplifies the use of phenomenological 
bracketing.  Clearly, there is reason to at least entertain the possibility that determinations of questionability 
require an act of judgment by the subject.  However, phenomenological analysis reveals that such belief is 
not suggested by the experience of questionability itself, but is an element of cognitive theory.  Once we 
isolate or “bracket-out” such elements from what is actually given by the conscious experience, we can see 
the justification for characterizing perceived questionability as judgment without a judge. 
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distinction between “seeing-that” and “reasoning-why” to explain why individuals adopt 
ostensibly unreasonable beliefs, proposing that perception is favored over reason to the 
point that individuals utilize reasons not as elements of a deliberative process leading to 
judgment but as rationalization for what has already been perceived as being true.  And 
both Biesta (2011) and Vansieleghem (2005) argue that the possibility of cognitive 
natality – of engaging new ways of thinking – requires an epistemically interruptive 
experience, something that “embarrasses us, that puts us into doubt, that confuses us and 
causes perplexity” (Vansieleghem, 2005, p. 27).  Here again, it is the experience itself, 
not any thinking about the experience, that is responsible for doubt or confusion. In 
calling such an experience the “wind of thinking,” Vansieleghem seeks to describe a 
process where the clearing out of existing thought patterns not only begins with a lived 
experience, but forgoes any cognitive contribution. 
Dehaene comes one step closer to articulating perceived questionability itself 
when he briefly engages the phenomenology of metacognition.  In defining 
metacognition as “knowing the limits of one’s own knowledge” (Dehaene, 2014, pp. 247-
248), Dehaene specifies that we not only assign degrees of “belief or confidence to our 
own thoughts,” but that such assignment involves an inherently affective response.  He 
states: 
…crucially, in humans a smaller perceptual distance [between two 
different frequency tones] also elicits a second-order feeling of lack of 
confidence.  When the sound is too close to the boundary, we realize that 
we face a difficulty.  We feel unsure [whether the second tone is higher 
pitched or not], and we know that our decision may well turn out to be 
wrong.  If we can, we bail out, openly reporting that we have no idea of 
the correct answer.  This is typical metacognitive knowledge:  I know that 
I don’t know. (Dehaene, 2014, p. 248) 
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Here, Dehaene’s description, though phrased as a felt lack of confidence, is quite similar 
to the epistemic resistance that I described in cases of uncertain experience or not 
knowing.  While his articulation is more limited in scope than perceived questionability, 
his use of the word “crucially” suggests that he views it as an inherent aspect of epistemic 
cognition, part of the structural fabric of experience.  Most interesting, Dehaene presents 
this elaboration not just as an exercise of experiential analysis, but in the context of 
elaborating the scientific evidence that other high-functioning animals engage in similar, 
though more rudimentary, metacognitive behavior.  Like my approach to perceived 
questionability, Dehaene expects phenomenological description to be backed up by the 
empirical data. 
Valerie Thompson (2009) turns such phenomenological description into an 
empirical construct quite similar to perceived questionability, though she does so in the 
context of reason and problem solving instead of critical questioning.  Termed “feeling of 
rightness,” or FOR for short, Thompson defines the construct as the metacognitive 
experience that accompanies intuitive, or heuristic, answers to posed problems.  As 
supported by empirical studies (Thompson, Turner, & Pennycook, 2011), a strong FOR 
response “is the reasoner’s cue to look no further afield for the answer” (Thompson, 
2009, p. 175) while a weak FOR increases the likelihood that the subject will experience 
a “judgment of solvability” – that is, a metacognitive assessment of the problem’s 
difficulty.  While she acknowledges the lack of research regarding metacognitive 
processes in the domain of reasoning and problem solving, she references the substantial 
related literature in memory recall to speculate that FOR is the felt experience of 
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retrieving heuristic output.  Retrieval that is processed fluently should thus be 
experienced as “right,” while more effortful, less efficient retrieval should be felt as less 
likely to be correct.14 
 Perhaps the most closely related concept, though, comes from Dewey, who 
speaks of the personally sensed disequilibrium (Dewey, 1938) or “feeling of a 
discrepancy, or difficulty” (Dewey, 1910, p. 73) that precedes, and provides impetus for, 
critical inquiry.  Such a state, Dewey claims, lacks the cognitive content demanded by 
inquiry. Instead, it presents affectively “as a shock, as emotional disturbance, as a more 
or less vague feeling of the unexpected, of something queer, strange, funny, or 
disconcerting” (Dewey, 1910, p. 74).  Dewey even employs the language of both 
sensitivity and perceived questionability to emphasize the need to cultivate interrogative 
recognition, stating that 
If germinating powers are not used and cultivated at the right moment, 
they tend to be transitory, to die out, or to wane in intensity. This general 
law is peculiarly true of sensitiveness to what is uncertain and 
questionable; in a few people, intellectual curiosity is so insatiable and 
that nothing will discourage it, but in most its edge is easily dulled and 
blunted. (Dewey, 1910, p. 33, emphasis is mine) 
                                                 
14 Here, I might emphasize that Thompson equates FOR with the processing involved in retrieval 
of the heuristic response, which one would suppose is different than the processing resulting in the heuristic 
response.  Why retrieval and not the fluency and efficiency of the response processing itself is responsible 
for FOR is left unstated, but perhaps such questions are better accounted for in the memory and recall 
literature.  That said, I want to further speculate that Global Workspace Theory, which I cover in some 
detail in Chapter Five, might offer an answer to both this question and the source of perceived 
questionability. 
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This statement itself says little about the affective character of interrogative recognition.  
But taken with Dewey’s description of first-person experience, sensitiveness to what is 
uncertain and questionable very much approximates the phenomenological articulation of 
perceived questionability.  Indeed, unlike Perkins’ sensitivity construct, which applies to 
a conception of good or critical thinking, Dewey frames the issue specifically in terms of 
criticality, as a response to questionability rather than the recognition of a thinking 
shortfall.  On the other hand, it is surprising just how much the statement approximates 
Perkins’ the articulation of sensitivity.  In addition to utilizing the same term, it hints at 
the “more is better” critical ideal.  While such a commitment is not itself explicit, the fact 
that Dewey describes the pedagogical problem as dulled curiosity and contrasts it to 
insatiable inquisitiveness suggests that more questioning defines the interrogative ideal.  
As such, my earlier criticism of Perkins applies just as much to Dewey – that is, neither 
recognizes the gap between what can be taken as an interrogative opportunity and what 
ought to be taken as one.  
5.4. Expertise theory - linking critical recognition to critical judgment 
As articulated, perceived questionability offers first-person support for conceiving 
of criticality as an act of interrogative recognition.  Through the phenomenological 
description of epistemic confidence and resistance as the affective poles of a structural 
aspect of first-order experience, perceived questionability affirms the existence of a 
moment of critical recognition, a moment where a claim is perceived as questionable.  
And yet, the question remains how such recognition could be understood as an act of 
critical judgment, as demanded by our standard of criticality.  Again, I want to approach 
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the issue from the perspectives of both phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience, with 
the expectation that, despite the seemingly intractable gap between the physical and the 
phenomenal, the third-person claims of the latter can provide material justification for 
first-person description.15    While I leave the brain science to the next chapter, I offer in 
this section a phenomenological explanation in the form of Hubert Dreyfus’s expertise 
theory.  Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s (2013) phenomenological concepts of maximal 
grip and the intentional arc, Dreyfus offers a five stage model of expertise development 
that details the transition from explicitly conceptual judgment – that is, judgment based 
on the conscious evaluation of well-defined mental representations – to judgment that is 
rendered concretely in perception itself.16  Though the theory has been applied 
pragmatically to address the pedagogical demand for expertise in a diversity of fields 
(Benner, Tanner, & Chesla, 2009; Dorst & Reymen, 2004; Paterson, Higgs, & Wilcox, 
2006; van Manen, 2008), Dreyfus intends the theory as an argument against the 
representational theory of mind.  It is in this latter vein that the theory applies to my 
conception of criticality, where it lends some measure of legitimacy to the idea that 
judgment can be rendered as a perceptual given without any need for conscious 
                                                 
15 I ought to make clear that Chalmers’s (1995) so called “hard problem” of theory of mind does 
not preclude the use of brain science to support phenomenal claims.  While the hard problem defines an 
explanatory gap for which the current empirical paradigm has offered little hope of a bridge, the non-
controversial concept of supervenience - which states that any change in mental state requires a change in 
physical (brain) state - allows for a measure of explanation through correlation between reported 
phenomenal states and quantified neurological states.  Even in the absence of any idea how the physical 
might explain the phenomenal, supervenient correlation offers the possibility of theoretical insight that has 
pragmatic ramifications.  As I will argue later, the empirical support for perceived questionability and 
expertise theory justify specific pedagogical ramifications of an education for criticality.  
16 To be clear, I take perception to include non-phenomenal aspects of experience. 
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cognition.  As we will see later, however, the theory does maintain significant practical 
ramifications for a pedagogy that nurtures criticality. 
Dreyfus’ theory of expertise describes the essential characteristics of each stage of 
skill development, from novice to expert, and articulates the conditions necessary for an 
individual to advance between stages (Dreyfus, 1988; Dreyfus, 2002).  In the novice 
stage, an individual introduced to a new skill is instructed to act according to a set of 
“context-free” rules.  Dreyfus offers two examples to illustrate this starting state of skill 
acquisition, those of the novice car driver and the novice chess player.  In both cases, the 
neophyte is given a set of rules for action that does not require any judgment of situation.  
The driver is told, for example, to shift from first to second gear when the speedometer 
reads twenty miles per hour, while the chess player is given a set of point values for each 
piece on the board and told to take the opponent’s piece whenever that action will result 
in a greater loss of points for the opponent.  As the individual gains experience, she 
begins to notice aspects of the activity that dictate additional rules, rules that inherently 
depend on perceived characteristics of a situation. Such rules are inherently less precise 
and universally valid than the initial context-free rules, and involve some sort of 
recognition and categorization of situational specifics.  For the driver, this might mean 
shifting gears based on the sound of the engine after having recognized that traveling on 
an incline generally puts more of a strain on an engine than traversing a flat surface. 
Similarly, the chess player might learn to avoid overextending her position after 
experiencing situations where capturing pieces according to point value resulted in losing 
154 
 
other, more valuable pieces later in the game.  This contextual rule development is the 
hallmark of what Dreyfus terms the advance beginner stage. 
With the development of a plethora of context-specific rules, the individual is 
faced with a developing problem - judging which potentially conflicting aspects of a 
complex situation should be prioritized.  Such a problem defines the stage of competence.  
The competent chess player must decide whether to exploit the perceived weakness of an 
opponent’s king defense or defend against his own recognized vulnerability.  Similarly, 
the driver must choose whether to prioritize getting to an appointment on time over 
driving safely.  In either case, adopting a goal and a subsequent plan of action enables the 
actor to manage the number of rules that govern decision-making.  The chess player can 
focus solely on offensive action, while the driver, for better or worse, can focus on 
traveling as fast as possible at the expense of not passing on the right.  
According to Dreyfus, competence defines a turning point in the process of skill 
building.  For the first time, the performer must decide for herself what perspective to 
take on a multifaceted situation, and hence what set of rules to follow. The relative 
inexperience of the competent actor forces her to make a conscious, perhaps calculated, 
decision among a perceived set of options.  As Dreyfus notes, there are  
more situations than can be named or precisely defined, so no one can 
prepare for the learner a list of what to do in each possible situation.  
Competent performers, therefore, must decide for themselves in each 
situation what plan to choose without being sure that it will be appropriate 
in that particular situation. (Dreyfus, 2002, p. 369) 
In other words, there exist no rules to determine which perspective, and consequently 
which goal or plan of action, to adopt.  Instead, the actor must decide through trial and 
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error.  He may wing it, engage in “a calculative procedure” (Dreyfus, 2002, p. 371), or 
utilize a combination of both.  However, without previous experience, the choice of any 
plan or goal is always the outcome of a conscious decision among perceived alternatives. 
It is important to highlight the difference between Dreyfus’s use of the term 
“competence” and our common understanding of the term.  The stage of competence is 
defined by the need to judge, not by the success of one’s judgments. The competent actor 
may fail to achieve a goal but is viewed as competent simply by virtue of having made a 
choice about how to respond – a choice not required of the advanced beginner.  On this 
account, we would expect the competent performer to fail often throughout the 
competence stage, as potentially errant plans are invoked for numerous types of newly 
encountered situations.  Yet, the successes and failures of the competent actor play a 
crucial role in the progression of skill development, for as Dreyfus claims,  
prior to this stage, if the learned rules didn’t work out, the performer could 
rationalize that he hadn’t been given adequate rules…Now the learner 
feels responsible for disasters…Successful plans induce euphoria, while 
mistakes are felt in the pit of the stomach. (2002, p. 370).   
Despite the hyperbolic overtones of the statement, Dreyfus’s point seems ultimately 
reasonable.  Given some measure of care for acting successfully, individuals faced with 
decisions about how to act are likely to experience emotional reactions to judgment that 
are not part of the lived experience of an individual who is merely following the rules.  I 
would even argue that this way of phrasing the claim understates the issue, for while the 
rule follower might react emotionally to the outcome of her actions, it is simply not 
possible for her to have such a response to her judgment.  Such judgment, by definition, 
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begins with competence, and is thus not something to which the advanced beginner can 
respond. 
This affective component of skilled action provides the requisite foundation for 
the next two stages of skill development - proficiency and expertise.  Each of these stages 
describes a transition from explicitly deliberative judgment and action to progressively 
more intuitive behavior, with proficiency addressing how one interprets a situation and 
expertise defining how one chooses to respond to it.  Dreyfus claims that the competent 
actor achieves proficiency only when situational interpretation, or perspective adoption, 
becomes a matter of perception - when instead of consciously figuring out what is 
important about a situation, “certain features… stand out as salient and others [will] 
recede into the background and be ignored” (Dreyfus, 1988, p. 28).  Thus, what was to 
the competent actor a set of articulated situational considerations whose relative 
importance could be determined only through a process of (good or bad) reasoning 
becomes to the proficient performer an integrated and holistic aspect of perception - a 
skill-specific perceived perspective or “seeing as.”17  It is this perception that affords the 
proficient actor well-defined opportunities for response (Greeno, 1994; Scarantino, 
2002). 
                                                 
17 A similar, though perhaps stronger, claim is offered by John Searle (Seeing things as they are, 
2015), who proposes that all seeing is a “seeing as.”  What is interesting about Searle’s claim is its 
phenomenological overtones, which is unusual for a committed analytic philosopher.  
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As Dreyfus explains, emotionally committed skill engagement is essential to 
making this transition, as it is such commitment that enables the genesis of the affective 
assessment of action:  
If, as the learner practices her skill, events are experienced with 
involvement, the resulting positive and negative experiences will 
strengthen successful responses and inhibit unsuccessful ones.  The 
performer’s theory of the skill, as represented by rules and principles, will 
thus gradually be replaced by situational discriminations accompanied by 
associated responses.  Proficiency seems to develop if, and only if, 
experience is assimilated in this atheoretical way and intuitive behavior 
replaces reasoned responses (Dreyfus, 2002, p. 370). 
While this statement extends beyond the perspective adoption of proficiency to include 
the transition to intuitive response, it illustrates how competence signals the turning point 
in skill development.  In forcing the involved, or “caring,” actor to consciously prioritize 
recognized aspects of experience, competence enables an emotional component to find its 
way into the learning process.  Affect becomes the skilled mode of judgment assessment, 
offering the competent actor an out from the progressively more involved, and hence 
cognitively burdensome, deliberation that results from continually enhanced perceptual 
discrimination.18  Rather than consciously weigh the relevance of an increasing number 
of factors that influence interpretation of a complex situation, the caring actor ends up 
getting progressively better at simply “seeing” what is important about it.  Previously 
experienced situations evoke past perspective adoption that was judged to lead to 
                                                 
18 This is precisely the burden described by both James and Willingham (see Chapter 2), and is the 
reason why a normative articulation of criticality ought not to demand that we question everything. 
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successful responses – that is, to responses accompanied by the positively valenced 
feelings of success.19  In this way, perspective adoption occurs without any use of a 
consciously calculative procedure.  
A similar process is at work in the transition to expertise.  In intuitively adopting 
skill-relevant perspective, the proficient actor may see what needs to be done, but must 
still decide how to do it.  Such a decision, like the perspective adoption decision faced by 
the competent actor, requires deliberation, as the proficient actor is incapable of intuiting 
the appropriate course of action.  The expert, though, has responded to a significantly 
greater number of lived situations and thus intuits not only perspective, but response.20  
Here again, continually revised feelings of success and failure govern the transition from 
the deliberate to the intuitive, offering a mode of response assessment that does not 
involve comparison to some explicit representation of ideal skill execution.  The result of 
                                                 
19 It is important to distinguish here between what is merely descriptive and what is explanatory.  
In defining the transition from competence to proficiency, Dreyfus seeks to describe what actually happens 
– a movement from deliberative and conceptual perspective adoption to transformed perception. But he 
also quietly introduces explanatory statements, as when he states that “if, as the learner practices her skill, 
events are experienced with involvement, the resulting positive and negative experiences will strengthen 
successful responses and inhibit unsuccessful ones” (Dreyfus, 2002, p. 370).  Statements such as this one 
go beyond mere description, and provide the basis for Dreyfus’s support for a non-representational theory 
of mind.  Yet these are the very claims that representationalists would find contentious, regardless of the 
viability of the descriptive elements of the theory.  (See, for example, Fodor, LOT 2: The language of 
thought revisited, 2008; Aydede, 2015) 
20 Here, one might ask why intuitive perspective adoption requires less skill than intuitive 
response. While the first-person descriptive character of expertise theory obviates the need to provide an 
answer, Dreyfus does offer an explanation.  He states that “this is inevitable since there are far fewer ways 
of seeing what is going on than there are ways of responding. The proficient performer simply has not yet 
had enough experience with the variety of possible responses to each discriminated situation to respond 
automatically” (Dreyfus, Intelligence Without Representation – Merleau-Ponty's critique of mental 
representation: The relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation, 2002, p. 371). 
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the process is the perception of an obvious response, one whose appropriateness is not 
determined through conscious deliberation.  Such a response, as Dreyfus explains 
(above), constitutes one aspect of the individual’s current ideal, or theory, of the skill, an 
ideal that is experienced only as a felt disposition to respond to particular circumstances 
in particular ways.21 
While Dreyfus defines additional stages of skill acquisition (see Dreyfus, 2008), 
the stages up to, and including, expertise describe a path that makes clear the transition 
from conceptual to perceptual decision-making.  In its most concise articulation, 
expertise theory specifies that this transformation occurs by engaging in the caring 
practice of a skill.  Where the behavior of the novice practitioner is governed by 
externally imposed rules, the skill acquired through caring practice manifests, in part, as 
increasingly discriminated skill-specific perception.  Such perception forces a change in 
the way that we approach the assignment of situational relevance as the number of factors 
perceived to influence perspective adoption and, ultimately, response exceeds the 
capacity of deliberation.  Indeed, at the point of competence, expertise theory postulates 
initiation of a virtuous “feed-forward” loop, where affective assessment of success 
nurtures the perceptual discrimination of judgment while enhanced perceptual 
discrimination itself refines one’s feeling (and thus ideal) of success.  It is this 
                                                 
21 While it may be obvious that Dreyfus is not advocating a type of behaviorism, I want to avoid 
any misinterpretation of behavioristic terms such as “situation” and “response.”  Indeed, the 
phenomenological rendering of expertise theory precludes any affirmation of behaviorism.  Rather, the 
theory offers consciousness -specifically affective consciousness - as the mental construct responsible for 
modulating environmental input. 
160 
 
progressively refined felt judgment that allows the grandmaster chess player to fare well 
against one hundred simultaneous opponents, that allows the professional quarterback to 
know where to deliver the ball amid the chaos of a pass play, and that governs our ability 
to drive safely in heavy traffic.  In each of these cases, the ability to render expert 
judgment is substantially expressed as an awareness or recognition that is absent in the 
lived experience of the non-expert. 
We might look at perceived questionability as a critical skill subject to a similar 
developmental trajectory.  Here, I do not mean to suggest that expertise theory applies to 
the very existence of interrogative recognition itself.  For clearly, such recognition exists 
prior to the active or demanded search for questions, as evidenced by the plethora of 
“whys?” and “hows?” emanating from young children in the course of everyday 
activities.  Indeed, the fact that perceived questionability is a defining feature of our 
experiential topology forecloses the possibility of utilizing expertise theory to explain the 
genesis of interrogative recognition.  Rather, the skill of interrogative recognition, like all 
skills, concerns the approximation of a standard or ideal.  And in this case, the standard is 
an interrogative one - the ability to recognize questions when they ought to be 
recognized.22 
                                                 
22 This brings up an interesting point about Dreyfus’s use of the term “expertise.”  For Dreyfus, 
expert behavior is not defined as optimal skill, but as intuitive response.  While the two very often go hand-
in-hand, Dreyfus is clear that one might have acquired expertise in doing something particularly “wrong” 
from the point of view of an accepted skill.  Such expertise, Dreyfus claims, is a product of affective self-
assessment, where the actor’s standard of assessment differs from the accepted standard, from “the 
traditional practices of a community” (Wrathall, 2014, p. 11).  This point bears direct relevance to the issue 
of criticality as a skill, where the ability to recognize questions when they ought to be recognized is the 
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This is the skill of criticality, the development of one’s existing “faculty” of 
interrogative recognition so that it aligns with our critical ideal.23  Here, expertise theory 
is a natural fit.  Regardless of an individual’s baseline tendency to interrogate claims, we 
can articulate Dreyfus’s stages of skill development to show how the caring practice of 
questioning utilizes repeated and iterative acts of conscious interrogative judgment to 
transform an individual’s critical discrimination - their perceived questionability - to 
approximate an adopted standard.  What that standard is, how widespread its adoption, or 
how much it varies are legitimate issues that may make it difficult to see criticality as a 
skill.  But as I have said all along, that such a standard exists is not in question.  We may 
not all agree about which claims and experiences ought to be questioned, but we are all 
held to some standard of critical behavior.  And it is this standard that defines criticality 
as a skill. 
As such, we might concretely elaborate the application of expertise theory to 
criticality in the context of critical thinking development, which as I argued earlier, is 
                                                 
ideal defined by the practices of a community – in this case (as I argued in Chapter 2), the educational 
community.  
23 We might view the relation between criticality and interrogative recognition in much the same 
way that the skill of pitching relates to throwing a ball.  While throwing is both a necessary condition and 
fundamental activity of pitching, a toddler can throw without having any skill at pitching.  In the same way, 
criticality is a skill such that the mere ability to recognize a claim as questionable fails to impart any 
measure of criticality to an individual.  Such is the case because, in the same way that pitching concerns, 
not throwing, but retiring a batter, criticality fundamentally concerns not just interrogative recognition, but 
the approximation of a critical ideal – knowing when and when not to interrogate.  Without any ability to 
approximate the ideal, interrogative recognition itself fails to impart a measure of criticality. 
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inherently interrogative.24  Given the contemporary call for more questioning, critical 
thinking pedagogy seeks to increase one’s critical recognition so that more claims are 
seen as questionable.  With this in mind, the novice critical thinker is initially given a set 
of context-free critical thinking rules, some of which articulate criteria for interrogation.  
Foremost among these would likely pertain to the need to offer reasons (Siegel, 1988) – 
criteria such as “accept a statement if someone offers a reason for doing so” and “accept a 
statement as true if and only if you find more reasons that it is true than false.”25  As the 
thinker gains experience using these rules and finds reasons to interrogate more,26 she 
begins to notice aspects of dialog, written text, and situational experience that suggest the 
contextually relative strength of reasons.  She develops, or may be instructed to use, an 
assortment of context-sensitive rules such as “in cases where there are acknowledged 
experts, give weight to their claims.”   At the point of competence, she will have learned 
to discriminate numerous factors contributing to the relative strength of warrant – the 
trustworthiness and authority of the source, the import of the statement, her own recent 
                                                 
24 Here, I intend this application of expertise theory to criticality to be understood as illustrative, 
not as a rigidly proscribed means of skill acquisition.  As Mark Wrathall (Hubert dreyfus and the 
phenomenology of human intelligence, 2014) notes, Dreyfus himself has emphasized the need to view the 
theory flexibly, expecting that different skills and environments would dictate a variety of possible variants 
of the described path to expertise. 
25 While this may, at first, sound like an unreasonable rule for coming to judgment, students in my 
kindergarten and first grade “philosophy with children” classes have often articulated just such a rule. After 
listing the reasons for accepting or rejecting the claim that “Frog and Toad were brave,” children will 
frequently note that their final judgment was based on the number of reasons in each list.   
26 Note that it is reasonable to think that individuals will question more in this situation only if we 
assume two things – that approximation of the standard requires that the individual generally question 
more, and that the standard is something toward which the individual strives.  The first is a claim I offered 
in Chapter 2, and the second amounts to Dreyfus’s requirement for involved or caring practice. 
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and not-so-recent experience, how the assertion comports with her belief system, and so 
on.  Here, our thinker is forced to judge which of these aspects ought to be prioritized and 
which can be ignored.  For example, she might prioritize that her friend is not much of a 
dog expert over her friend’s trustworthiness, thus leading her to question his claim that no 
dogs have different colored eyes.  This intentional judgment of situation – a decision 
forced upon our thinker by her improved capacity to discriminate situational complexity 
– places responsibility for either engaging or foregoing critical interrogation squarely on 
her shoulders.  Such responsibility, initiates a transition to the affective assessment of 
judgment, leading our thinker to feel the impact of her interrogative decisions – in this 
case, satisfaction upon learning that border collies typically do have mismatched eye 
color. 
As our thinker feels the results of repeated and involved interrogative decisions in 
the context of progressively more taxing deliberation, feelings of satisfaction and dismay 
replace reason as the standard of interrogative assessment.  In the presence of such 
assessment, explicit deliberation over questionability fades, replaced by a reconfigured 
tendency toward felt epistemic confidence and resistance.  Claims that in the past might 
not have been perceived as questionable now evoke a resistance toward acceptance, while 
claims previously perceived as questionable might no longer appear as such.  Of course, 
in the presence of a standard of questionability that demands more interrogation, we 
would expect more frequent manifestations of resistance and correspondingly fewer 
experiences of confidence.  And the same might be said in the inverse.  Given a standard 
of appropriate questioning, those overly disposed toward interrogation would tend to 
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have the interrogative needle moved in the other direction, from experiences of resistance 
toward epistemic confidence.  What we get in both cases is an alignment toward the 
standard, an acquired ability to act in a manner defined by a sought-after ideal.  Such 
alignment constitutes, by definition, the development of criticality. 
5.5. Revisiting criticality as a form of judgment 
Toward the end of chapter three, I presented two substantial problems with a 
conception of critical recognition as a form of judgment.  First, I wondered how a process 
of judgment could explain interrogative recognition without begging for further judgment 
in order to account for the need to determine when it is appropriate to judge whether or 
not we should interrogate.  Such an explanation, I proposed, would initiate a regressive 
loop that promised to raise as much of a question as it proposed to answer.  Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, I noted the difficulty of characterizing a perceptual event as a 
form of judgment given the traditional opposition of perception and conception.  With 
both issues, I believe there is much in the domains of cognitive neuroscience and 
contemporary consciousness research that offers potential solutions – and I will get to 
these in the following chapter.  However, it is just as important to understand the degree 
to which such issues are addressed by the phenomenology itself – that is, by the concept 
of perceived questionability and the application of expertise theory. 
Indeed, it is not immediately clear that expertise theory does justify a conception 
of interrogative recognition as a form of judgment.  For while the theory describes a 
learning process where the caring practice of explicitly conceptual judgment fosters the 
transition to intuitive decision-making that aligns with previous assessments of critical 
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response (and non-response), it is not obvious that such decision-making can itself be 
characterized as a type of judgment.  Rather, it seems to have the character of a learned 
behavioral response more along the lines of habituation than judgment.  Dreyfus, himself, 
facilitates this view when he states that in the development of expert behavior “the 
performer’s theory of the skill, as represented by rules and principles, will thus gradually 
be replaced by situational discriminations accompanied by associated responses” 
(Dreyfus, 2002, p. 370).  If this is the case, it is difficult to see any opening for judgment, 
as responses would seem to be judgments only to the degree that they follow from some 
form of considered evaluation of alternatives.  And in a model of behavior where 
responses merely accompany situational discriminations, no such evaluation would seem 
to be operative.  Indeed, it is characteristic of expert behavior that only one response 
presents – the perceived “right” one. 
Perhaps we might find a role for judgment in the act of situational discrimination, 
of deciding that a situation is of a certain type.  Given the proposed mapping of response 
to situation, judgment of situation would then be tantamount to judgment of response.27  
But here, too, the phenomenology of expertise theory is clear - there is no decision to be 
                                                 
27 This is precisely the form of Bechara’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Bechara, The role of 
emotion in decision-making: Evidence from neurological patients with orbitofrontal damage, 2004; 
Bechara & Damasio, The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural theory of economic decision, 2005), an 
empirically justified decision-making theory that gives a key role to affect.  While I will not discuss this 
theory in Chapter Five, it bears mentioning here given its use of a judgment map. According to SMH, the 
brain develops a mapping between previous judgments and the lived emotional responses to those 
judgments. The mapping is then invoked in the process of making a decision, with the brain unconsciously 
searching among the “database” of previous judgments to find those situations that it judges to be similar to 
the current one.  After aggregating similar situations, the brain initiates what Bechara calls an “as-if” 
emotional response intended to provide decision-making guidance for the current situation. 
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made.  Situations are perceived not conceived, and skilled performers simply perceive 
more – more detail, and hence more situational distinctions.  Here, we might suggest the 
possibility that despite the lack of judgment in first-person experience, some form of 
judgment of response, or even of situation, is necessary “under the hood,” as part of an 
encapsulated and inaccessible process.  This might very well be the case, and we will 
explore this possibility in the next chapter.  But there is little evidence in the first-person 
perspective to support such a view.  To the degree that the performer is an expert, the 
phenomenology of both the discriminated situation and the response maintains the 
character of an experiential given.28 
Indeed, the most that the phenomenology itself justifies is a view of criticality as 
what we might call the “embodiment of judgment.”  As we have already seen, both the 
classically cognitive assessment integral to nascent skill development and the affective 
assessment of proficient or expert response are acts of judgment.  In the case of the latter 
specifically, its felt character is the result of an implicit comparison between a skilled 
response and the actor’s non-representational theory of the skill.  But rather than being a 
mere judgment of previously rendered response, expertise theory claims that all such 
assessment bears a direct effect on future response, where the “positive and negative 
experiences will strengthen successful responses and inhibit unsuccessful ones” (Dreyfus, 
2002, p. 370).  In a very concrete way then, response assessment is a temporally 
                                                 
28 I would further argue that to the degree that third-person empirical studies justify an “under-the-
hood” process that does rely on the evaluation of alternatives, any suggestion that the first-person data does 
not warrant such a process illustrates the limits of phenomenological analysis.  Such a position is consistent 
with, and a ramification of, a methodological approach to phenomenology. 
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bidirectional judgment, one whose backwards vector evaluates a past response and whose 
forward vector issues a judgment for future situations.  Given its concern with the future, 
the forward vector necessarily takes the form of a conditional similar to, though not 
generally as definitive as, “if this situation presents, this is the way I ought (not) to 
respond.”  Such judgment, rendered repeatedly for ever-more-finely discriminated 
situations constitutes the means by which particular responses pair with defined 
situations, thus constituting the skill-related “dispositions to respond to the solicitations 
of situations in the world” (Dreyfus, 2002, p. 367). 
To the degree that we commit to articulating some concrete attribute of the 
individual that accounts for this pairing, we can thus justifiably see its relation to 
response assessment as something more than causal.  For it is not merely that such 
assessment causes the development of the attribute.  Rather, it causes a particular kind 
development – one where the attribute “incorporates” the assessments, where its 
character is such that the future tendency toward critical engagement becomes 
progressively better aligned with the assessments of past interrogative decisions.  
Whether assessment conditionals can be said to exist as distinct constituents of the 
attribute depends on its elaboration as something more than a “black box,” a process that 
may very well be empirical in nature.  But even as a black box, the fact that future 
behavioral output progressively matches past assessment input lends justification to a 
description of the attribute as an instantiated amalgam of conditionally formulated 
judgments previously rendered.  As such, we might say not only that criticality is a 
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product of judgment, but that the act of critical recognition is itself the embodiment of 
judgment. 
It is this last claim, in particular, that addresses the weakness of the sensitivity 
conception.  As I discussed in Chapter 3, sensitivity exists as a response to the failure of 
motivation to account for the “when of thinking,” for the need to apply critical skills at 
the right time.  But in saying little about what is involved in such application, the concept 
propagates the very issue it was meant to address - it leaves us asking what it is about the 
critical spirit that enables it to engage critique when it ought to be engaged.  At this point, 
though, we would seem to have our answer.  Critical individuals exhibit appropriate 
critique because they have embodied good critical judgment.  That is, they have 
developed a personal attribute - a virtue - whose implementation manifests the meta-
judgments of the past in the critical recognition of the present.  This is not to say that in 
exhibiting appropriate critical behavior, individuals engage in an act of critical judgment 
in the moment - though as we will see in the next Chapter, there is reason to believe that 
critical recognition is just such an act as well.  Rather, it is that whatever process 
underlies the decision to engage or forgo critique has been instantiated in a manner that 
abides by the conditionals of past critical assessment. 
Yet one might argue that such a process is better conceived as a manifestation of 
habit.  For in establishing a tendency to respond, the development of expertise, like our 
common sense notion of habit, specifies the pairing of perceived situations with 
responses, so that situations S1, S2, and S3 tend to produce response R1.  James himself 
formally defined mental habit in this manner, stating that “our thinking and feeling 
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processes are also largely subject to the law of habit, and one result of this is a 
phenomenon which you all know under the name of 'the association of ideas,’ (James, 
1925, p. 37) where “certain ideas… are always followed by certain other ideas” (James, 
1925, p. 41).  Like Dreyfus, James emphasized the role of repetition in the development 
of such association.  Habit, he claimed, “becomes effectively ingrained in us in 
proportion to the uninterrupted frequency with which the actions actually occur, and the 
brain 'grows' to their use” (James, 1925, p. 33).  As such, James advocated the need for 
repetition in education, so that we might “make automatic and habitual, as early as 
possible, as many useful actions as we can, and as carefully guard against the growing 
into ways that are likely to be disadvantageous” (James, 1925, p. 32).  
Similar characteristics define the mental functioning underlying expert response. 
Dreyfus, like James, never doubts the presence of lived experience, but it maintains little 
role in the production of expert behavior.  The expert chess player lives the experience of 
a “right” move, but as Dreyfus describes it, there is little gap between the experience and 
the execution.  The expert is “geared into” the world, so that the response is executed 
without the need for deliberation or even mental representation.  It happens as a purely 
dispositional response set up in advance, one already tuned to a diverse set of 
environmental complexities.  As such, expertise bears an unmistakable resemblance to 
Jamesian association.  Situations present and responses tend to follow, without mediation. 
 There is, however, a crucial difference.  If expert response were truly habit, it 
should be the case that repetition always reinforces the tendency toward a particular 
situation-response pair.  Indeed, I would suggest that such an understanding of habitual 
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development is not merely part of articulation offered by James, but a core characteristic 
of our common sense understanding.  Actions are habits precisely because the repeated 
pairing of situation and response has rendered the response the dominant behavior in the 
specified situation.29  Expertise theory, though, does not hypothesize this straightforward 
relation between repetition and dominant behavior.  While repetition is a necessary 
condition for the development of expertise, it does not mandate the reinforcement of the 
situation/action pairing.  That is, the mere repetition of action A in situation S does not 
necessarily increase the likelihood of responding with A in future S situations.  Rather, 
expertise theory postulates that the tendency toward A in future S situations is dependent 
on one’s affective assessment of the execution of A after the fact.  Contrary to increasing 
the likelihood of responding with action A in the future, a negative assessment of A in 
situation S is hypothesized to inhibit the A-S pairing.  Unless one defines habit as solely a 
description of the tendency to behave, and not as a comment on the type of mental 
functioning that underlies the behavior, there is reason to conceive of expert response as 
something other than habit.  Indeed, where we might view habit as the instantiation of 
previous action, embodied judgment is the instantiation of previous judgment. 
Finally, I should note the striking similarity between criticality as the embodiment 
of judgment and Dewey’s conception of critical disposition as “habit.”  As I explained in 
                                                 
29 Stated this way, habit is not just a term describing a pattern of behavior.  It is a comment on the 
nature of mental functioning, one that specifically rejects the need to define an intervening mental construct 
or process to explain such patterns.  
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chapter three, Dewey acknowledges the difficulty of articulating the dimensions of the 
concept, stating that 
… we need a word to express that kind of human activity which is 
influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains 
within itself a certain ordering or systematization of minor elements of 
action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt 
manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form 
even when not obviously dominating activity.  Habit even in its ordinary 
usage comes nearer to denoting these facts than any other word.  If the 
facts are recognized we may also use the words attitude and disposition. 
(Dewey, 2007, pp. 40-41) 
Unlike the affectively motivational conception of critical disposition, which postulates 
“will” as the source of one’s tendency toward critical engagement, Dewey’s statement 
expresses a conceptual complexity that positions critical disposition somewhere between 
the extremes of unconstrained autonomy and reflexive, habitual behavior.  Such is also 
the case for the expertise conception of criticality, which similarly affirms both willful 
and habitual aspects.  Indeed, I would suggest that the entirety of Dewey’s articulation 
applies to the expertise conception.  Expert criticality is “influenced by prior activity and 
in that sense acquired.”  It “[orders the] minor elements of action,” is “ready for overt 
manifestation,” and is “operative in some subdued subordinate form.”  It further affirms a 
similar role for attitude.  In accepting “attitude” and “disposition” as legitimate, though 
qualified, descriptors of critical disposition, Dewey suggests an agentic, willful element 
to a type of action that is acquired, dominant, and default.  Expertise theory hypothesizes 
this role for will in two ways – first by proposing that the individual’s theory of the skill 
is rendered merely as a disposition, or tendency, to respond; and second by emphasizing 
the centrality of care in the development of skill acquisition.  In this way, expertise theory 
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not only hints at a role for will in the moment of critical opportunity, but it brings 
attention to its more dominant role before the moment as well.30 
5.6. The remaining challenge 
While a phenomenological account of criticality founded on perceived 
questionability and expertise theory may justify a view of criticality as embodied 
judgment, it fails to provide evidence for the stronger and potentially more contentious 
claim that critical recognition is itself an act of judgment.  As I hinted at earlier, support 
for this claim requires more than just first-person description - it requires that we delve 
into the black box of criticality and explore the possibility that there is something 
operating under the hood of conscious critical experience.  Here is where an inquiry into 
existing neurocognitive theory has something to offer.  Though the material basis for 
cognition and consciousness leaves numerous fundamental questions on the table, this is 
the first time in history where our understanding of neural structure and function is such 
that we can turn to the structure and function of the brain to explain the specifics of 
cognition.  This is not to say that we ought to commit definitively to the claims of extant 
neural theory.  However, to the degree that such theory is empirically justified, we might 
use our current neural understanding of cognition as an opportunity both to further 
                                                 
30 A similar articulation of the varying relation between motivation and habit is offered by Nieto 
and Valenzuela (A study of the internal structure of critical thinking dispositions., 2012), who offer 
empirical evidence for the diminished role of motivation in critical disposition over time.  One might also 
interpret Nieto and Valenzuela’s hypothesis along the lines of expertise theory, where motivation is the 
care that catalyzes intuitive judgment. 
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substantiate our first person claims and gain insight into the ramifications of the fact that 
not all cognition is phenomenologically experienced. 
Chapter 6: Cognitive Science, The Frame Problem, and Criticality 
6.1. Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, methodological phenomenology defines a 
symbiotic relationship between phenomenological analysis and empirical research and 
theory.  Rather than pursue the comprehensive first-person ontology of philosophical 
phenomenology, the methodological variant seeks to articulate the detail and richness of 
first-person experience as data in need of further explanation.  It was in this vein that I 
introduced perceived questionability as a structural component of experience that 
explains the possibility of critical recognition.  Similarly, while I invoked expertise 
theory in part to justify criticality as embodied judgment, the theory itself is a model of 
phenomenological description that, in detailing the first-person characteristics and 
transitions of expertise development, begs for further explanation.  Dreyfus himself hints 
at such a need, stating, for example, that “proficiency seems to develop if, and only if, 
experience is assimilated in this atheoretical way and intuitive behavior replaces reasoned 
responses” (Dreyfus, 2002, pp. 371-372, emphasis is mine).  For in using the phrase 
“seems to,” he qualifies the epistemic import of the claim in a manner that invites other 
modes of inquiry to contribute to its confirmation.  Or, as Dan Zahavi (2010) might 
phrase it, he indicates an openness to revising the phenomenology in light of findings 
from other modes of inquiry. 
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 The current chapter addresses this demand for further explanation and 
confirmation by delving into the domain of cognitive neuroscience.  In large part, the 
chapter mirrors Chapter 4, providing third-person analogs for the previously articulated 
set of first-person claims.  Specifically, I seek to show that there exists at least one 
empirically promising cognitive architecture that offers third-person support for the 
expertise conception of everyday criticality as elaborated by perceived questionability 
and expertise theory.  Most important is that such an architecture back up my two-
pronged commitment to criticality as a form of judgment, particularly with regard to the 
as-yet-unjustified claim that critical recognition is itself an act of judgment.  Here is 
where I expect the science to offer particular benefit, as it suggests an empirically 
validated cognitive architecture that justifies just such a claim. 
That said, the nature of this chapter is speculative, and for good reason.  First, 
there has been almost no neurocognitive research on questioning, let alone critical 
questioning (Berger, 2014).31  We are thus left to speculate how existing neurocognitive 
theory might offer support for the first-person claims of the previous chapter.  That said, 
the broad scope of the cognitive theories I reference in this chapter suggests a natural 
application to the issue of criticality.  As we shall see, the breadth of these theories 
suggest an architecture and mechanism for cognition in general, thus putting critical 
questioning in its purview. 
                                                 
31 As Berger notes, the research most relevant to critical questioning focuses on divergent 
thinking.  I would add that there is a substantial body of research on hypothetical thinking as well (see 
Evans, Dual-process theories of reasoning: Contemporary issues and developmental applications, 2011), 
which is also closely related to critical questioning. 
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Yet, even if we grant the relevance of cognitive theory to the specific issue of 
criticality, there is a more basic issue at hand -  contemporary neurocognitive theory is 
currently itself a somewhat speculative endeavor. The field has, for years, engaged in 
several foundational debates, including the role of representations (see, for example 
Fodor, 2008; Freeman, 2000; Greeno, 1994; Dreyfus, 2002), emotions (Panksepp, 2005; 
Panksepp, 2014; Damasio, 2012; Thagard & Aubie, 2008), and consciousness (Dennett, 
1991; Searle, 1997; Dehaene, 2014; Chalmers, 1995).  And differing positions on these 
issues have produced a diversity of often conflicting theories of cognition.  Indeed, we 
have already experienced the ramifications of some of these debates in the elaboration of 
criticality presented in previous chapters.  And we will need to address them further in 
this chapter. 
Thus, we ought to take the goal of this chapter for what it is – an early attempt to 
utilize the promise of contemporary theories of cognition and consciousness to 
understand the critical process, and by extension, critical disposition.  I have little doubt 
that continued empirical inquiry into the workings of the brain will further the current 
trajectory, minimizing the speculative aspect of theories of mind, both as it concerns our 
broad understanding of cognitive mechanisms and their application to criticality.  
Notwithstanding the progress made in the field of brain science since James’ Principles 
of Psychology (James, 1890) in the late 19th century, this is perhaps the first time in the 
history of inquiry into mind where there is substantial empirical evidence to warrant 
theorization of a brain-based cognitive architecture.  It is my intent in this chapter to 
illustrate how we might harness these efforts to provide support for my earlier arguments. 
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6.2. Theoretical considerations regarding the use of cognitive neuroscience 
In previously articulating a role for phenomenological analysis in the task of 
understanding critical recognition, I had to address longstanding doubts over the 
epistemic value of first-person method.  To the same end, it is necessary to confront the 
issue from the other side, to address the prima facie primacy of cognitive neuroscience in 
explaining cognitive functioning.  The promise of cognitive neuroscience, in conjunction 
with the entrenched commitment to materialist ontology, often leads to an outright 
disdain for other modes of explanation, as exemplified by Dennett’s comprehensively 
dismissive claims in Chapter Four above.  So in order to further justify a symbiotic 
relationship between first and third person methods, it is not only necessary to promote 
the value of phenomenology but to highlight, and perhaps temper, any overzealous 
expectations for cognitive neuroscience.  This is not to at all diminish the ultimate value 
of a materialist explanation of cognitive functioning, but to counteract a premature 
commitment to a reductionist account.  Indeed, I am not opposed to the goal of 
comprehensive physicalist reduction of mind and cognition, but instead am more 
concerned that it is unjustified at this point in the development of brain science to close 
the window on interdisciplinary perspective.  There is an argument to be made for at least 
the possibility of a future successful reduction, but it is presently more a matter of faith - 
or, perhaps more generously, an extrapolation from the current trajectory of the field’s 
development – to assume that the parameters of scientific methodology as they apply to 
brain science can facilitate comprehensively physicalist accounts of mind and human 
cognition.  This is perhaps especially true in light of Chalmers (1995; 1996) “hard 
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problem of mind” – the ostensive inability to explain the manifestation of phenomenal 
experience by reference to the structure and functioning of physical, specifically neural, 
material. 
That said, it seems wholly unreasonable to deny the promise of brain science 
when it comes to questions of cognition.  For one, there is strong commitment, both 
among scientists and philosophers of mind, to the principle of supervenience – the claim 
that there is no change in mental state without a corresponding change in physical state.32  
While this tenet presents a claim far weaker than one justifying physical reduction, it 
does articulate a tight binding between mind and the brain, where it would seem 
impossible to account for mental functioning without reference to neural mechanics.  
Stephen Campbell articulates precisely this line of thinking to argue for the need to 
embrace cognitive neuroscience in educational research.  He states: 
…changes in subjective experience must in principle manifest objectively 
in some manner as changes in brain, body, and behavior, and vice versa.  
Placing the details of causality and the nature of matter aside, this radical 
view of the embodied mind (viz., the mindbrain) warrants a search for 
correlations between subjective experience and embodied behavior.  If we 
wish to study subjectively experienced changes in the mental states of 
learners, one promising avenue in so doing is to study changes in brain 
and brain behavior. (Campbell, 2011) 
Here, it is important to note the care Campbell exhibits when speaking of the relation 
between subjective experience and physical substrate.  The supervenient relation is 
                                                 
32 This “mental-specific” formulation notwithstanding, supervenience is a general principle 
applicable to a variety of domains.  As a general principle, supervenience entails that B-properties 
supervene on A-properties if and only if a difference in B-properties requires a difference in A-Properties 
(McLaughlin & Bennett, 2011). 
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merely one of correlation between lived experience and the brain, and Campbell is right 
to place “the details of causality and the nature of matter aside” given the epistemic 
difficulties presented by these stronger relations. But as Campbell makes clear, even mere 
correlation warrants the need to direct inquiry toward the brain. 
 Furthermore, there is historical reason to believe that cognitive neuroscience 
offers the potential for unparalleled explanatory success.  As Weinstein has argued, 
despite the missteps, competing theories, and fundamental disagreements that 
characterize the current state of the field, three meta-epistemological hallmarks 
characterize the development paradigmatically successful scientific enterprises 
(Weinstein, 2002; Weinstein, 2011; Weinstein, forthcoming; Fisherman & Weinstein, 
2015).  Such disciplines produce theories that are supported by a converging body of 
evidence of increasing scope and detail.  These theories both subsume an expanding set 
of diverse explananda and are themselves increasingly explained by higher-order 
frameworks that connected them to other similarly characterizable theories in the domain.  
Termed consilience, breadth and depth, these features offer an assessment not of the 
content of a field per se, but of its dynamics, its epistemic trajectory.  They paint a picture 
of an expanding web of relations between a growing core of data and the theories and 
frameworks that explain them.  It is this increasingly detailed and hierarchical web that, 
independent of the specific theories and debates defining contemporary cognitive 
neuroscience, warrants our confidence in the discipline. 
Despite these arguments, there are those who have sought to minimize or even 
dismiss the value of brain science.  Catherine Malabou (2008), for example, has critiqued 
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the concept of brain plasticity, arguing that in equating plasticity to adaptability and 
flexibility, cognitive neuroscience has unwittingly injected a measure of “ideological 
drift” into its account of human cognition.  Malabou focuses on her own formulation of 
the hard problem – not the gap between the physical and the phenomenal per se, but what 
she refers to alternatively as the transformation or transition of the neuronal to the 
mental.33  Neuroscientists, she claims, fail to appreciate such a gap, instead postulating a 
naive and uncritiqued “continuity” between the two domains, a continuity that reinforces 
a socio-political view of individuals as obedient and docile.  This continuity, Malabou 
says, results from an anemic concept of plasticity, where development of the mental 
amounts to an adaptive response to the environment, as exemplified by the ongoing 
Hebbian (Hebb, 1949) rewiring of neuronal arrays.  Yet for Malabou, brain plasticity is 
more than adaptation.  As she states: 
To be flexible is to receive a form or impression, to be able to fold oneself, 
to take the fold, not to give it.  To be docile, to not explode.  Indeed, what 
flexibility lacks is the resource of giving form, the power to create, to 
invent or even to erase an impression, the power to style.  Flexibility is 
plasticity minus its genius. (2008, p. 12) 
Here, Malabou makes clear why the plasticity postulated by neuroscience is insufficient 
to bridge the gap between mentation and its physical substrate.  Plasticity, conceived 
through the Darwinian lens of neuronal survival of the fittest fails to account for the 
power of humans to self-create, to shape their own consciousness and cognition.  As a 
                                                 
33 Malabou does not explicitly elaborate her understanding of the mental.  But it seems clear to me 
from the text that “mental” refers to both conscious awareness – that which we experience reflectively – 
and cognition. 
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mere response to environmental forces, mental development is “docile,” in the sense that 
what develops is not, at least in part, of its own making.  It is no wonder then that 
Malabou requires an articulation of brain plasticity that includes a formative and active 
“resistance to homeostatic constancy” (2008, p. 72), enabling the production of the 
mental not through mere Darwinian adaptation, but as an “ontologically explosive” 
(2008, p. 72) act of self-creation.  She states: 
What results is a tension born of the resistance that constancy and creation 
mutually oppose to each other.  It is thus that every form carries within 
itself its own contradiction.  And precisely this resistance makes 
transformation [from the neuronal to the conscious] possible.  The auto-
constitution of self obviously cannot be conceived as a simple adaptation 
to a form, to a mold, or to the received schemata of a culture.  One is 
formed only by virtue of a resistance to form itself. (2008, p. 71)34 
Malabou justifies the invocation of a dialectical account by arguing that the theoretical 
fissure between the neuronal and mental can be filled only by providing a non-neuronal, 
non-biological story.  Indeed, she claims that the infusion of ideology, in the form of 
Darwinian adaptation, is a result of having failed to recognize the need for such a story: 
By wishing not to construct a hermeneutic schema capable of 
explaining…the relations between the neuronal and the mental, by wishing 
not to recognize the necessarily meta-neurobiological dimension of that 
schema, one exposes oneself, whether one recognizes it or not, to 
ideological drift – for example, and above all, to that of mental Darwinism 
or psychological Darwinism. (2008, pp. 64-65) 
                                                 
34 I might note that in referencing “self,” and not conscious awareness or cognition, this passage 
exemplifies the loose and disparate conception of “the mental” utilized by Malabou.  As we will see later in 
the chapter, neuroscientists, philosophers of mind, and cognitive scientists distinguish between the various 
potential referents of “mental,” treating each as a distinct, though perhaps related, target of inquiry. 
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Such a view is tantamount to a substantial rejection of the third-person accounts of 
neuroscience.  For absent the meta-neurobiological component, our understanding of how 
our consciously cognitive selves come to be is, at best, incomplete – and, at worst, simply 
wrong.  The mental develops from the neuronal not merely through adaptation to one’s 
environment, but also in the necessary presence of a self-creative force that sits in 
opposition to it.  Neuroscientific accounts of both the development and functioning of 
conscious cognition thus omit a key explanatory variable, one that endows humans with 
an agency capable of “unleashing possibilities, of unleashing new ways of living and… 
new ways to be happy” (2008, p. 67).  Indeed, if Malabou’s argument does nothing else, 
its affirmation of an ontologically primary self-creative force accounts for the sense of 
agency that characterizes our daily lived experience.  That is, we feel our own agency 
because such agency exists. 
Clearly, in arguing that contemporary neuroscience is fundamentally ideological, 
Malabou offers a bold and radical critique of the field.  While she presents much that 
invites response, an in-depth critique of her views at this point is more of a digression 
than I wish to engage, particularly in light of my stated commitment to neuroscience.  
Instead, I want to offer a few comments that illustrate the problems one encounters when 
questioning the value of neuroscience as an enterprise.  On the one hand, it is important 
to acknowledge the current intractability of the physical/phenomenal gap defined by the 
hard problem of mind.  And it is also the case that scientists often have glossed over the 
issues that make the hard problem hard (see, for example Damasio, 2012; Kaku, 2014; 
Dennett, 1991).  However, neither issue on its own or together, warrants that the 
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physical/phenomenal gap need be filled by a meta-neurobiological account.  Chalmers 
(1995; 1996), for example, has committed to a naturalist account of phenomenal 
consciousness despite arguing that a science limited to describing structure and function 
is likely to be theoretically incapable of providing such an account.  In this case, rather 
than relying on a non-scientific or meta-scientific account, Chalmers suggests that a new 
paradigm of scientific description –  one that continues to be empirically based – must be 
embraced.  Malabou, however, argues that the only way to fill ostensibly physical/non-
physical gaps in a manner that avoids “ideological drift” is to leave the domain of the 
empirical itself.  We might compare this to Weinstein’s criteria of depth, which, while it 
accepts the need for a hierarchy of theoretical explanation, does not postulate that such an 
explanation be non-scientific.  To the contrary, Weinstein’s depth criterion requires that 
any meta-account be part of the enterprise itself (Weinstein, 2002). 
Second, and perhaps more damning, it seems clear that Malabou’s motivation for 
a critique of plasticity is her insistence that brain plasticity must be taken to include a 
self-creative component.  And yet, in proposing this requirement, she begs the very 
question whether the creation of conscious awareness and cognition requires any more 
than Darwinian adaptation.  The “genius of plasticity” may, in Malabou’s understanding 
of it, require more than adaptation, but she offers little reason for taking a position on a 
question that has long remained questionable.35  From the perspective of neuroscience, 
                                                 
35 Here, it is important to note Malabou’s socio-political motivation for insisting the self-creative 
aspect of plasticity.  Much of “What Should We Do with Our Brains?” elaborates a mirroring relation 
between the ideology of anemic plasticity and contemporary socio-political structure where the broad and 
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one could very well argue that the drive to view plasticity – and the type of conscious self 
that arises from it – through the lens of Darwinian adaptation is merely an application of 
Occam’s razor.  That is, to the degree that adaptation can ultimately account for the 
specifics of our modes of awareness and cognition, there would seem to exist little need 
for adding anything more to the story.  Of course, whether more is required is still a 
matter of inquiry, but to insist that it is needed to explain our sense of agency would seem 
to beg whether it is indeed required. 
On the other hand, we might argue that Malabou simply misrepresents the 
neuroscientific understanding of plasticity.  For whether or not agency is required, there 
is empirical evidence that the brain significantly bootstraps its own consciousness.  As 
Dehaene explains, 
Autonomy is the primary property of the nervous system. Intrinsic 
neuronal activity dominates over external excitation.  As a result, our brain 
is never passively submitted to its environment but generates its own 
stochastic patterns of activity. (Dehaene, 2014, p. 189) 
As we will see later in this chapter, intrinsic neuronal activity often manifests 
consciously, at which point it maintains a tangible effect on neuronal development.  The 
                                                 
unwarranted application of evolutionary adaptation has allowed us to make a virtue of adaptive flexibility 
in everyday social and political life.  Indeed, Malabou suggests that we have been taken by evolutionary 
adaptation to the point where we see ourselves as mere reactions to the existing environment.  Thus, as an 
answer to the book’s guiding question, she claims that recognizing the self-creative nature of plasticity will 
enable us to confront a socio-political system that promotes docility and endurance over agency.  As she 
states: “To ask ‘What should we do with our brain?’ is above all to visualize the possibility of saying no to 
an afflicting economic, political, and mediatic culture that celebrates only the triumph of flexibility, 
blessing obedient individuals who have no greater merit than that of knowing how to bow their heads with 
a smile” (Malabou, 2008, p. 79) 
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resultant developmental loop suggests that neural plasticity is not merely adaptive but 
creative as well. 
Damasio further critiques the opposition of agency and adaptation, arguing that 
conscious behavior is governed not by the direct constraint of homeostatic maintenance, 
but by the broader drive for felt emotional well-being.  Here, Damasio postulates a proxy 
role for felt emotions where they act as “the dutiful executors and servants of biological 
value,” (Damasio, 2012, p. 115).  While emotions ultimately function to promote 
homeostatic maintenance, they uncouple the direct relation between behavioral 
motivation and adaptation.  That is, feelings of well-being are not necessarily those that 
signal current homeostatic maintenance, but rather perceived long-term organismic 
success.  As such, Damasio allows all sorts of social and personal behavior that may or 
may not prove beneficial for organismic well-being to fall under the rubric of adaptation.  
For it is only the combination of the predictive capacity of cognition along with the use of 
emotion as the measure of biological value that is truly adaptive.  Specific instances of 
behavior do not necessarily promote homeostatic maintenance in their own right.  If 
Damasio’s view is correct, there is little reason to hold adaptive plasticity in opposition to 
agentic behavior.  In being a tool for the promotion of felt well-being, emotion blurs the 
line between the requirements of adaption and Malabou’s need for self-creation. 
While Malabou’s argument targets the basic explanatory value of neuroscience, 
others have critiqued its applied utility to education.  Willingham, who is himself a 
neuroscientist, has warned against taking an optimistic view of educational neuroscience, 
arguing that the different levels of analysis required by the two domains makes it unlikely 
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that teaching and learning can benefit substantially from the claims of cognitive 
neuroscience.  Willingham offers the example of memory to make his point: 
So here’s the rub: for the sake of simplicity, cognitive psychologists 
intentionally isolate one component of the mind (e.g., memory or 
attention) when they study it. But in the classroom, all of the components 
operate simultaneously. So a principle from the cognitive lab might 
backfire when it’s put into the more complex classroom environment. 
That’s the problem of levels of analysis. Cognitive psychologists study 
one level — individual components of the mind — but educators operate 
on a different level — the entire mind of the child. (Willingham, 2008, p. 
422) 
According to this argument, cognitive neuroscience peddles in the technical specifics of 
cognitive components, not their holistic interaction.  And simply knowing how each 
component operates is insufficient to generate claims of relevance to education.  Thus, 
Willingham concludes that if we really want to improve teaching and learning, what 
matters is not the data from the brain, but data from empirical studies that test “what 
works” in the classroom.  While it is theoretically possible for neuroscientists to offer 
brain-based suggestions that foster the goals of education, Willingham views their work 
skeptically.  As he states, “I don’t believe that there will be many… situations… in which 
neuroscientists say, ‘Hey, maybe you should try this at school,’ and educational 
researchers say, ‘Never thought of that!’” (Willingham, 2008, p. 423). 
Along these lines, Michel Ferrari (2011) notes that there have been numerous 
documented cases of “false generalization,” where implementation of neuroscientific lab 
findings has failed to generate expected outcomes in the classroom.  He warns of the 
“medicalization” of educational issues, urging us to guard “against claiming that the root 
cause of learning difficulties is a mechanical failure or abnormality that operates at the 
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genetic or neural level” (2011, p. 33).  And in an argument not wholly unlike the one 
Malabou presents, Paul Howard-Jones (2011) suggests that the tendency of 
neuroscientific theory to avoid, or even reject, the attribution of autonomy is in direct 
conflict with the primary theoretical assumptions of education, which at its core seeks to 
nurture the independence and autonomy of learners.  Given the unsettled nature of the 
autonomy issue, he states that educators ought to be wary of bringing to the classroom 
findings that minimize, or otherwise ignore, the role of reflexive self-determination in the 
learning process.  Ferrari, too, supports this view, stating that recent findings warrant that 
“educational neuroscience [ought to] be careful to promote frameworks in which agency 
is possible and valued” (2011, p. 33). 
While Ferrari, Howard-Jones and others (see, for example, Campbell, 2011; 
Ansari, Coch, & De Smedt, 2011) are quick to warn of the potential pitfalls of 
educational neuroscience, they do not reject or otherwise seek to marginalize its utility.  
Rather, they argue that we ought to articulate the parameters of a relationship between 
neuroscience and education that can harness its potential value.  In much the same way 
that phenomenologists have sought to utilize first-person experience to help define the 
explananda of empirical science, they advocate a bidirectional, collaborative, multi-
disciplinary, and multi-perspective approach to educational neuroscience where 
educationists help define a research agenda and cognitive neuroscientists help to confirm 
or reassess existing educational assumptions, understanding, and techniques.  Geake 
elaborates how this might work in his self-labelled “position statement” on the research 
objectives of educational neuroscience: 
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… a cognitive neuroscience-education nexus should be a two-way street 
(Geake, 2004). Whereas cognitive neuroscience could inform education by 
providing additional evidence that confirms good practice, helps resolve 
educational dilemmas, or suggests new possibilities in pedagogy or 
curriculum design, education could inform cognitive neuroscience by 
providing a source of complementary behavioral data, especially on 
children, as well as posing new worthwhile lines of investigation. (Geake, 
2011, p. 44) 
Campbell (2011) argues for more than bidirectional interaction, advocating that 
educational neuroscience ought to transcend any penchant for strictly third-person, 
mechanistic explanation to accommodate the ontological commitments that underlie 
education’s goal of improving the lived experience of people.  Here, Campbell seeks the 
integration of the governing conceptual frameworks and methodologies of both domains 
– education and neuroscience - arguing that 
educational neuroscience as a bona fide transdisciplinary activity, by 
definition, must entail the forging of new philosophical frameworks and 
research methodologies for variously bridging education and 
neuroscience, mind and brain, phenomenological and physiological, 
teleological and causal, first person and third person, objective and 
subjective, and so forth. (Campbell, 2011, p. 8; emphasis is mine) 
Ferrari takes the position one step further, saying that “educational neuroscience must 
itself become part of a broader debate about the aims of education and how to help 
students flourish, understand deeply, and become socially productive members of 
society” (Ferrari, 2011, p. 35). 
Taken as a whole, these positions define goals for, and constraints upon, 
educational neuroscience that offer a simultaneous acceptance and critique of 
Willingham’s levels of analysis argument.  While agreeing that the viability of 
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educational neuroscience depends upon its ability to engage in analysis both relevant to 
education, and consistent with its ontological presuppositions, Geake, Campbell, and 
Ferrari are optimistic that such analysis is possible.  Where Willingham sees 
neuroscience as inherently compartmentalized, these authors envision a research program 
capable of developing an integrated understanding of cognitive structures.  In place of 
purely mechanistic, causal explanation, they express optimism for theories that account 
for autonomous cognition, lived experience, and sense of self. In short, contrary to 
Willingham’s characterization of neuroscience, these authors paint a picture of cognitive 
inquiry capable of transcending its roots to both complement and influence educational 
theory and practice. 
And yet, issues such as autonomous cognition are as open for debate as ever.36  
Indeed, Howard-Jones’s warning to avoid theories that reject cognitive autonomy offers a 
case in point.  Rather than reference findings that affirm the existence of cognitive 
autonomy, Howard-Jones offers only the weaker - and I think more defensible - claim 
that the issue has yet to be decided.  Thus, we might ask what happens to the project of 
educational neuroscience (let alone what happens to the core educational goal of 
developing individual autonomy) if debates over such topics like automaticity veer 
toward mechanistic and causal explanation.  While some might argue that it is premature 
to address such hypotheticals, or even that doing so unjustifiably assumes that these 
                                                 
36 See Bargh (The automaticity of everyday life, 1997) and Bargh and Ferguson (Beyond 
behaviorism: on the automaticity of higher mental processes, 2000), for extensive evidence against such 
autonomy. 
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issues can be addressed empirically, the answer to such questions has the potential to 
make salient those educational commitments that are a precondition for the viability of 
educational neuroscience. 
The specific case of cognitive autonomy is particularly illuminating.  Here, I 
think, it is essential that we distinguish between education’s presumption of cognitive 
agency and its goal of improving the lived experience of individuals.  While cognitive 
autonomy is valued because it is assumed to benefit lived experience, the very statement 
of this claim designates cognitive autonomy as only a means to the primary aim of 
improving lived experience.37  And the statement further allows that it is not the only 
means of doing so.  Indeed, I would venture to say that regardless of the final position on 
the autonomy debate – or, more generally on any phenomenon open to causal explanation 
- educational neuroscience will have something relevant to say as long as it buys into the 
primacy of subjective experience and its sensitivity to education.  That is, even if agency 
is ultimately cashed out only as sense of agency, there are still neurally-definable 
variables sensitive to educational intervention that maintain causal relationships to lived 
experience.  Some of these exist independent of autonomy - variables related to literacy 
and basic mathematics, for example.  Others, like those pertaining to internal motivation 
                                                 
37 To be clear, by “lived experience” I mean personal, subjective experience as felt by a 
consciously aware entity.  I certainly do not mean material conditions, though I grant that material 
conditions often have a substantial bearing on lived experience. 
By “improving lived experience” I mean the perceived improvement of experience over the 
hypothetical defined by the absence of education.  Of course, the reference to a hypothetical entails that 
individuals themselves are not capable of truly assessing the benefit of education.  That is, in not being able 
to compare our own lives to one without education, we merely speculate that, for the most part, education 
benefits our lived experience. 
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and interest, relate directly to autonomy (see Ames, 1992).  But even these latter ones do 
not disappear in the absence of true autonomy.  Whether interest or internal motivation is 
“self-generated” or merely appears that way, it is reasonable to assume that it can be 
influenced by education.  Thus, regardless of the autonomy verdict, these variables would 
continue to be the purview of educational neuroscience. 
When we articulate a symbiotic relationship between education and neuroscience, 
when we are open to changing the way that neuroscience “does business” within the 
context of education, we can respond to Willingham’s pessimism about the relationship 
between the two.  Such pessimism, as we have seen, arises from the belief that the 
disconnect in ways of doing business prevents neuroscience from specifying novel, 
viable, and substantive changes to the classroom.  But in specifying reciprocal constraints 
– in particular, by requiring that neuroscience accommodate at least some of the 
presuppositions and goals of education – we no longer require that neuroscience offer 
such contributions for it to be relevant.  Instead, it can assume a supportive, critical, and 
creative role.  As such it would offer both material justification for, and critical insight 
into, new educational approaches and techniques.  This would have the effect of either 
reinforcing existing educational research to provide multi-disciplinary perspective, or 
providing reason to hold tentative, or otherwise reassess, our existing beliefs.  And it 
would further act as a springboard for educational practice and theory, facilitating the 
formulation of new conceptual and practical possibilities in the domains of teaching and 
learning. 
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It is with this understanding of educational neuroscience that it makes sense to 
explore what neurocognitive theory might offer to perceived questionability and the 
expertise theory of criticality.  Indeed, to the degree that such theory might provide 
material support for, or critical insight into, my claim that criticality ought to be 
conceived as matter of judgment instead of mere motivation or sensitivity, we might view 
my approach as an example of educational neuroscience in action – the application of 
neuroscience to an educationally-relevant position defined and justified in the context of 
educational philosophy and articulated in first-person language.  In this case, education 
opens a window for a third-person research agenda, requesting a multi-disciplinary 
perspective on an issue defined by educational theory.  On the other hand, we might 
critique this attempt as a rather weak example of educational neuroscience, as speculating 
upon extant cognitive theory is a far cry from the tight integration envisioned by Geake, 
Campbell, and Ferrari.  Such a critical stance certainly seems defensible.  However, I 
would suggest that these baby steps invite future neuroscientific research on the issue, 
research that can put to the test the application of cognitive theory to the specific question 
of criticality as a form of expert judgment.  Given the absence of literature on the neural 
basis of critical questioning, such a step ought to be taken as an attempt to break new 
ground. 
6.3. What are we looking for? 
In turning to cognitive neuroscience for third-person support for the expertise 
conception, there are a number of specific features of a cognitive architecture that would 
seem to be essential.  Given my claim that perceived questionability is a structural 
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component of subjective experience, we should hope to find an “always-on” mechanism 
of judgment, a physically implemented means of evaluating in real time, the epistemic 
acceptability of experience.  Such an architecture should further account for the 
experience of critical recognition, explaining how, in the context of continuous 
background judgment, some judgments manifest as part of our conscious, reflective 
experience.  And any such architecture ought to provide a physical explanation of 
Dreyfusian expertise as it relates to the development of critical judgment.  In particular, it 
must address the hypothesis that the affective assessment of responses determines one’s 
disposition – that is, one’s tendency, for future response.   
Finally, it is perhaps most important that we be able to cash out any physical 
account of criticality as a form of judgment.38  Central to this task is the issue of critical 
relevance, the degree to which particular claims and issues ought to factor into a 
determination of appropriate critical engagement.  In the same way that any assertion or 
situation can be considered a critical opportunity, any number of considerations might be 
taken as factors when determining whether to engage, or continue to engage, critically.  
When we suggest that critical engagement is warranted, we thus imply that we have 
considered the factors relevant to such a determination and have ignored the rest.  Indeed, 
in claiming that judgment is necessary to put a brake on iterative questioning I have, in 
essence, claimed that we judge additional questioning to be irrelevant to the particular 
                                                 
38 Just to reiterate, in calling criticality a form of judgment, I propose that a) criticality is embodied 
judgment and b) critical recognition is an act of judgment. 
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situation.  And in invoking expertise theory, I have further suggested that, to the degree 
we are critical experts in everyday situations, determinations of relevance are folded into 
perception.  That is, we perceive only what is critically relevant. 
Thus, we might specify an additional condition for any neuroscientific 
explanation of critical recognition - it must account for our ability to judge critical 
relevance in the context of what we might call an “interrogatively unencapsulated”39 
environment, an environment where there are no defined brakes on continued 
questioning.  Here again, the issue is both practical and theoretical.  Not only must a 
cognitive architecture address the need to assign critical relevance in a timely manner, but 
it must explain how such assignment happens at all.  For without the assignment of 
relevance, there would seem to be no way to justify the notion of appropriate 
interrogation.  Either interrogation would cease without reason (though perhaps not 
without cause), or it would not stop at all.  
As such, any account of criticality must address a long-standing problem in theory 
of mind devoted to the issue of relevance – the frame problem (see Dennett, 1984; Fodor, 
1983; Fodor, 1987; Shanahan & Baars, 2005).  The frame problem first arose as a 
practical matter in the field of AI, where a machine entity capable of successfully 
navigating a complex environment needed to keep track of the changes its own actions 
effected in that environment.  For an entity utilizing representations to map external 
                                                 
39 This phrase is a variant of Fodor’s (Modules, frames, fridgeons, sleeping dogs, and the music of 
the spheres., 1987) “informationally encapsulated” environment. 
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conditions, any such change required the robot to update some subset of those 
representations to reflect the altered state.  But knowing which representations needed to 
be updated proved to be problematic without evaluating each of them. 
Dennett (1984) has humorously illustrated this problem by describing the 
situation of a robot tasked with safely removing a wagon from a room containing a time 
bomb.  Even when the robot is programmed with criteria for determining the relevance of 
representations to a specific action, the sheer number of statements that require 
evaluation prevent timely completion of the task.  For perhaps it is not sufficient to 
remove the wagon from the room because the bomb is on the wagon.  Or perhaps the 
bomb is tethered to a taut string, such that moving it in the wrong direction would cause 
the string to pull the trigger.  However pedestrian or eccentric these possibilities may be, 
there would seem to be no way for a representational system to know which 
environmental representations were relevant to the action without evaluating each.  
Dennett articulates this point in his punchline: 
“Do something!” they [the researchers] yelled at it [the robot].  
“I am,” it retorted. “I’m busily ignoring some thousands of implications I 
have determined to be irrelevant. Just as soon as I find an irrelevant 
implication, I put it on the list of those I must ignore, and”  
… the bomb went off. (Dennett, 1984, p. 130) 
Such a situation is very much the same with criticality, in two respects.  First, as I argued 
in Chapter 2, the demand for judging interrogative relevance is a matter of practical 
timeliness, where appropriate criticality demands that we engage iterative interrogation 
without compromising the need to act promptly in the world.  Thus, in approximating the 
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critical ideal, we must judge when continued interrogation is relevant to evaluating a 
claim appropriately.  Second, this issue of “when to stop” is simultaneously an issue of 
“when to start,” as it pertains to the initial act of critical recognition.  In this case, 
recognition as judgment requires that there be some mechanism to determine which 
epistemic commitments bear influence on initiating a critical response.  For again, the 
need for a timely response would seem to render the evaluation of all such commitments 
untenable. 
But beyond the issue of timeliness, the frame problem defines a more 
fundamental and intractable issue concerning relevance (Shanahan, 2016).  While 
Dennett’s robot faced the unenviable task of evaluating all epistemic commitments in 
order to determine the subset relevant to the task at hand, it did have at its disposal a set 
of criteria to determine the relevance of any particular epistemic commitment.  Such 
criteria could be incorporated into the “mind” of the robot precisely because the task for 
which it was programmed defined those criteria – that is, those tasks were explicitly hard-
coded as part of the robot’s purpose, its raison d’etre.  Presumably, such an approach 
could be scaled up, so that robots capable of handling a variety of tasks could be 
programmed to maintain sets of such criteria – frames, as they have been called - each of 
which could be applied to specific situations to determine relevance.  But this presents a 
problem, as the robot would now need to determine which frame was relevant to a given 
physical situation, thus requiring us to specify second-order criteria to enable such a 
determination. 
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That this demand for meta-criteria begins a potentially unending regress becomes 
evident when we realize that the application of any particular meta-criteria itself requires 
criteria to determine its relevance to the situation at hand.  For what is relevant to any 
situation depends not merely on its physical features, but on our in-the-moment goals that 
we bring to it.  That is, what is relevant in physically identical situations X and Y may 
differ given what we seek to accomplish at that moment in time.  And determining what 
we seek to accomplish at a particular time is again based on more encompassing goals – 
and on and on.  The point is, once we accept the need for meta-criteria, we begin a 
regress that prevents any particular set from acting as the source of relevance.  For any 
frame will beg for a higher-level frame to supply the criteria needed to select the relevant 
lower-level frame from the set of existing ones. 
As such, the frame problem appears intractable, in the sense that the application 
of a frame, at any level, gets us no closer to explaining how we can determine relevance.  
We might be tempted to claim that at some level in the “hierarchy” of frames, the 
biological mind simply creates a final mapping, in much the same way as programmers 
might implement such criteria in a scaled-up version of Dennett’s robot.  But it will 
always be appropriate to then ask how that mapping is created.  To the degree that we 
postulate some set of relevance-free rules or criteria as the answer, we are left to either 
re-ask the question as it concerns those rules or render arbitrary the ultimate source of 
relevance.  As Dreyfus himself notes (2012), the frame problem suggests that it is 
impossible to inject relevance into any set of epistemic commitments by reference to 
rule-based criteria.  Rather, in order to judge relevance, relevance itself must somehow 
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already be part of our epistemic foundation, a necessary condition for the possibility of 
knowing the world.40 
6.4. Dual cognition theory 
With the core requirements of a cognitive architecture articulated, we are set to 
delve into specifics.  Given the need to account for the perceptual character of critical 
recognition - its sense of “givenness” - it seems appropriate to begin with dual-cognition 
theory, the idea that the brain has evolved two defined systems or types of cognition.  
While the conceptual distinction between conscious and unconscious cognitive processes 
can be traced, through Freud and James all the way back to Liebniz and Descartes, 
empirical evidence for subconscious cognitive processes first emerged in the 1960s with 
Arthur Reber’s research on implicit learning (Frankish, 2010).  Since then, numerous 
distinct dual-cognition theories have been proposed to explain reasoning, judgment, and 
social cognition, each of which distinguishes between two types of cognitive processes: 
those whose operation is ostensibly automatic and inaccessible, and those to which we 
have consciously access.41  Where the distinction was originally articulated by 
                                                 
40 I might point out that a similar argument was offered by Heidegger (Being and time, 1962) long 
before the articulation of the frame problem. Heidegger rejected the possibility of relevance-free Being, 
arguing for an ontology based, not on physical being, but on the care that makes possible human 
experience.  As the ultimate source of relevance, Heidegger’s care provides the criteria by which 
derivative, rule-based determinations of relevance are made possible. 
41 Over the years, various terms have been used to articulate the distinction.  Fodor (The 
modularity of mind, 1983), for example, speaks of the difference between input modules and higher 
cognition; Evans (The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation, 2006) proposes the 
“heuristic-analytic” distinction; and Lieberman (Social cognitive neuroscience: a review of core processes, 
2007) contrasts reflexive and reflective cognition. 
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postulating two systems of cognition – System 1 and System 2 – Evans and others 
(Evans, 2008; Evans, 2011; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Thompson, 2009) have argued that 
the distinction is more appropriately conceived as being between types of cognitive 
processes - Type 1 and Type 2 - with a vast and growing amount of empirical evidence 
suggesting a multiplicity of Type 1 systems.42  Indeed, in a review of dual cognition 
theories, Evans (2008) emphasizes the diversity of proposed Type 1 processes.  Some 
theories, he states, hypothesize the existence of individual innate cognitive modules that 
implement fully encapsulated processing of perception, language, attention, and other 
base cognitive functions.  Others describe an associative learning system that enables 
acquisition of implicit knowledge - knowledge that directly affects behavior but cannot 
be articulated semantically.  Still others provide pragmatic support for Type 2 processes, 
identifying and retrieving explicit knowledge for conscious processing.  And perhaps 
most clearly relevant to expertise theory, some implement fully automated processes that 
have taken over the function of previously conscious tasks. 
In addition to the conceptual evolution from systems to types, the functional, 
anatomical, and evolutionary characteristics that define each type have changed over 
time.  Where Type 1 processes were initially thought to be uniformly rapid, unconscious, 
evolutionarily old, contextualized, and uniquely subject to cognitive bias, Type 2 
processes were taken as necessarily slow, conscious, abstract, of recent origin, and 
                                                 
42 As Evans (Dual-processing accounts, of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition, 2008) notes, 
the evidence is less definitive on the issue of multiple Type 2 systems.  
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resistant to bias.  Such rigid characterization, though, has faded, with empirical evidence 
mounting that, among other things, some otherwise Type 1 processes manifest 
phenomenologically and many, if not most, Type 2 processes contains components that 
are equally not reportable (Baars & Franklin, 2007).  Furthermore, it has been shown that 
ostensibly analytic and rational Type 2 processes are as equally subject to cognitive bias 
as purportedly heuristic Type 1 processes, though for different reasons - where heuristic 
processes fail to cue the relevant information, analytic processes fail to correctly apply 
the appropriate rules for processing. 
Frankish offers a sparser set of oppositional characteristics, defining the 
distinction as one between intuition and reason, where “the former [is] immediate, quasi-
perceptual, sensitive to subconscious cues and sometimes biased; and the latter, [is] slow, 
effortful, explicit and more cautious” (Frankish, 2010, p. 915).  Though Frankish fails to 
unpack some of the terms in his articulation, he softens the oppositional character of the 
distinction, avoiding the rigid unconscious/conscious differentiation and acknowledging 
the possibility that bias affects both types of process.43  Evans similarly strips the 
distinction of its early attributes, emphasizing a core four.  Claiming to present the view 
currently articulated in the cognitive psychology of reasoning, he describes Type 1 
processes as “fast, high capacity, independent of working memory and cognitive ability” 
and Type 2 processes as “slow, low capacity, heavily dependent on working memory and 
                                                 
43 For our purposes, it is most interesting that Frankish describes intuitive cognition as “quasi-
perceptual.”  While he fails to further explain what he means here, the term itself seems to suggest 
something along the same lines as perceived questionability – that there is an element of experienced 
“givenness” to the products (i.e. the decisions or judgments) of intuitive cognition. 
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related to individual differences in cognitive ability” (Evans, 2011, p. 87).  In this case, it 
is the use of working memory that does the heavy lifting for Type 2 cognition by 
accounting for many of its salient characteristics without requiring that they be either 
exclusive to such processes or wholly determinative of their operation.  Features such as 
conscious accessibility, analytic operation, and perceived resistance to bias can thus be 
generally attributed to Type 2 processes while allowing that some Type 1 processes 
exhibit such features while some Type 2 processes lack them. 
Beyond distinguishing between types and attributes of cognitive processes, dual 
cognition theories have hypothesized the relationship between them.  In his review of 
dual cognition theories, Evans (2008) discerns two general types of proposed interaction 
– parallel-competitive models and default-interventionist models.  The parallel-
competitive model specifies little interaction between Type 1 and Type 2 processes, 
elaborating a cognitive architecture where both types are mobilized independently and 
compete for behavioral influence.  Such a model assumes that there exist analogous Type 
1 and Type 2 functions, where Type 2 functions render reasoning and behavior-inducing 
judgment through analytical manipulation of semantically pregnant representations, while 
Type 1 functions do the same through a semantically empty connectionist architecture – 
that is, through a mechanistic process best interpreted without reference to semantic 
content.  The default-interventionist model, on the other hand, specifies a relationship 
whereby Type 1 processes provide default responses that influence behavior only in the 
absence of a Type 2 override.  Here, in a manner consistent with our common sense lived 
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experience of intuitive response, Type 1 output is sent to Type 2 processes for possible 
further evaluation.  
Both models of interaction suggest the need for adjudication between Type 1 and 
Type 2 claims for behavioral control.  That the parallel-competitive model in particular 
leaves the issue wholly unaddressed has led Stanovich (2009; Evans & Stanovich, 2013) 
to propose a tripartite model of mind that further differentiates between Type 2 processes.  
Rather than speak solely of process types, Stanovich’s model distinguishes among types 
of mind, each of which defines a “level” of cognitive control rather than a single 
encapsulated system.  The model thus postulates three levels of control - an 
“autonomous” mind consisting of the traditionally-defined Type 1 processes that is in 
control only of its own functioning; an “algorithmic” mind of rule-based Type 2 
processes that maintains inhibitory or override control over what Stanovich calls the 
autonomous set of systems (“TASS”); and a “reflective” mind that controls the initiation 
of Type 2 inhibitory processes.  As Stanovich explains, the further distinction between 
algorithmic and reflective processes is designed to reflect the difference between 
analytical capacity and the classically defined thinking dispositions – precisely the 
distinction that motivation, sensitivity, and perceived questionability seek to address.  
While he acknowledges that the similar functional traits of algorithmic and reflective 
processes will make their distinction less prominent than the Type 1/Type 2 distinction, 
he offers a variety of empirical data warranting its value – data regarding not only the 
correlation between cognitive bias and general intelligence, but also concerning types of 
cognitive breakdowns and psychiatric disorders (see Stanovich, 2009).  Indeed, he views 
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such data as justifying a material distinction between intelligence and rationality, where 
algorithmic processes implement the former and reflective processes implement the 
latter. 
What might we take from the central claims of dual (or tri) -cognition theory as 
they relate to perceived questionability and the expertise theory of criticality?   Perhaps 
the implications are already obvious, but we ought to articulate them clearly.  Most 
important, I believe, is that dual cognition theories, particularly those elaborating a 
default-interventionist model, offer an empirically-based theoretical account of a pre-
reflective, inaccessible, and sub-personal cognitive apparatus that provides ready-made 
content to conscious thought.  While such an apparatus does not itself account for an 
“always-on” mechanism of critical judgment, it does explain the intuitive and affective 
“givenness” of perceived questionability.  In this case, questionability is explained as the 
Type 1 determinations that are output to Type 2 processes, the latter of which account for 
our reflective experience, including critical recognition.  That Type 1 processes are 
themselves both sub-personal and inaccessible suggests that our experience of such 
recognition would be that of a content delivered to consciousness, not something 
requiring intentional and willed cognition.44  And the fact that Type 1 processes are 
thought to lack semantic content and, at times, manifest affectively is consistent with the 
                                                 
44 Indeed, there is an argument to be made that there is a sense in which sub-personal processes are 
truly what they imply – processes that are not “of the person.”  While such an argument would, in the best-
case scenario, suffer the typical pitfalls of dualism, it would further justify the sense of givenness 
experienced during critical recognition. 
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inarticulate feelings of resistance and confidence that characterize background perceived 
questionability. 
As such, dual cognition theories provide a large-scale framework to support some 
of the significant characteristics of the expertise conception of criticality, both with 
regard to its pre-reflective background operation and its reflective manifestation in 
critical recognition.  But the application of a dual cognition principle alone seems to lack 
the detail to provide a robust account of the cognition underlying criticality, however 
speculative that account may be.  Several core questions clearly remain.  Just how do 
algorithmic and/or reflective processes interact with the autonomous mind to account for 
the perceptual transformation central to the development of expertise?  How does the 
architecture account for the presence and effect of affective assessment in such 
development?  How does it justify a conception of critical recognition as an act of 
judgment?   And finally - perhaps most importantly - how does such a cognitive 
architecture address the issue of relevance, particularly as articulated by the frame 
problem?  These are all questions whose answers would seem to require reference to a 
specific theory, though at this point in our material understanding of cognition, one 
theory alone may not comprehensively address their aggregate scope. That said, there 
exists a theory with extensive empirical support that, surprisingly, accounts for just about 
all of these questions.  It is called global workspace theory.  
6.5. Global workspace theory 
First developed by Bernard Baars in the 1980s, global workspace theory (GWT) 
is a high level and comprehensive dual-cognition theory of consciousness that is 
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supported by a substantial and expanding body of empirical data.45  In being a cognitive 
theory of consciousness, GWT not only articulates a cognitive role for consciousness, but 
it postulates cognition as the function of consciousness, its raison d’etre.  Indeed, as 
Baars and Franklin conclude, consciousness “allows us to deal with novel or challenging 
situations that cannot be dealt with efficiently, or at all, by local, routine unconscious 
processes” (Baars & Franklin, 2007, p. 958).  And as Dehaene argues, data collected 
from empirical neurocognitive and consciousness research point to one core conclusion - 
that “we need to be conscious in order to rationally think through a problem” (Dehaene, 
2014, p. 108).  A similar position has been advocated by others not directly associated 
with GWT.  Evans (2011), for example, has claimed that consciousness is essential to 
hypothetical thinking, allowing us to generate inferences from events yet to be realized.  
And Michio Kaku (2014) calls human consciousness a simulation machine, one that 
“creates a model of the world and then simulates it in time, by evaluating the past to 
simulate the future” (Kaku, 2014, p. 46).  While these views utilize slightly different 
language to describe the purpose of consciousness, they all describe the same functional 
role – consciousness enables us to rationally contemplate the future.  Where unconscious 
processing facilitates judgment about the present based on the past, conscious processes 
grants us the ability to utilize the past and present to formulate predictions about what is 
yet to occur. 
                                                 
45 See Dehaene (Consciousness and the brain: Deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts, 
2014) for a detailed account of the extensive empirical data that supports GWT. 
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Global Workspace Theory, however, articulates a highly circumscribed definition 
of consciousness, where to be conscious of X is to be aware of X.  Though “awareness 
of” is no doubt a central condition of consciousness, such a definition leaves unaddressed 
a fundamental component of our common-sense conception – the phenomenal or 
qualitative character of consciousness.46  For awareness of X does not, at least logically, 
entail phenomenal manifestation.  Rather, it requires only the recognition of experiencing 
X – or, perhaps more accurately, of simply becoming cognizant of some piece of 
information (Dehaene, 2014, p. 21).47  As such, GWT has been said to assume a 
functional definition of consciousness, one where, regardless of phenomenal 
manifestation, a conscious agent utilizes its awareness of distinct states of affairs to 
accomplish real-world tasks (Baars & Franklin, 2007).48 
I should emphasize, though, that the functional definition is not intended as a 
reduction of consciousness.  Both Dehaene (2014) and Baars and Franklin (2007) refer to 
it as an “intermediate” concept, one that enables the scientific study of consciousness in 
                                                 
46 We might compare this highly-specific definition of consciousness to Malabou’s broad and 
loose use of the term “mental.”  I would suggest that a significant part of the problem with Malabou’s 
argument can be traced to the ambiguity inherent in her use of this term.  Indeed, as Dehaene 
(Consciousness and the brain: Deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts, 2014) emphasizes, it is the 
narrow scope of “consciousness” that has contributed to the viability of empirical consciousness research.  
47 Here, it bears mentioning that I intend the phrase “awareness of X” to equate to “awareness that 
X.”  While the former suggests awareness of objects, it is more accurate to speak of awareness of a state of 
affairs – a nuance entailed by “awareness that.”  I continue to use “awareness of” because, the Dehaene 
comment notwithstanding, the empirical GWT literature more often speaks of recognizing objects rather 
than states of affairs. 
48 I might note that it is the perceived lack of function that contributes to our difficulty in 
understanding phenomenal consciousness.  While there is clearly the need for awareness of environment 
regardless of phenomenal manifestation, it is less clear what role phenomenal consciousness might have 
without the functional awareness of objects. 
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the face of the perceived intractability of Chalmers’s hard problem of mind.  And such 
conceptualization does offer demonstrable empirical benefit.  For while any first-person 
claim to awareness is still susceptible to many of the theoretically-defined pitfalls of first-
person reports described earlier, claims to awareness of X preclude the need for rich 
qualitative description of what is experienced.  The mere simplicity of the report – for 
example “gorilla,” “blue,” “five” - thus helps to mitigate the vagaries associated with the 
descriptive detail of phenomenal character.  In a substantial sense, the use of the 
functional definition has allowed researchers to focus on conscious recognition over the 
actual qualitative character of experience.  And in being an “experience as,” recognition 
parses away any of the phenomenal detail not needed for that experience. 
In providing a cognitive account of consciousness, GWT can be seen as an odd 
sort of dual-cognition theory.  Like other accounts of dual-cognition, GWT specifies the 
functional relation between two types of cognition, where typically conscious Type 2 
cognition is uniquely characterized by the utilization of a working memory repository, 
the global neuronal workspace.  In being a theory of consciousness, however, GWT 
differs from traditional dual-cognition theories in two significant ways.  First, it eschews 
the competitive and interventionist accounts in favor of a symbiotic relation between 
unconscious and conscious processes.  And second, the theory postulates the necessary 
involvement of Type 1 processes in the creation of consciousness itself.  Type 1 
processes may indeed form an autonomous mind, as Evans, Stanovich and others 
propose, but according to GWT, the conscious mind is not itself a standalone functional 
entity, one that simply competes with or dominates its generally unconscious counterpart.  
207 
 
Instead, the manifestation of consciousness relies fundamentally on the very processes 
that dual cognition broadly distinguishes from consciousness.49 
   In its most basic form, global workspace theory defines mind as a hybrid of 
parallel and serial processing designed to collapse the ongoing stream of disparate brain 
input into a temporal sequence of semantically articulable states of affairs (Baars & 
Franklin, 2007; Dehaene, 2014; Shanahan & Baars, 2005) – a process that Dennett (2005) 
has colorfully described as “fame in the brain.”  A vast array of task-specific neural 
modules implements Type 1 processes that continually manipulate information from both 
the environment and the organism (including the brain itself).  The output of these 
modules is sent up a hierarchical chain of Type 1 processors (Damasio, 2012; Meyer & 
Damasio, 2009), eventually reaching the global neuronal workspace, an anatomical nexus 
of neural pathways that serves as the locus or “workspace” of conscious processing.  
While afferent pathways provide entry to this top-level convergence point for Type 1 
data, efferent pathways direct workspace output back to those modules, providing a 
mechanism for post-convergence distribution of data.50  Given the limited capacity of the 
                                                 
49 Here, it is important to reiterate that dual cognition does not slice along the line of 
consciousness.  As I already mentioned, in opting for a Type1/Type2 distinction, dual cognition theory 
does allow that conscious processes utilize Type 1 processes, making it consistent with the core tenets of 
GWT.  That said, what is perhaps unique about GWT is its claim that consciousness requires the operation 
of the same Type 1 processes that operate in the same manner regardless of the presence of functional 
consciousness. 
50 It is worth noting the intersection of global workspace theory with research in other areas of 
brain inquiry.  Hierarchical Type 1 processing and the post-workspace dissemination of information was 
originally proposed by Damasio (Self comes to mind: Constructing the conscious brain, 2012; Meyer & 
Damasio, 2009), who articulated a cognitive architecture founded on “convergence-divergence” zones, a 
series of processing “way-stations” on paths both to and from a top-level neural nexus.  While Damasio’s 
architecture was not explicitly presented as a theory of consciousness, it clearly forms a necessary 
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global neuronal workspace, though, only a subset of the data transmitted on these afferent 
pathways makes it into the workspace.  Entry entails a competitive process where the 
neural arrays supporting the workspace act as gatekeepers.  These arrays evaluate the 
mass of arriving data to synthesize a “best fit” interpretation of the state of the organism 
and its environment relevant to organism’s well-being.  Each bit of information on its 
own provides a limited such account, and it is the job of the global workspace process as 
a whole to construct from this diversity a differentiated yet integrated interpretation of the 
state of affairs.  To this end, workspace processes deny entry to information that is judged 
inconsistent with a best-fit synthesis of the data or is otherwise deemed irrelevant to 
organismic well-being.51 
The data that makes it into the global workspace is then broadcast back to Type 1 
modules via the efferent channels of the workspace.  This broadcast serves two distinct 
functions.  It first acts to recruit additional Type 1 modules to “join in handling novel and 
high-priority input, and in solving current problems” (Baars & Franklin, 2007, p. 958).  
And second, it provides feedback to the very modules supplying data to the global 
workspace, enabling a self-corrective process similar to the one described in 
phenomenological terms by Dreyfus.  So in the case where one or more Type 1 modules 
                                                 
component of the GWT account.  Such intersection and mutual support of neural theory exemplifies 
Weinstein’s characterization of neuroscience as a discipline exhibiting the characteristics of 
paradigmatically successful scientific enterprises. 
51 It bears mentioning that there are substantial epistemic and ontological ramifications to 
postulating an ultimate goal of organismic well-being.  Specifically, that the GNW filters Type 1 output 
based, in part, on relevance to well-being suggests that epistemic and ontological claims are abstractions 
from experience, a claim long argued by phenomenologists.  
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responsible for detecting skunks, for example, has fired concurrent with modules devoted 
to detecting raccoons, a global judgment of “skunk” would reinforce the existing neural 
structure of the former while initiating a reworking of the latter.52  Here, individual Type 
1 modules engage a process of learning based on a form of neuronal crowdsourcing, 
where a module’s information processing is a result not just of its isolated neural 
capacity, but of the higher-order judgments resulting from the aggregated output of task-
specific experts. 
The feedback broadcast from the global workspace itself stimulates additional 
Type 1 processing from both the original and newly recruited Type 1 modules.  This 
begins a second iteration of communication with the global workspace, amplifying and 
further modulating the initial broadcast.  The cycle repeats for some period of time before 
breaking down, creating what Dehaene describes as a transient, but stable “brain web of 
synchronized areas” (Dehaene, 2014, p. 140).  Most importantly, it is this web of 
activation that consistently correlates with reports of awareness in empirical tests.  
Indeed, the entire natural history of such activation is clearly evident on fMRI scans, 
providing a triangulation of evidence between anatomical structure, first-person report, 
and dynamic visualization that points to one conclusion –  that “consciousness lives in the 
loops” (Dehaene, 2014, p. 156), in the reverberation of neuronal transmission initiated by 
                                                 
52 Again, one should take this example for illustrative purposes only.  Whether there exist specific 
Type 1 modules that detect skunks and raccoons, or whether the granularity of distinction is greater or less 
than I have specified, is, in this context, beside the point.  What is important is that there exists some level 
of Type 1 processing that is modified by the judgments resulting from the aggregation of Type 1 output in 
the global workspace. 
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the broadcast of global workspace contents.53  As such, the content of functional 
consciousness consists of whatever information has been granted access to the global 
workspace. 
Like dual cognition theories in general, the cognitive architecture described by 
global workspace theory explains the “givenness” at the core of critical recognition.  That 
is, by postulating pre-reflective, inaccessible and sub-personal processes that feed content 
to functionally conscious cognition, GWT provides a mechanism for understanding how, 
much like perception generally, the experience of critical recognition can manifest 
without a preceding act of conscious second-order critical evaluation.  Furthermore, 
GWT’s focus on functional consciousness expands on the dual-cognition support for the 
distinction between perceived questionability as a pre-reflective phenomenon and its 
reflective manifestation in critical recognition.  On the GWT account, critical recognition 
occurs because the determinations of Type 1 critical experts are deemed important 
enough for organismic well-being to warrant global broadcast.  And in the absence of 
such broadcast, any phenomenal manifestation of Type 1 critical output occurs without 
garnering conscious attention.  That is, it manifests pre-reflectively. 
But GWT’s explanatory support for perceived questionability extends beyond that 
offered by traditional dual cognition theory.  For in its account of the bidirectional and 
symbiotic interaction between conscious and unconscious processes, GWT makes two 
                                                 
53 The idea that consciousness is a product of neural reverberation was first introduced by Gerald 
Edelman, who articulated the concept of re-entrance in the 1990s.  See Searle (The mystery of 
consciousness, 1997) and Edelman (Naturalizing consciousness: A theoretical framework, 2003) for more 
information. 
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key points related to perceived questionability and expertise theory that are not a part of 
the interventionist, competitive, or reflective models.  First, it proposes that unconscious 
processing is “always on,” that the mass of Type 1 parallel processors is constantly 
attending to the low-level information supplied to the brain by the organism and its 
environment.  GWT thus endorses the possibility of a set of neurally-implemented, 
“always-on” critical watchdogs undergirding the pre-reflective and reflective 
manifestations of perceived questionability.  For as I stated earlier, GWT has been 
proposed as a general architecture for cognition, one intended to subsume the variety of 
cognitive processes contributing to conscious awareness.  How those task-specific critical 
“experts” go about their work and how critically granular their tasks, are further issues.  
But given the integral relation between thinking and questioning - between cognition and 
criticality - it seems ultimately reasonable to think that the account offered by GWT 
extends to perceived questionability.  Such speculation is perhaps further justified given 
the dearth of empirical literature on the material basis of critical questioning. 
Second, in proposing that the broadcast of global workspace content feeds back a 
best-fit interpretation of information relevant to organismic well-being, global workspace 
theory accounts for a good portion of the neural mechanics of expertise development.  In 
so far as expertise theory proposes that phenomenologically salient feelings about one’s 
actions influences future perception of situational response options, GWT offers the 
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large-scale material account of such effect.54  And it does this by articulating the causal 
story behind Dreyfus’ claim that conscious feelings act to modulate – to either reinforce 
or weaken - situation/response pairings.55  Specifically, GWT suggests that conscious 
feelings of response assessment offer the feedback needed by neural arrays to rework or 
reinforce their existing synaptic structure to better align with such assessments.56  These 
changes then manifest as changes to functional consciousness, as low-level modules alter 
their processing of environmental or organismic information while the high-level 
gatekeepers of the global workspace develop the ability for more discriminating 
interpretations of the aggregate data.  In its broad articulation, global workspace theory 
thus provides a neural account of how action and real time decision assessment transform 
future awareness.  Indeed, it seems clear that such an account describes the material 
mechanism behind embodied judgment. 
In proposing a hybrid parallel-serial cognitive architecture, GWT also offers a 
computational solution to the frame problem, one that, perhaps paradoxically, affirms 
Dreyfus’ claim that determinations of relevance must reside at the very foundation of our 
                                                 
54 That said, unlike expertise theory, GWT fails to distinguish between affective and analytical 
response assessment, implying that the two should bear a similar effect on functional consciousness.  
Indeed, GWT does not offer a neural account of the transition from Dreyfusian competence to proficiency, 
though it certainly does not preclude such a transition.  
55 Here, it is important to note that GWT requires such feelings to be functionally conscious, not 
merely phenomenally conscious.  While Dreyfus does not explicitly distinguish between functional and 
phenomenal consciousness, his emphasis on the role of care in expertise development would seem to 
suggest the importance of reflectively attending to affective response assessment. 
56 The process of synaptic reweighting as a means of modulating the neural synchronization has 
long been acknowledged as a central process of brain development (see Hebb, 1949). 
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epistemic process.57  As I explained earlier, the issues articulated by the frame problem 
are twofold.  First, in the absence of any built-in criteria for determinations of epistemic 
relevance, we are faced with the practical issue of timeliness, where successful navigation 
of the world would seem to demand that evaluation of relevance be restricted to some 
manageable subset of epistemic commitments.  And second, the fact that we do 
successfully navigate such situations without exhaustive evaluation appears to be 
inexplicable by reference to computational, rule-based theories of cognition, as any 
attempt to employ rules in the process of relevance determination begs for further 
“higher-level” rules to select which lower-level ones ought to be employed. 
Global workspace theory addresses both problems by exposing two latent 
assumptions of the frame problem – first, that determinations of relevance must occur 
serially, and second, that such determinations are the responsibility of the same cognitive 
process that utilizes them.  In critiquing the first assumption, Shanahan and Baars take 
issue with the design Dennett’s robot: 
Perhaps Fodor and other like-minded cognitive scientists have been led 
astray by Dennett’s caricature of a ploddingly stupid robot trying not to 
get blown up. Recall that Dennett’s imaginary robot explicitly considers 
each irrelevant implication of its actions before it decides to ignore it. The 
robot’s supposed difficulty is that it doesn’t know how to stop thinking. 
But the design of Dennett’s robot is absurd. It carries out a serial 
computation that exhaustively works through a long list of alternatives 
one-by-one before it terminates. (Shanahan & Baars, 2005, p. 164) 
                                                 
57 To be clear, to say that assignment of relevance must be a foundational component of our 
epistemic process is to say that our knowledge of the world already presupposes some epistemic 
prioritization – some filtering - of environment information.  That is, we do not prioritize our knowledge 
claims only after obtaining that knowledge.  We do so in order to obtain knowledge.  
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Here, it is not just the sheer volume of required epistemic evaluations that renders 
timeliness problematic.  It is also the serial execution of the evaluative process, where 
determinations of relevance must be made sequentially.  As Shanahan and Baars suggest, 
the fact that Dennett’s robot is incapable of timely action ought to be taken as a reductio 
ad absurdum of any serial cognitive architecture. 
With regard to the second assumption, Shanahan and Baars argue that in asking 
how a cognitive process selects the relevant information, the frame problem poses a 
loaded question: 
…how does a cognitive process like analogical reasoning manage to select 
among all the information available to it? …as it stands this question is 
somewhat ill-posed.  It betrays an assumption that it is the responsibility 
of the cognitive process itself to make the selection of relevant 
information. According to the proposal of the present section, a better 
question would be the following. How is it that the required relevant 
information is made available to a cognitive process like analogical 
reasoning? (Shanahan & Baars, 2005, p. 164) 
Here, the authors suggest that the “framing” of the frame problem is itself problematic in 
that it assumes that the cognitive process tasked with rendering decisions is the same 
process that is responsible for determining relevance.  But as we have seen, global 
workspace theory avoids this assumption by specifying distinct roles for parallel and 
serial cognitive processes.  The former generates relevance claims, while the latter 
utilizes them. 
Thus, the global workspace architecture is well-suited to respond to the frame 
problem, avoiding the very assumptions that give it life.  But how, precisely, does 
rejection of these assumptions enable GWT to resolve the issues of timeliness and 
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computability?  The answer to the former rests with parallel processing.  The parallel 
execution of Type 1 processes enables the simultaneous determination of relevance on a 
grand scale, where potentially many millions of “always-on” neural watchdogs, each 
tuned to respond to the presence of specific information, constantly monitor the organism 
and its environment.  This may seem like quite a biological feat, but as Shanahan and 
Baars note, “with 100 billion neurons and many trillions of synapses, the human brain has 
plenty of scope for truly massive parallelism” (Shanahan & Baars, 2005, p. 168) .  As 
such, there is no need for the sequential evaluation of relevance claims.  Evaluation 
happens concurrently, rendering timeliness a non-issue. 
To resolve the computability dilemma, global workspace theory engages in what 
may seem like sleight of hand – it actually accepts the frame problem’s conclusion that 
determination of relevance is not a computational, rule-based operation.  However, in 
rejecting the “single process” assumption, GWT still offers a computational account of 
cognition.  For it postulates that computation is at the heart of the other processes, the 
processes that manage the global workspace.  While rules may be absent in the 
production of relevance claims, they are central to their subsequent processing, a 
processing devoted to the production of functional consciousness.  Put simply, the 
selection regress is an issue only for the computational production of relevance claims.  
By isolating relevance determination from the production of functional consciousness, 
global workspace theory avoids the regress while maintaining the computational 
character of cognition.   
216 
 
It is important to be clear that, in offering this solution to the frame problem, 
global workspace theory affirms Dreyfus’s core claim that relevance is a prerequisite for 
the creation of mental representation.  The GWT account specifies relevance 
determination as a prerequisite for the production of semantically articulable mental 
tokens, postulating, like Dreyfus, that awareness of any concrete state of affairs is 
founded upon the relevance claims of the organism.  Furthermore, given that both 
expertise theory and GWT peg the development of relevance-generating structures to 
organismic goals, they stand in contrast to traditional computational theories of mind, 
which conceive of cognition as the rule-based manipulation of representational tokens 
(see Fodor, 1983).  In such a model, neither relevance nor goals factor into the creation of 
representations.  Rather, they are cognitively integrated only afterward, as part of their 
computational manipulation.  Indeed, this chronology of the cognitive process is at the 
heart of the frame regress.  As such, it is little wonder that GWT aligns with Dreyfus’s 
anti-representationalist stance.  It would seem that any solution providing an “out” from 
the regress would be forced to affirm the temporal primacy of relevance.58  Yet, it should 
also be clear that neither expertise theory nor GWT precludes the use of goals and 
relevance determinations in the subsequent manipulation of representations, particularly 
                                                 
58 To be fair, others have preceded Dreyfus in making similar claims.  From a philosophical 
perspective, Heidegger (Being and time, 1962) argued that what we take to exist – our perceived ontology - 
is a function of care, the fundamental source of our goals, projects, and actions.  Merleau-Ponty 
(Phenomenology of perception, 2013) suggested that the particular structure and functioning of our body – 
its limits, capabilities, needs, and goals - influence our experience of the phenomenal world.  And in the 
empirical domain, Gibson’s notion of affordances (Greeno, 1994; Scarantino, 2002) and Walter Freeman’s 
attractor states (Freeman, 2000) provide scientific analogs of the same basic idea – that our perceived 
ontology is a product of our goal-oriented navigation of the world.  
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at the level of conscious cognition.  Rather, the important takeaway is that both theories 
conceive of such thinking as involving mental tokens that are themselves the product of 
the goals and self-assessments of an organism seeking to thrive in the world. 
6.6. Reprise: Criticality as a form of judgment and the paradox of criticality 
At this point, we can articulate how global workspace theory supports the two 
claims that underwrite criticality as a form of judgment.  Of course, such a position 
assumes that the process of critical recognition can be subsumed by the cognitive 
architecture articulated by global workspace theory.  But if it can – and I have argued as 
much – global workspace theory offers material justification for this conception.  Indeed, 
I have already noted that in hypothesizing the neural reworking of relevance 
determination as a consequence of consciousness, GWT postulates the very mechanism 
of embodied judgment.  The process of relevance determination may not itself qualify as 
an act of judgment traditionally conceived, but the fact that the conditionals of previous 
critical assessment cause Type 1 relevance generators to output assertions that abide by 
those conditionals suggests that such a process is still a form of judgment – one that is 
embodied in a semantically inarticulate and non-representational neural configuration. 
Let me suggest, however, that global workspace theory justifies the second, and 
perhaps more contentious, claim that the production of functional consciousness is itself a 
process of ongoing judgment.  For in creating a definitive state of affairs from the mass 
of statistical relevance claims, the processes of the global workspace must engage in an 
evaluation of competing claims. They must decide, according to criteria such as internal 
consistency, which claims warrant inclusion in a best-fit synthesis of the data in any 
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particular situation.  And given the semantic character of these claims, such decision-
making seems paradigmatically judgmental in that it entails the explicit weighing of 
alternatives.  Indeed, Dehaene reports that, in the process of settling on a defined state of 
affairs, the neural structures of the global workspace consider several hypotheses at once 
(Dehaene, 2014, p. 99).  If this is the case, global workspace processing not only 
evaluates which relevance claims deserve inclusion, but it does so by weighing a number 
of possible claim combinations.  The construction of functional consciousness would thus 
seem to be a neural exemplar of judgment as traditionally understood – a process that 
evaluates a set of claims founded on past experience to decide what we ought to attend to 
in the present.  Critical recognition, as the act of becoming functionally conscious of what 
we ought to interrogate in the present, is likely the result of this same sort of judgment 
process. 
To be clear, the creation of functional consciousness is an ongoing act of 
judgment because the global workspace process must adjudicate among an ever-changing 
set of relevance claims.  As I have presented it, the embodied judgment of Type 1 
generation cannot itself be considered an act of judgment because of its non-
representational, non-semantic character.  But the only viable interpretation of a process 
that creates a single target of reflective attention from a seemingly infinite number of 
possible relevance claim permutations is as an act of judgment. And this is the neural 
reason for the weakness of the sensitivity conception – it fails to account for the big 
picture.  That is, in the presence of a mass of competing and potential conflicting 
relevance claims, sensitivity to any specific critical environmental cue does not itself 
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warrant a critical response.  Some additional process must sanction relevance in light of 
other factors.  The beauty of a parallel processing model is that, at a fundamental level, 
our brain can present for its own consideration a complex picture of the world that 
includes potentially disparate and unrelated aspects.  And yet, if functional consciousness 
is serial, if we must consciously attend to only one aspect of that picture at any particular 
moment, we must have a tool to judge which aspect deserves that consideration. 
In describing perceived questionability as a pervasive structural component of 
experience that episodically manifests in critical recognition, I have presented the 
phenomenology of criticality in a manner that aligns particularly well with GWT.  For 
GWT does not preclude the phenomenal manifestation of Type 1 output.59  It simply 
insists that we cannot be reflectively aware of it.  This is precisely the distinction between 
perceived questionability and critical recognition that the phenomenology seems to 
suggest.  As part of the structural background of experience, perceived questionability 
tends to manifest pre-reflectively, inarticulately, and minimally – much like the way we 
perceive the leaves of a forest from a distance, or see our shadow on the sidewalk as we 
attend to oncoming street traffic.  Critical recognition, however, like all recognition, 
punctuates reflective experience, creating a discreet object of conscious attention in 
moments where felt epistemic acceptance or resistance demands attention.  It is precisely 
this demand that is the act of judgment, a judgment that proclaims “this is important, 
                                                 
59 As noted earlier, dual cognition theory specifically proposes that some Type 1 processes 
manifest phenomenologically, particularly affectively.  
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think about it.”  Such is the purpose of functional consciousness, of Dennett’s “brain 
fame” – to issue these judgments, so that we may attend to that which is judged to be 
important to our ongoing well-being.60 
One final point is in order.  At the end of chapter 3, I proposed a resolution to 
what I had earlier called the paradox of criticality.  I suggested that the theoretically 
infinite regress of criticality meets its practical end in the act of critical recognition, that 
in approximating a standard of criticality, we can stop questioning without compromising 
the critical character of critical interrogation because we appropriately recognize that 
further questioning is not relevant.  The question then becomes how recognition can serve 
this role, how its determinations of critical relevance or irrelevance can be justified to the 
point that ending the critical regress does not automatically render critical behavior 
“uncritical.”  When the issue is framed this way, it should be clear that the paradox of 
criticality is closely related to the frame problem.  For in suggesting that a vicious regress 
results from any attempt to specify criteria for determining relevance, the frame problem, 
like the paradox, asks how it is possible to non-arbitrarily stop thinking when faced with 
the need to make a decision in an informationally unencapsulated context.  The fact that 
global workspace theory proposes that thinking starts and ends with the production of 
                                                 
60 Two points here.  First, I might note that while the literature considers well-being to be defined 
biologically, such a definition does not preclude attention to aesthetic, ethical, and other abstract 
considerations.  Clearly, our well-being is, to varying degrees, affected by such considerations.  Second, the 
social construction of a critical ideal amounts to a social claim about the role of critical interrogation in 
promoting well-being.  Specifically, such a claim suggests that to the degree we approximate the ideal, we 
also promote our well-being. 
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Type 1 relevance claims thus suggests that we might look to Type 1 processors for a 
material resolution to the criticality paradox as well. 
And this is, indeed, where I believe such resolution lies – in the embodiment of 
critical judgment.  Global workspace theory is clear that Type 1 modules have been 
designed to output statistical assertions consistent with our conscious assessments of past 
relevance claims.  That is, situationally-specific relevance claims previously judged to 
have facilitated successful behavior are likely to be reinforced, while claims judged to 
have had the opposite effect are apt to be abandoned.  Thus, to the degree that such 
claims express a response to past experience, they are not epistemically arbitrary.  And 
given their foundational role in critical recognition, both the recognition and non-
recognition of critical opportunities are themselves similarly justified.  
It is particularly important that we appreciate this criticality of non-recognition.  
For it means that in ceasing the critical process, in putting an end to the theoretically 
endless iterations of critical questioning, we do not engage in an arbitrary, acritical act.  
Rather, the lack of critical recognition - at least to the degree that it expresses a critical 
standard – is an act pregnant with the critical judgment of past experience.  As we have 
seen, the Type 1 relevance generators of global workspace theory are “always-on,” 
constantly monitoring the organism and its environment for information relevant to 
organismic well-being.  When those modules responsible for determining critical 
relevance have been “tuned” to a critical standard, their lack of response is as much a 
justified statement of critical relevance as any response.  Thus, the end of the critical 
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regress is only ostensibly acritical and arbitrary.  In actuality, both critical recognition 
and lack of critical recognition are critical through and through.61 
6.7. Limits and promise 
As I mentioned earlier, the relative nascence of cognitive neuroscience suggests 
that we ought not to expect any single existing neurocognitive theory to provide a 
comprehensive material account of the expertise conception. Such is certainly the case 
with global workspace theory.  While a large and growing set of empirical data points to 
GWT as a theory with staying power (see Dehaene, 2014), it is far from the 
comprehensive account of cognition needed to address the diverse aspects of critical 
expertise.  Perhaps its most salient deficiency in this regard concerns the role of affect.  
Here there are two issues – first, the affective character of perceived questionability, and 
second, the lack of distinction between affective and analytical response assessment.  
This latter issue, in particular, prevents GWT from offering an account of the 
phenomenological transition from competence to proficiency, leaving us with only the 
general claim that all conscious awareness, affective or analytical, bears influence on the 
relevance claims produced by Type 1 modules.  What is likely needed to fill this gap is a 
contribution from theories that articulate the role of affect in cognition, of which there is 
a burgeoning literature (see, among others, Damasio, 2012; Panksepp, 2014; Rolls, 2013; 
Thagard & Aubie, 2008; Bechara, 2004). 
                                                 
61 Here, I need to reiterate that I am speaking only of the case when critical behavior approximates 
the critical ideal.  Of course, lack of critical recognition in particular, can simply be symptomatic of a lack 
of criticality, a fact that may render the assessment of critical behavior difficult. But the essential point here 
is that the paradox of criticality does not a priori doom the very concept of criticality. 
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That said, we ought to acknowledge what global workspace theory does offer - an 
empirically substantiated, material account of cognition that aligns remarkably well with 
the expertise conception of criticality.  From its ability to explain the givenness of critical 
recognition, to its description of a mechanism that enables transformation of awareness 
through self-assessment; from its support for critical recognition as a form of judgment, 
to its material resolution of the criticality paradox, GWT provides an empirically viable 
material basis for the view of criticality that I have articulated in previous chapters.  In 
this sense, it satisfies one side of the symbiotic relation between first- and third- person 
accounts of mind.  Indeed, in portraying perceived questionability, expertise theory, and 
global workspace theory as necessary partners in an account of criticality, I have 
attempted to elaborate both sides of this relation, offering an example of how 
phenomenological analysis and cognitive neuroscience can work together to make 
headway on a longstanding issue central to, and defined by, education.  Such an example, 
I suggest, serves to highlight the promise of educational neuroscience. 
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Chapter 7: Educating for Criticality 
7.1. Introduction 
Unlike sensitivity and motivation, the expertise conception articulates an 
understanding of criticality that does justice to our deepest sense of critical behavior.  It is 
not simply that expertise accounts for the critical ideal of appropriate questioning.  
Rather, in providing an out from the paradox of criticality, the expertise conception does 
something else that the other conceptions fail to do – it preserves the viability of the 
criticality in light of its epistemically iterative nature.  Stated with regard to the 
pragmatics of criticality, the expertise conception is unique in showing how the end of 
critical interrogation can itself be a critical act.  Motivation and sensitivity may explain 
the impetus for critical engagement, but in failing to offer an account of critical non-
recognition, both conceptions fail to impute critical character to its ostensibly acritical 
end.  The expertise conception addresses this shortcoming through the idea of embodied 
judgment, thus legitimizing the strong sense of criticality that is central to our normative 
educational vision.  
 Ultimately, though, the expertise conception ought to prove its value in the 
classroom.  Indeed, any conception of criticality, regardless of how well justified, proves 
valuable only to the degree that it facilitates the approximation of an accepted critical 
standard.  To this end, much has been written about the educational ramifications of 
motivation and sensitivity as they relate to critical thinking disposition.  And to no 
surprise, much of this literature amounts to articulating ways to motivate students to 
critically engage and make them more sensitive to critical opportunities (see, for 
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example, Costa & Garmston, 2001; Tishman, 2001; Richhart, 2001; Facione, 1990).  In a 
similar manner, I might offer the generalization that criticality as judgment suggests that 
an education for criticality ought to focus on improving the critical judgment of students.  
This claim seems obviously true – indeed, almost trivial - given the expertise conception 
that I have articulated.  And yet, a look at the theories that justify such a conception – 
expertise theory and GWT – suggest changes to classroom practice that do seem to hold 
the promise of moving students toward the critical ideal of appropriate questioning. 
Again, we ought to keep in mind a point I made earlier regarding the findings of 
neuroscience.  Contrary to Willingham’s assumption that neuroscience must introduce 
novel pedagogical ideas to justify its educational relevance, I have argued that the 
discipline can serve a valuable supportive, creative, and critical role even in the absence 
of breakthrough contributions.  That is, it can provide both the warrant for pedagogical 
decisions and the inspiration for research in other educationally-relevant domains.  With 
this in mind, the concrete changes to teaching and learning suggested by an expertise 
conception of criticality are not themselves novel or ground shaking.  But in being based 
on phenomenological analysis and neurocognitive theory, they perhaps include novel and 
substantive reasons why we ought to implement them.  And they certainly provide insight 
into the contributions and shortcomings of educating for critical motivation and 
sensitivity alone.  As such, I would again offer the expertise conception, and its 
neuroscientific warrant, as an exemplar of how we might partner first and third-person 
theory of mind to address educational issues. 
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7.2. Education and the modulation of functional consciousness 
Perhaps the most educationally-relevant feature of both expertise theory and 
GWT concerns the self-modulation of functional consciousness.  As discussed in the 
previous two chapters, both theories postulate a feedback loop where consciousness 
serves to recalibrate its own future tendency toward certain experiences of awareness.  In 
the language of expertise theory, this recalibration is described as the strengthening or 
weakening of particular perceptual responses to the world.  For GWT, recalibration 
entails the rewiring of neural arrays devoted to relevance determination and the global 
workspace gatekeepers.  In both cases, experience is not described as a static, passive 
rendering of the environment, but as a malleable response substantially influenced by our 
goals, activities, and even the capabilities and constraints of our bodies.1  This is not to 
discount the role of the environment in experience, but to acknowledge its complex 
relation to the subject in the production functional consciousness. 
Both theories thus imply two levers to modulate conscious awareness – that which 
exists in the world, and our personal investment in it.  These, in turn, suggest two 
concrete and significant pedagogical changes required for an education for criticality.  
First, to the degree that movement toward the critical ideal contingently entails more 
critical engagement, educators simply ought to create a world with more critical 
engagement, one where critical interrogation is part and parcel of daily life.  Clearly, in 
                                                 
1 For more on the role of the body in perception, see Scarantino, 2002, Greeno, 1994, Gallagher, 
2005, and Merleau-Ponty, 2013. 
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the domain of schooling, this starts with substantive changes to the pedagogy of the 
curriculum.  Rather than teach for answers and fact, we ought to engage a concerted 
effort to portray the disciplines as ongoing sites of critical inquiry, both with regard to 
unanswered questions and matters of established theory.  Indeed, a “pedagogy of 
answers,” where teaching consists solely, or even primarily, of introducing students to the 
accomplishments, methods, and current state of a discipline, works against an education 
for critical engagement.  For it is not just that this sort of teaching neglects to 
appropriately develop the Type 1 neural arrays needed to generate critical relevance.  It 
creates the general mindset that the discipline is authoritative - that its output is generally 
definitive and without a need for ongoing epistemic critique of its content. While we may 
not at this point understand the neural ramifications of such a mindset, we have good 
reason to believe that it works contrary to the goal of criticality.  It is also particularly 
unfortunate given that the actual practice of the disciplines is characterized by a continual 
communal critique of theory and method. 
That said, substantive changes to the pedagogy of the disciplines is not itself 
sufficient to create a more “questioned” world.  Here it is important to remember that the 
educational aim concerns not domain-specific criticality, but everyday criticality.  As 
such, we are faced with two options – encourage the transfer of domain-specific 
criticality to the diverse and complex contexts of everyday life, or present a more 
questioned everyday world.  While there is an extensive literature on the pedagogy of 
transfer, the possibility and extent of successful transfer with regard to critical disposition 
remains an open issue (see, for example, Willingham, 2007; Perkins & Salomon, 2012; 
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McPeck, 1990).  Regardless of the viability of transfer within the disciplines themselves, 
one would think that transfer of criticality from the disciplines to the context of 
everydayness would be that much more difficult.  Indeed, in limiting the education for 
criticality to the disciplines, we run the risk of conveying the message to students that 
critical engagement is solely a mode of academic behavior.  This is especially true in the 
presence of contemporary non-academic social and cultural pressures toward epistemic 
conformity and homogeneity, where I would venture to say that media, government, 
business and various other social institutions work in concert to present a unified, 
comprehensive, and dominant worldview.  In this sense, the education for criticality is 
always fighting an uphill battle, working to enact change in the context of powerful 
oppositional forces. 
It would thus seem reasonable to suggest that education for criticality requires 
schools to make critical interrogation a part of their everyday functioning.  This begs for 
an enculturation of criticality (Richhart, 2001; Tishman, Jay, & Perkins, 1993), where 
critical engagement is a matter of course not only in the disciplines, but on the 
playground and ball field, in the cafeteria and at assembly, and during any other of the 
myriad routine activities of school life.  This is clearly no small task, and involves not 
merely the modelling of critical engagement by teachers in formal didactic situations, but 
their actual critical engagement in daily tasks – in their interaction with other teachers 
and staff, as well as their non-academic interaction with parents and students.  Ideally, 
such engagement would extend to non-teaching personnel as well, permeating the nooks 
and crannies of social life at school so that criticality is perceived casually by students, as 
229 
 
part of the baseline of both their academic and non-academic experience.2  No doubt, 
such a vision of the school borders on the utopic, especially again, in light of the larger 
social and cultural forces at play.  But the theories supporting the expertise conception of 
criticality suggest that critical perception requires the presence of critical opportunities in 
the environment.  Given that every assertion and state of affairs could be considered a 
critical opportunity – as I argued in Chapter Three - existence reduces to salience.  That 
is, critical opportunities exist as something distinguishable from the background 
questionability of everything only when they are made visible as an opportunity.  To the 
degree that such opportunities are excluded from the everydayness of the school 
environment and limited to academic interaction, we thus fail to make them salient in the 
everyday world.  At that point, we rely solely on the potential of transfer to make 
academic criticality a cornerstone of an education for everyday criticality. 
But as suggested by both expertise theory and global workspace theory, there is 
more to the modulation of functional consciousness than the structure and content of the 
environment.  Both theories acknowledge the influence of our personal investment in it – 
                                                 
2 Here, I ought to note the gap between everyday life and everyday life at school.  In arguing that 
education for criticality requires a culture of criticality at school, I am still assuming that some sort of 
transfer is necessary.  That said, this would seem to be the minimal level of transfer assumed to take place 
in educating for anything. 
On the other hand, this gap highlights again the limitations of schooling with regard to an 
education for criticality.  A student’s everyday life in school is only a fraction of a student’s everyday life, 
and it is clear that the broader environment of the individual – the environment outside of school – fails to 
make salient the critical opportunities needed to promote approximation of the type of critical standard 
articulated by education (even accounting for regional variance).  Thus, we might ask about the possible 
effectiveness of an education for criticality in a world where the critical standard diverges from the 
educational ideal.  If people “live their world,” as global workspace theory in particular would seem to 
suggest, we ought to expect the critical ideal of everyday life to work at cross-purposes to the educational 
ideal.  
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what Dreyfus calls “care,” and what GWT terms “relevance.”  As such, care plays a 
central role in criticality, helping to determine which assertions and situations we take to 
be critical opportunities.  This is a position held by the motivation conception as well, 
which assumes that motivation to engage critically follows from caring about criticality. 
Indeed, the Delphi commission made the development of care for critical thinking a 
centerpiece of its pedagogical recommendations, suggesting that teachers find ways to 
impress upon students the personal and social benefits of thinking critically (Facione, 
1990).  I explored this relation between rational valuation and critical behavior back in 
Chapter 3, and I won’t revisit the details now except to again note the gap that exists 
between the two.  As I discussed then, the concept of sensitivity was proposed precisely 
to fill this gap.  
That said, I would suggest that the specific role of care in the expertise conception 
is not the same role defined by the motivation conception.  Where the motivation 
conception specifies a link between care and the in-the-moment tendency to critically 
interrogate - as if care underwrites an affective and “consistent internal motivation” to act 
critically (Facione, 2000, p. 61) - the expertise conception views care as a before-the-
moment influence, a necessary factor in the development of critical recognition skill.3  
Indeed, this is the takeaway from both expertise theory and global workspace theory.  In 
                                                 
3 Note that in calling critical recognition a skill, I am committing to a skill-based view of critical 
disposition.  Such a view is a direct rejection of perhaps the core distinction of critical thinking theory – the 
distinction between critical thinking skills and the disposition to use them.  While I certainly do not wish to 
engage the issue in detail at this point, it seems clear to me that the expertise conception of criticality, and 
specifically its backing in GWT, provide ample reason to question the viability of a rigid boundary between 
skills and dispositions.   
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the case of expertise, care is necessary make the jump from the conscious and conceptual 
judgment of situation characteristic of Dreyfusian competence to the intuitive, perceptual 
judgment of proficiency.  And in the case of GWT, care influences the development of 
neural processes that generate relevance claims and adjudicate among them. 
This difference in the function of care bears concrete ramifications for an 
education for criticality.  While it is no doubt important that teachers impress upon 
students the value of appropriate critical engagement in everyday life, it is by no means 
sufficient for the development of critical recognition.  Rather, if emotional commitment 
to interrogative decision-making must accompany its practice in order to move from 
critical competence to critical proficiency, teachers ought to expend energy creating 
environments where students care about their decision to iteratively interrogate.  Here 
teachers might seek to engage critical discussion on matters of personal relevance, where 
the decision to accept or critically engage an assertion is not merely academic, but a 
matter of personal significance - where the motivation to keep questioning the basis of an 
issue comes from wanting to know, not from getting a grade or learning a skill.  Perhaps 
topics related to current events, the origin of the universe, or the ontological status of 
mathematics, would inspire the necessary emotional commitment.  But if not, teachers 
might have to expand the domain of legitimate school discussion to include sports, pop 
culture, monsters, or first-person shooter games.  Indeed, if “we hold dear the ability to 
nurture critical disposition, we may have to embrace discussions on any number of 
unexpected topics” (Fisherman, 2014a, p. 102). 
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Alternatively, we might look not to the topic of discussion to generate 
commitment, but to its context.  While I am fully aware of the potential downside of 
encouraging a competitive spirit to communal deliberation, formal activities such as 
debates, model UN, and ethics bowls offer students the opportunity to engage critically in 
an environment conducive to care (Fisherman, 2014a).  I would venture to say that in-
class games, even video games, could provide a similar avenue for emotionally 
committed critical engagement.4  This is not to say that such games already exist, but 
only that we might see gaming as a potential mode of critical practice that satisfies the 
need for care.  Here, I might note that in any of these activities, we need to ensure that 
opportunities for continued questioning are not dominated by a focus on answers, 
problem solving, or reasoning, although these are clearly important in their own right.  In 
my own experience supervising a high school ethics bowl team, I have been disappointed 
by this “dominance of answers,” where rebuttals to specific positions were framed not as 
openings for further inquiry, but as definitive positions on the issue at hand.  While the 
assertive component of critical engagement cannot be ignored, we need to be alert to the 
ease with which answering the question or resolving the issue becomes the focus of the 
activity, thus rendering the care for iterative questioning subservient to the care for 
answering.  As I have argued throughout this work, criticality demands a persistent effort 
to dig deeper into our foundational beliefs, an effort that itself requires that we treat 
                                                 
4 See Gee (What video games have to teach us about learning and literacy, 2003) for an extended 
and convincing argument touting the educational, and indeed critical, virtues of video games. 
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answers as invitations to interrogation.  Without the requisite focus on questioning, 
though, we ought not to expect to dig very deep. 
7.3. Philosophy and an education for criticality 
This is where philosophy itself proves valuable as a didactic discipline.  
Numerous proponents of critical thinking education have advocated for incorporating 
philosophy in the curriculum, with Carrie Winstanley offering, for example, that “critical 
thinking is the essence of philosophy” (Winstanley, 2009, p. 91) , and Matthew Lipman 
arguing that “only philosophy can provide the logical and epistemological criteria that are 
now lacking in the curriculum” (Lipman, 2003).  However relevant such reasons are to 
the specific development of criticality, I would like to introduce two additional reasons, 
reasons that derive from the levers of care and environment.  First, to the degree that 
approximating the critical ideal contingently requires that individuals be more apt to 
interrogate assertion, doing philosophy has the perhaps unique potential for inspiring care 
for questioning over care for answers.  I would suggest that such potential derives, 
ironically, from the greatest failure of philosophy as a discipline of inquiry – its inability 
to lay to rest debate over its central questions, to provide definitive answers.  Philosophy 
is truly unique in this regard, and has engendered much criticism for it, both from within 
the field and without.  Indeed, Wittgenstein devoted much of his later life attempting to 
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expose philosophy as a confused, sense-less, and ultimately useless discipline of inquiry 
whose only redeeming goal could be to provide its own reasons for closing shop.5 
And yet, this failure of philosophy is precisely the reason why the discipline has 
didactic value.6  For clearly, that the questions of philosophy still engender serious study 
despite their long-standing intractability suggests that they maintain a substantial and 
broad allure.  And I would argue that such allure is not simply conceptual and 
intellectual, but affective – that the questions themselves inspire an emotional response 
that elicits engagement despite their intractability.  Indeed, I have seen this sort of 
response as a matter of course when introducing core philosophical questions to both 
high school students and undergraduates.  For the large majority of my students, the 
problematizing of their world, their recognition that the assumed “facts” of the world are 
at all question-able, is to varying degrees revelatory.  Certainly, the opening up of the 
possibility of a re-envisioned world generates both confusion and angst.  Yet it 
simultaneously lends a measure of palpable and ongoing excitement, an excitement not 
for actually re-envisioning the world, but for the very possibility of re-envisioning – for 
the fact that there is “more to it” than previously thought.  Often, this excitement is 
explicit, with students paradoxically describing their exhilaration upon leaving class with, 
for example, the eerie feeling that perhaps there is no way that the world “looks” 
                                                 
5 This goal is perhaps best expressed when Wittgenstein states “What is your aim in philosophy? 
—To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 87e). 
6 Indeed, I have offered a similar argument in Fisherman 2014b(Fisherman D. , Wittgenstein and 
the value of meaningless questioning, 2014b). 
235 
 
independent of mind.  Other times, the excitement manifests more subtly, in increased 
class engagement, or simply in an engaged, attentive look.  And such interest is not 
necessarily a byproduct of the initial philosophical question, either. The emotional 
experience of “no longer knowing” regularly punctuates philosophical discourse. 
This is not to say that questions in physics and mathematics do not inspire such a 
response.  Rather, both the epistemic track record and established methodologies of those 
disciplines motivate a shift from care for the question to care for an answer.  In being 
affectively drawn to philosophical questions, though, one’s care is never focused solely 
on generating answers.  Rather, it is always focused beyond the answer, on elaborating 
the questions that arise from any given answer.7  Such a practice is the practice of 
criticality, the practice of iterative interrogation.  We might thus revise Winstanley’s 
claim to proclaim that criticality is the essence of philosophy. 
Beyond inspiring this care for the question, philosophy serves a further role in the 
didactic modulation of critical consciousness – it allows students to test the limits of 
appropriate questioning, particularly as they relate to practical decision-making.  Stated 
differently, it enables us to put to the test the assertions that ought to comprise the 
epistemic foundation of everyday life.  And it does this by providing a forum to delve 
into Burbules’s deep sense of criticality, where individuals iteratively interrogate to the 
depth of fundamental belief.  At some point in this process, questioning the belief itself 
                                                 
7 As David Kennedy has often said, philosophical “progress” merely causes the horizon of inquiry 
to recede. 
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becomes questionable, and the response to continued questioning can no longer sensibly 
constitute an epistemic reason but only a rejection, one that fundamentally upends the 
epistemic “riverbed” (Wittgenstein, 1969) that underwrites our understanding and 
everyday judgment. It is at this point that we separate the beliefs which can be sensibly 
questioned from those which we must accept axiomatically (Wittgenstein, 1969).   
Thus, we are again back to the core of the paradox of criticality, where it seems 
that the process of critical judgment requires the uncritical acceptance of at least one 
assertion.  But let me suggest that the concept of criticality is not threatened by such an 
axiomatic bedrock.  For in knowing that there is an end to justification, we salvage 
criticality by understanding that we can go no further without “a-justifiably” rejecting the 
basis for our beliefs.  And we get to this understanding only when we get to the point of 
questioning the question.  As I have argued throughout, we resolve the paradox of 
criticality through critical recognition, where recognition is itself an act of in-the-moment 
critical judgment based on the reified amalgam of our previous judgments.  Such is the 
upshot of both expertise theory and GWT.  But for recognition to be truly critical, this 
amalgam needs to be critical all the way down.  That is, it needs to include the judgments 
we make when questioning the question, when we understand that we can no longer offer 
epistemic reasons as a response to the critical challenge and have articulated the 
consequences of rejecting what we had previously, and uncritically, accepted as true.  
This is how I interpret the charge offered by Burbules and Berk, Paul, and others to delve 
deep.  And the only way to meet this charge is to engage in the extended iterative 
questioning that leads to questioning the question.  This, then, is what philosophy 
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provides – a forum, a space, where outside of both daily life and the accepted 
methodologies of the disciplines, individuals can iteratively question to the point where 
they critically evaluate not just the responses to those questions, but the legitimacy of 
asking them in the first place.8 
This is perhaps the most fitting conclusion for an extended philosophical 
treatment of criticality – that philosophy itself is the didactic tool of the critical ideal.  In 
some ways, this is the same conclusion that other proponents of critical thinking have 
reached.  Yet in other ways, the conclusion is different.  Philosophy is not uniquely 
positioned to develop good thinking as is argued by many proponents of critical thinking.  
Nor is it necessarily first among the disciplines in nurturing good practical judgment, as it 
was to Matthew Lipman and Ann Sharp, the founders of the philosophy for children 
movement (Lipman, 2003; Sharp, 1991).  But philosophy does have a unique place in 
education as the domain of truly iterative questioning, of questioning until the legitimacy 
of the question is itself at stake.  This, I would suggest, is the strongest argument for the 
need to do philosophy in schools.  For such questioning puts us on a path toward the 
critical ideal while simultaneously addressing the paradox of criticality. 
                                                 
8 I might note that Vansieleghem comes to an ostensibly similar conclusion – that didactic 
philosophy ought to be most valued as a space.  Vansieleghem’s space, however, is devoted to cognitive 
natality, to the creation of new thought, whereas the space I describe facilitates evaluation of critical 
boundaries.  Clearly, there is a close connection between the two, one that mirrors the relation between 
critical thought and creative thought.  However, I would suggest that the two maintain an integrity 
independent of the other.  That is, one can do one without engaging the other. 
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